

**Conflict Studies Research Centre**  
RUSSIA'S 1999 DRAFT MILITARY DOCTRINE  
C J Dick  
Nov 1999

**Disclaimer**  
The views expressed are those of the  
Author and not necessarily those of the  
UK Ministry of Defence

*A version of this article will be appearing in **Jane's Intelligence Review**.*

## **INTRODUCTION: THE STATUS OF THE NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE**

"Military doctrine represents a systematized aggregate of fundamental official views," [ie, of all the power ministries and not just the MoD] "concentrated in a single document, on preventing wars and armed conflicts, on their nature and methods of waging them, and on the organization of the activities of the state, society and citizens to ensure the military security of the Russian Federation (RF) and its allies... The provisions of military doctrine...are mandatory for all bodies of executive authority." Thus, the provisions of doctrine, which have the force of law, provide a rudder to guide the armed forces and other [ie, non-MoD] troops and other state bodies in preparing for and executing tasks in defence of the state and its interests. In the Russian view, circumstances have changed, generally for the worse, since the promulgation of the last military doctrine in 1993. It has therefore become necessary to alter course somewhat. However, much of the earlier document apparently still has validity as the current one "elaborates on the 1993...military doctrine and, as applied to the military sphere, concretises the guidelines of the [1997] national security concept." For a full understanding of Russian thinking on security issues, the three documents need to be studied together.

Like its predecessor, the new doctrine "is a document of the transition period, the period of the establishment of democratic statehood and of a multi-structured economy, of the re-organization of the Russian military and of a dynamic transformation of the system of international relations." In other words, it will require (probably drastic) revision if economic, social and political decline continues (transition is a protracted business in Russia) and if the international situation develops further along lines perceived to be inimical to RF interests.

The new doctrine "is strictly defensive...with firm resolve to defend national interests and guarantee the military security of the RF and its allies." It is probably not significant in itself for an understanding of Russian attitudes to the wider world that the document concentrates on threats and counters to them. It is, after all, a military doctrine; the national security concept deals with the broader issues and responses. It may, however, be significant that nowhere is the meaning of the term "ally" made clear; is an ally necessarily defined by a treaty relationship or could it merely be a state which Russia regards as a friend?

## **MILITARY-POLITICAL PRINCIPLES**

This section begins with a general survey of the world military-political situation. There are two, contradictory tendencies in the world today: a trend towards a unipolar world dominated by one superpower and "military force resolution of key problems"; and a trend towards a multipolar world based on the equal rights of people and nations, on consideration for the national interests of states and on the rule of international law.

Specific features of the situation include:

- a diminished threat of world war, including a nuclear war;
- the development of machinery for maintaining global and regional peace and security;
- the formation and strengthening of regional power centres;
- the strengthening of ethno-national and religious extremism;
- separatism;
- the escalation of local wars and armed conflicts;
- increased regional arms races;
- proliferation of nuclear and other WMDs and of their delivery means;
- intensification of information warfare (Russ: protivoborstva);
- growth in the scale and intensity of transnational organized crime, terrorism and illegal arms and narcotics trades.

Several factors are contributing to the destabilization of the military-political situation:

- support for extremist, ethno-national and religious separatists and terrorist movements;
- the use of information warfare and other non-traditional means for achieving destructive military-political goals;
- the diminished effectiveness of existing machinery for ensuring international security, especially the UN and the OSCE;
- the practice of using military force, circumventing generally recognized principles of international law, without UN Security Council sanction;
- violation of international treaties and agreements on arms limitation and disarmament.

Russia and her allies are said to face potential (including large scale) threats to their military security. Moreover, these are growing with time.

· External threats include:

- territorial claims on the RF;
- intervention in RF internal affairs;
- attempts to ignore or infringe on RF interests in resolving international security problems and opposition to Russia being an influential centre of a multipolar world;
- centres of armed conflicts, especially near the borders of the RF and its allies;
- the creation/build-up of force groupings near the borders of the RF and its allies, disturbing the existing balance of forces;
- the expansion of military blocs/alliances to the detriment of Russia's military security;
- the creation/support of armed groups on the territory of other states with the intention of deploying them on the territory of Russia and its allies;
- attacks on Russian military installations located abroad or on its and allies' borders;
- attempts to undermine regional and global stability, including efforts to degrade Russia's C2 systems and the efficiency of her nuclear and space forces;
- information warfare directed against the RF and its allies;
- discrimination against and suppression of the rights of Russian citizens abroad;
- international terrorism.

- Internal threats include:
  - attempts violently to overthrow the constitutional system;
  - activities of extremist ethno-national, religious, separatist and terrorist movements to disrupt the unity and territorial integrity of the state and destabilize the RF;
  - the creation of unlawful armed units and the proliferation of illegal weapons, etc, for terrorist and sabotage actions;
  - organized crime, terrorism, smuggling on a scale threatening military security.

This mostly gloomy assessment of the situation reflects the official Russian view that the country's position has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War and the publication of the 1993 military doctrine. Actually, the earlier version contained a similar list of problems, but distinguished between "dangers" and "threats": the former were conditions in which the possibility of war is inherent and the latter were conditions of immediate threat of war, brought about when aggressive political intentions are backed by appropriate military capabilities or the attempt to create them. The litany of dangers and threats was prefaced, in 1993, by an acknowledgement that ideological confrontation was waning, armaments were being cut back, political, legal and economic actions were being taken to reduce the risk of war and cooperation was gaining ground. Although far from certain, it is possible that the 1999 doctrine's omission of the distinction between dangers and threats and the positive prefatory comment reflects a Russian perception that NATO and some other states harbour hostile intentions towards the RF.

Looked at from a Russian point of view, and remembering to add traditional Russian paranoia and a reluctance to accept that greatly diminished military, economic and political/ideological weight must inevitably result in a loss of influence, it is easy to see why Russia is concerned about current trends.

- The military balance has moved decisively against Russia. NATO has expanded eastwards, despite Moscow's objections, and enlargement seems set to continue, perhaps even into FSU territory. In the Russian view, this is in contravention of an understanding (they maintain, a promise) made by western governments that this would not happen if the Soviet groups of forces were withdrawn from Eastern Europe. Moreover, the US, and to a lesser extent some other NATO, armed forces are modernizing to create qualitatively new militaries. In her economic plight, Russia cannot exploit in the same way the current revolution in military affairs and thus faces continued relegation to the status of a second rate military power.
- The West is unwilling to accept that subsequent developments have rendered the CFE treaty unequal, to the detriment of Russia. Moreover, the USA seems set on abrogating the ABM treaty and destabilizing the nuclear balance; (the Senate has also refused to continue the nuclear test ban treaty).
- Russia does see itself as being under threatened or actual information attack, if not to the same extent as her friend, Serbia. Western reactions to the "anti-terrorist" operation in Chechnya is but the most important case in point.
- RF interests in solving international security problems are certainly ignored, or treated as being of only marginal significance by the West, and the USