

**THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY DOCTRINE
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND : MILITARY-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS**

Following the June 1990 declaration on state sovereignty, on 27 August 1991 the Republic of Moldova (RM) proclaimed independence and, by September, President Mircea Snegur had already signed the decree that was to lead to the establishment of national armed forces. In addition to the National Army (Armata Națională) which is charged with ensuring the military security of the Republic, there are also the Frontier Troops (Trupele de grăniceri) of the Ministry of National Security and the Interior Ministry's lightly-armed Carabineer Forces (Trupele de carabinieri) for the maintenance of public order. 1992 witnessed the establishment of the Ministry of Defence, the appointment of the first Moldovan defence minister, Major-General Ion Costa, as well as the passing of the laws "On the Military Duty and Military Service of the Citizens of the RM" and "On Defence." The same year also saw the outbreak of a full-scale, local civil war with Transnistrian separatists strongly supported by elements of Russia's highly politicised 14th Army, which provided a traumatic baptism by fire for the nascent armed forces of the Republic (some 500 people were killed, many more wounded, while refugees perhaps numbered 100,000)

Moldovans and Romanians have always spoken of "Moldova," while in the West we have usually called the territory by its Russian name "Moldavia." "Dneestr" (or variants "Dniester", "Dniestr") is the Russian designation for the river the Moldovans and Romanians know as the "Nistru." From the

Moldovan/Romanian standpoint the region to the east across the Nistru is, of course, "Transnistria", which is known, however, in Russian as pridnestrov'ye, or "the land on the Dneestr." In this paper we generally refer to the self-styled, breakaway Transnistrian Moldovan Republic by its Russian

initials, PMR (pridnestrovskaya moldavskaya respublika).

Since late July 1992 the Moldovan Army has been deployed on peacekeeping duties highly significantly - on the territory of the RM itself. Having failed to secure any UN (or indeed any CIS) involvement in a peacekeeping role, President Snegur was finally constrained by Moscow to accept what was essentially a

Russian peacekeeping force. The Yel'tsin-Snegur agreement of 21 July 1992 provided for a cease-fire, the creation of a security zone on both sides of the Nistru river and the deployment of a joint Russian/Moldovan/PMR peacekeeping force

under the day-to-day supervision of a trilateral Joint Control Commission.

Originally, the peacekeeping forces comprised six Russian battalions (3600 men), 3 Moldovan battalions (1200 men), and 3 PMR battalions (1200 men).

Lacking a distinctive national military tradition, Moldova was nonetheless able to celebrate its first "Army Day" on 3 September 1993. According to the then defence minister, General of Division Pavel Creanga, all units were manned and ready to receive their standards by this time.

On 16 March 1994, Moldova became the twelfth state (and fourth former Soviet republic) to enrol in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. (The PMR leadership deplored the fact that Tiraspol had not been consulted.) At the signing ceremony in Brussels, President Snegur highlighted his country's policy of neutrality, pointing out that Moldova did not belong to the military structures of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and elected - unlike most of the earlier signatories - not to raise the possibility of eventual NATO membership. Snegur also said, however, that Moldova's participation in the PfP programme would help to strengthen the territorial integrity, political independence and national security of his country; moreover, the main obstacle to a settlement of the conflict between Moldova and Transnistria was the presence of Russia's 14th Army on Moldovan territory.

The Moldovan Parliament adopted a new constitution on 28 July 1994 which proclaims Moldova a neutral, sovereign, independent and indivisible state, with equal rights for all minorities. Article 11, in particular, stipulates that "The Republic of Moldova declares its permanent neutrality [and] does not admit the stationing of foreign military units on its territory". The provisions of Article 11 are reiterated in the foreign policy concept adopted by parliament in February 1995:

"The Republic of Moldova is pursuing a policy of permanent neutrality, having undertaken not to participate in armed conflicts, in political, military or economic alliances having the aim of preparing for war, not to utilize its territory for the stationing of foreign military bases, and not to possess nuclear weapons, nor to manufacture or test them." On 5 May 1995 parliament adopted a national security concept which yet again emphasized that "Moldova is a demilitarized state and it will not permit the deployment of foreign troops or military bases on its territory and maintains relations of friendship and partnership with all countries." On 6 June 1995 parliament adopted the military doctrine of the RM. A summary of the doctrine together with analysis and comment is offered below.

On 15 March 1996, President Snegur, in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, issued a decree removing Defence Minister Creanga from his post after accusing him of incompetence in combatting the theft of army property and wasting money. There followed a period of acute political crisis when parliament described the defence minister's dismissal as unconstitutional and the Constitutional Court ruled against the presidential decree. Despite the appeal by an overwhelming majority of army officers from the MOD staff and Chi n u garrison urging that Creanga "cannot further head the Defence Ministry", the former defence minister was reinstated in his post, though he said he intended

soon to resign. Civil-military relations continued to fester throughout 1996 with Snegur threatening to take "direct control of the army" and accusing Creanga of "mutiny," while the recently reinstated defence minister protested in an open letter in a government newspaper that he was the victim of a smear campaign because of his refusal to allow the army to be dragged into politics. The Creanga affair pointed alarmingly to the fragility of the machinery for effective political control of the armed forces and threw into relief the power struggle between the head of state and the prime minister in the run-up to the presidential elections of November 1996.

In the Summer of 1996 Moldovan troops participated for the first time in PfP manoeuvres "Shield of Peace '96" (in Ukraine) in June and "Cooperative Determination '96" (in Bulgaria) in July - albeit merely in platoon strength. The

Moldovan PfP liaison officer had already taken up his duties in September 1994, but on financial grounds Moldova had hitherto taken part in PIP exercises merely in an observer capacity. In May 1997 PfP exercises were held for the first time in Moldova. Moldovan and US Army medical troops participated in a joint exercise (held on B I i training area and M rcule ti air base) on the conduct of rescue and evacuation operations following a natural disaster. Always ready to acknowledge the positive benefits of PfP for military training and military cooperation, civil emergency planning, and so forth, Moldovan leaders have nonetheless made a point of emphasizing that the Republic's participation in the NATO programme is not at variance with its policy of permanent neutrality. (The Moldovan leadership has also consistently made it equally clear that Moldova's neutral status excludes any kind of participation in CIS military structures.)

Petru Lucinsehi was elected President of Moldova in the second round of voting in the presidential election on 1 December 1996, and secured 54.07% of the vote. (His opponent, the incumbent President Snegur, gained 45.93%). A former senior Soviet apparatchik, Moldovan Ambassador in Moscow, and since January 1993 Moldovan Parliamentary speaker, Lucinschi is a highly experienced and very skilful politician, a champion of compromise, consensus and consolidation, who has sought to establish a government of national unity. According to Lucinsehi, the appointment (in January 1997) of a civilian, Valeriu Pasat, as defence minister is dictated by Moldova's neutral status; however, he observed, the transition period to a civilian command of the army will be difficult and may last several years; Lucinsehi promised to set up a Commission to study military reform.

At the first sitting (on 7 April 1997) of the State Commission for the Elaboration of a Draft Reform of the Armed Forces, chaired by President Lucinsehi and attended by representatives from the power ministries, the supreme commander-in-chief of the national armed forces stated that Moldova's armed forces should correspond to the country's neutral status; at present they resemble a prototype of the former Soviet Red Army. It was necessary to devise a reform concept taking into account the experience of other neutral states - Austria, Switzerland, Slovenia and

Slovakia. What, precisely, the implementation of such a concept might amount to in practice remains as yet unclear, but what is certain is that cuts, downsizing, and a "job combination" approach are now firmly on the agenda. In a speech outlining the new government's priorities, Prime Minister Ion Ciubuc observed that the country's defence capability would not suffer if we unified several power-wielding ministries." There have already been cuts in the apparatus at the Defence Ministry in Chi in u, and at a press conference held to assess the results of his first six months in office President Lucinsehi stated that "the new reform concept for the power ministries presupposes, in particular, a gradual reduction in the strength of the National Army."

VALERIU PASAT

Moldova's first civilian minister of defence was born in 1958 in the village of Scumpia in F le ti district. He studied history at the Moldovan State University in Chi in u and attended the Diplomatic Academy in Moscow. He holds a doctorate in history. From 1988-1992 he was head of the Chi in u Communist Party ideology department. From 1992 he worked in the Moldovan Embassy in Moscow, latterly as Ambassador. He is the author of a book, Tragic Pages In Moldovan History, about the postwar deportations from Moldova.

In the 1997 budget parliament allocated the national army 70m. lei (almost 15m dollars), of which 5m lei are for the Moldovan peacekeeping forces deployed in the security zone. This represents a 10% cut in army funds as compared with 1996. (The Interior Ministry was allocated 85m. lei, the National Security Ministry 45m, and the Civil Protection and Emergency Department 15m.) Over the last five years Moldova has sold property inherited from the former Soviet Army worth 264m. lei (almost 60m. dollars). The four MiG-29 fighter aircraft sold during the summer of 1994 to South Yemen were part of the inventory. Prime Minister Ion Ciubuc announced plans to sell military property and use the proceeds for social

programmes, including the payment of arrears in pensions and salaries. The armed forces will undergo reorganization and "Moldovan security will hardly be affected." In November 1997 the Pentagon announced that the United States had bought 21 MiG-29 fighters from Moldova, in order to derail a possible deal with Iran. Pasat said his ministry "had to sell the planes, since the maintenance of one aircraft cost the budget 500,000 dollars per year". The Moldovan Armed Forces would buy helicopters to replace the fighters, he added.

Moldova has never regarded NATO enlargement in any way as a threat to its security, and has always insisted that enlargement should not take place to the detriment of Russia, or without taking Russia's interests into account when admitting new members. Indeed, the importance of a special relationship between NATO and Russia, and between NATO and Ukraine, has been underscored. NATO enlargement "should not fan tensions or draw new dividing lines in Europe," but "lead to a strengthening of security in Europe" and to the consolidation of stability and security on the continent." Moreover, "an expanding NATO must provide security guarantees to neutral countries such as Moldova." "If Ukraine and Romania become NATO members, Moldova will not hinder" their membership.

In recent months Moldova has intensified its efforts in the field of military cooperation with neighbouring states. On his first official visit abroad in Bucharest, Defence Minister Valeriu Pasat and his Romanian counterpart Victor Babiuc discussed the possibility of closer cooperation, particularly with regard to military education, conducting joint exercises, and establishing a joint peacekeeping battalion. 22 officers from Moldova were granted places at the Romanian Academy of Advanced Military Studies for autumn 1997. Moldova has also recently reached an agreement with Kyiv on training Moldovan officers in Ukrainian military educational establishments and Moldovan (former) Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Vladimir Don ul, highlighted the good prospects for Moldovan-Ukrainian technical cooperation with regard to the repair of equipment. In Moscow in late July 1997, defence ministers Pasat and Sergeyev signed military and technical cooperation accords which the Russian minister described as

~important... mutually advantageous documents for both sides." As well as approving documents on the training of Moldovan personnel and the repair of Moldovan equipment in Russia, both parties also agreed to hold joint military exercises in the near future. PMR political parties and public movements have voiced their concern at such a prospect, which was confirmed by Lieutenant-General Valeriy Yevnevich, commander-in-chief of the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Transnistria, though he was careful to note that there are no plans for elements of his Group to participate in such exercises. Pasat and Hungarian Defence Minister Keleti signed an agreement on military cooperation in November 1997.

THE NATIONAL ARMY: ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

The army is only 11,000 strong. This represents just over one quarter of one per cent of the Republic's population - a figure which is certainly on the low side when compared with most other former Soviet republics or, for that matter, with most countries worldwide. The national army is organised into six brigades: three motorized infantry brigades, an artillery brigade, one air-defence brigade and one brigade of mixed aviation. It has no tanks. The manoeuvre brigades are equipped with a mixture of BTR, BMD and Romanian TAB-7 I armoured combat vehicles. Artillery equipment includes the O-20 and 2A36 (152mm) towed guns, the M-30 (122mm) towed howitzer, the 2S9 (120mm) self-propelled combination gun, M-120 mortars, and the Uragan" (220mm) 16-barrelled multiple rocket launcher. The mixed aviation brigade is equipped the remaining 6 MiG-29 "Fulcrum' fighter aircraft (to be sold after their overhaul in Belarus is completed) and the Mi-8 "Hip" helicopter.

MOLDOVAN NATIONAL ARMY

1 Motorized Infantry Brigade (B I i)

Men: 1,470

APCs: 2 BTR-6OPB; 5 BTR-80; 69 TAB-71

Artillery: 17 M-30; 18 M-120

Vehicles: 14 BMP/BTR look-alikes/miscellaneous
armoured command and control vehicles

2 Motorized Infantry Brigade (Chi n u)

Men: 1,556

APOs: 36 BMD-1; 11 BTR~D

Artillery: 18 D-20; 24 M-120

Vehicles: 49 BMP/BTR look-alikes/misc

3 Motorized Infantry Brigade (Cahul)

Men: 1,476

APCs: 2 BTR-80; 58 TAB-71

Artillery: 13 D-20; 18 M-120

Vehicles: 48 BMP/BTR look-alikes/misc

Artillery Brigade (Ungheni)

Men: 983

Artillery: 18 x 2A36; 14 x 9P140 Uragan

Vehicles: 19 BMP/BTR look-alikes/misc

Mixed Aviation Brigade (M rcule ti)

Men: 845

Aircraft: 3 Mi~8

Air Defence Brigade (Chi in u)

Men: 1073

Total holdings

Men: 11,063

Tanks: Nil

APCs: 209 (54 BMD-1; 2 BTR-6OPB;

11 BTR-80; 11 BTR.-D; 131 TAB-71)

Artillery: 154 (21 x 2A36; 32 D-20; 17 M-30;

9 x 289; 15 x 9P140 "Uregan"; 60 M-120

Moldova has a largely conscript army. Twice yearly young men of 18 are drafted to serve for 18 months, though there are plans to reduce this period to one year. The possibility of alternative service for conscientious objectors existed for a while, but has recently been dropped as a good idea, so officers say, that it was not possible to put into practice. However, Moldova has relatively few problems with the draft, and fewer still with desertion. Conscripts turn up for duty, according to Moldovan officers, because a rural youth whose horizons are bounded by village life regards the army as providing an environment in which he can escape from his hamlet, see the world (to some extent at least), and become a man. Most conscript soldiers are country folk who tend to look up to their officers (who typically stem from the urban educated class) and are happy to serve their country: discipline is seldom a problem. It is, of course, equally true, as Moldovan officers occasionally lament, that a peasant conscript soldiery is far from ideal for manning a modern army which relies on sophisticated technical equipment for its combat effectiveness. "The national armed forces are a purely peasant army, as only village boys serve in it," an officer said recently; "under every possible pretext military service is shunned by the sons of parliamentarians, ministers, directors of industry, and other leaders." However, largely on financial grounds, there are at present no concrete plans for an early shift to an all professional army, although the number of contract servicemen is slowly increasing with time.

Moldovan officers have generally fared rather better than many of their former Soviet counterparts with regard to the problems of pay, housing and welfare that have plagued other post-Soviet military establishments; nor have they suffered any

traumatic loss of prestige, for Moldovan society, generally speaking, clearly acknowledges the importance of the profession of arms. 90% of officers and specialist warrant officers possess a quarter, pay compares fairly well with the civilian sector, and the Defence Ministry has plainly made a determined effort to solve social problems at the same time as trying to improve the quality of training. The provision of officer education has been a serious problem for the developing army as there were no military schools of any kind in Moldova prior to independence. A disproportionately large number of Moldovan officers study abroad, in Romania, USA, France, Greece, Germany and UK. However, since 1995 officers have been trained at the Alexandru cel Bun Military College in Chi in u - there are also military schools in Rezina and Cahul - and from 1997 the majority of officers commissioned into the Moldovan army will be graduates of that college.

THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

SUMMARY, COMMENT AND CONCLUSION

(Comment within the main body of the summary is enclosed within square brackets)

The text of Moldova's military doctrine - on a first reading at least - comes over quite strongly as a Russian military document. in the Russian language version, much of the military lexis and stereotyped phraseology - unsurprisingly - is redolent of Russia's 1993 military doctrine: indeed, whole clauses are frequently reproduced in pre-packaged form, word for word, in the Moldovan text.

Moreover, even a casual scrutiny of the two documents reveals a basic, bipartite structural similarity - the fundamental distinction between political determinants of doctrine, on the one hand, and military, or military-technical, or military-organizational determinants of doctrine, on the other - that is common to both.

Another feature that the military doctrines of both states share in common is that, once approved by legislation, military doctrine has the force of law, and also provides the ultimate foundation upon which the organization and development

of the armed forces (manning, force-structure, planning, procurement, training, tactics, etc) is based. When the Moldovan parliament adopted the military doctrine at the second reading on 6 June 1995, the then parliamentary speaker, Petru Lucinschi, pointed out that the document confirmed the republic's determination to conduct a policy of neutrality. The Military Doctrine of the RM is, in fact, (as we shall see) a very positive document that has clearly been formulated (as it claims) on the basis of foreign and domestic policy considerations in addition to the obvious military input - and that despite the impression that it sometimes gives of being a throwback to an earlier period.

SUMMARY OF MILITARY DOCTRINE

General Provisions

The military doctrine of the RM is determined by foreign and domestic policy, by the constitutional declaration of permanent neutrality, has an exclusively defensive character, and is based on the following priorities:

in the political domain - the peaceful settlement of interstate contradictions and the inadmissibility of military confrontation by means of the collective efforts of countries, which are determined by the principles and norms of international law; the establishment of political, economic and military relations which exclude, however, any encroachment on the sovereignty or independence of the state; in the military domain - the maintenance of the defensive capability of the state at a level which guarantees its military security; the strengthening of confidence-building measures, the broadening of mutually beneficial military cooperation based on principles which respect sovereignty, independence, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

The provisions of military doctrine form the basis for the coordination of the measures undertaken by public authority bodies to ensure military security.

The Military-Political Aspect

The main aim of the military policy of the RM is to ensure the military security of the people and of the state, to prevent wars and armed conflicts by means of

international law.

To achieve this aim the RM envisages a system of measures which include:
at the global level - participation in the work of the international community to prevent wars and to settle disputes by peaceful means; the creation of conditions that will ensure the realization of the right of the republic to assistance from international organizations in the event of an external military threat; active participation in the construction of a single international system of collective security;

[In April/May 1992 Moldova sought - unsuccessfully - to "internationalize" the Transnistrian conflict by making a series of appeals to the UN, the then CSCE, the CIS, and indeed to "The Parliaments and the Peoples of the World," in hopes of securing the involvement of an international peacekeeping force. It is in this context that the reference to "creating conditions that will ensure the right of the republic to assistance from international organizations" is best understood.]

at the regional level - the establishment of close, friendly relations with states in the region on a bilateral and multilateral basis, ensuring a high level of mutual trust and transparency in the military sphere, and also mutual assistance in the event of a threat to collective security;

at the national level - the creation of a military potential that is sufficient to ensure the military security of the state.

In implementing its military-political policy the RM:

does not accept war (except in cases of self-defence) as a means of achieving political ends;

is pursuing a peaceful foreign policy;

is ensuring its own military security without prejudice to the security of other states, or to security generally;

does not permit the use of its territory for aggressive actions against other countries, or for the stationing of troops of foreign states, with the exception of those cases which are envisaged in international agreements regarding the deployment of peacekeeping contingents.

[On 21 October 1994 Russia and Moldova signed an agreement on the withdrawal

of 14th Army from Moldova over a period of three years after the document's ratification. When Russia was admitted to the Council of Europe in January 1996, it undertook to ratify within six months the army withdrawal agreement. Thus far, however, the Duma has signally failed to do so. Moreover from 1994 onwards Russia sought to make its de facto military base in Transnistria de jure - a move that Moldova has so far been able firmly to resist.]

The RM considers as partners with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security all states and international organizations whose policy does not prejudice its interests and is not at variance with the United Nations Charter.

It follows from this that the RM:

adheres to the principles of the inviolability of state frontiers and the peaceful settlement of international disputes;

does not regard any state as its enemy;

[the last two points are taken verbatim from Russian military doctrine 1993]

makes no territorial claims against other states, and does not admit any territorial claims against itself;

[The territory of the RM is not coextensive with the historic Moldovan lands which are fragmented at the present time. As a result of the 1940 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (which allowed the Soviet Union to annex the eastern half of the Komaman provmce of Moldova) and of Stalin's postwar "divide and rule" nationalities policy (which, inter alia, detached present-day Transnistria from Ukraine and added it to the annexed territory), Moldova is today, potentially at least, an object of foreign (ie Romanian and Ukrainian) irredentism.]

does not permit its own army to be employed to fulfil political tasks in the interests of individual functionaries, parties, public organizations and movements;

will not be the first to initiate hostilities.

At the same time the RM must take account of the existing potential sources of military threat to its sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

Political sources of military threat include:

territorial claims made by other states;

attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the republic, to destabilize the

internal political situation;

the presence of foreign troops on the territory of the republic;

[It was in significant part the presence in Moldova of Russias highly politicized 14th Army that destabilized the internal political situation and led to civil war.]

the activity of separatist organizations employing armed violence directed against the territorial integrity of the republic;

the creation of illegal armed formations;

[Problems of territorial separatism plagued Moldova even before it became an independent state. Gagauzia approved a "Declaration on the Freedom and Independence of the Gagauz people from the Republic of Moldova" in August 1990, while Transnistria declared its secession from Moldova in September 1990. Both separatist 'republics' established armed formations. In the former case, the 600-strong Bugeac battalion of irregulars (who were supported militarily and politically by the Transnistrian separatists) was eventually disbanded after Moldova accorded a "special juridical status" to Ga~auz Yeri (the Gagauz Land) in 1995, when the paramilitaries were incorporated into a specially created unit of the Carabineer Forces. The "illegal armed formations" of the so-called PMR, as Moldova refers to them, are a powerful force indeed whose strength has been assessed as 8,000 (excluding reserves); they plainly have de facto capability and represent an important attribute of the quasi-statehood that resides within the PMR.]

With regard to what has been stated, the RM will take advantage of its inalienable right to self-defence and will ensure its military security by all the means at its disposal, and in this connection considers as lawful and necessary the possession of armed forces to defend its sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and other vital interests in the event that aggression be perpetrated against it, or in the event of any kind of illegal armed violence within the frontiers of the republic which could threaten its state system.

The state provides the legal basis for military security and the machinery for formulating military policy; it will enhance the prestige of military service and provide for the social protection of servicemen.

The only kinds of military activity, technology and armaments that are acceptable

are those which do not harm the ecological balance. Moldova will not produce, store or obtain weapons of mass destruction, and will not permit the deployment, transport or storage on her territory of weapons of mass destruction belonging to other states.

The President of the PM, parliament and the government bear the responsibility for ensuring the military security of the state and the perfection and development of its armed forces.

The Military-Organizational Aspect

The RM is carrying out military development and creating a military infrastructure to the extent necessary to ensure the military security of the state.

The armed forces consist of the National Army, Frontier Troops and Carabineer Troops, for ensuring military security, guarding the borders, and maintaining public order.

The President of the RM, Parliament, and the Government have overall command of the armed forces; the individual ministries are responsible for the centralized public administration of these military units and institutions which function within their structures; the Main Staff of the National Army and the Departments of Frontier Troops and Carabineer Troops exercise military command.

In peacetime, the Main Staff of the National Army works out the operational and mobilization plans for the armed forces and organizes their training for the defence of the state. But at a time of military threat, or in wartime, it is reorganized as the Main Staff of the Armed Forces attached to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces - the President of the PM, and commands all military units in the conduct of the defence of the country.

Principles for the development of the armed forces include:

democratic control over the defence sphere and the subordination of the organs of military command to the higher bodies of the civil power;

[The 1996 Creanga affair revealed the fragility of the institutional arrangements for the political direction of the armed forces - at one stage there were two defence

ministers acting simultaneously. However, Moldova managed to weather the crisis, which shows that the republic has taken some significant steps along the path which leads to the organization of defence in a democracy.]

the observance of the civil rights and freedoms of servicemen, and their social protection;

centralized military leadership and unity of command on a legal basis;

the establishment of troop strength and structures which accord with their missions and with the economic situation, as well as also conforming to legislation and to Moldovas international commitments;

the creation of a high level of professionalism;

priority material and financial provision for combat and technical subunits;

a mixed system of manning - conscription and contract service, with a gradual transition - over the long-term - to full manning on contract;

the complete "departyization" (Russian: departizatsiya) of the armed forces.

Financial provision for the armed forces comes exclusively from the state budget.

Arms and equipment will generally be procured abroad, though in cases which are justified from the economic point-of-view they will be manufactured in the republic.

The training system for military personnel is a constituent part of the state educational system and provides for the training of military personnel in military educational establishments both in Moldova and abroad.

The basis of the republic's military potential is the National Army which consists of regular forces and a trained reserve. Their combined deployment ensures the rapid mobilization and effective utilization of the personnel and economic resources of the republic for containing and rebuffing all forms of aggression, for localizing and liquidating armed conflicts in conjunction with the Frontier Troops and Carabineer Troops, and also for the elimination of other military threats.

In the event of aggression against the RM, the tasks of the National Army will be to repulse the enemy, to inflict the maximum possible destruction upon the aggressor, to prevent him from penetrating into the depth of the country, and to create conditions for the cessation of hostilities at the earliest possible stage and

for the restoration of peace on terms that are favourable to Moldova's interests.

Separate units and subunits of the National Army can be used to help the Frontier Troops and the Carabineer Troops in guarding the state border, in protecting the population from armed violence, in localizing and isolating areas of possible conflict, and in guarding and defending important sites; they can also be used to help Civil Protection forces to eliminate the consequences of accidents, catastrophes, and natural disasters, in accordance with the law.

[The Department for Civil Protection and Emergency Situations is part of the defence ministry, comprises two emergency-rescue battalions, and has a strength of 800 men.]

The local character of potential hostilities makes it unlikely that nuclear weapons will be used against the republic. Aggression against the RM with conventional weapons will be repulsed by means of defensive operations by the National Army in conjunction with the simultaneous introduction of territorial defence in parts of the republic, or over the whole of its territory.

[There are plans to establish a territorial defence force of some 300 men for each raion to protect key points.]

Defence is the main kind of military activity undertaken by the National Army, conducted by regular troops and units of territorial defence in the form of a defensive operation, in which special attention is paid to mobile defence.

At the same time formations and units of the National Army must also be prepared to conduct offensive combat operations in the context of a defensive operation.

[The emphasis placed on mobile defence and on the conduct of offensive combat operations in the context of a defensive operation is very Russian.]

Overall command of the National Army is exercised by the President of the RM. Direct command of the National Army is exercised by the minister of defence (as a rule, a civilian).

Operational command of the National Army is exercised by the Main Staff of the National Army. In the event that a civilian is appointed minister of defence, the Chief of the Main Staff is at the same time the Commander of the National Army. The military doctrine will be supplemented, amplified and perfected in the light of

the continuing establishment of Moldovan statehood, or in the event of the adoption of a new system of international relations.

The concept for the development of the armed forces, as well as legislation on military matters, is worked out on the basis of military doctrine.

ENDNOTES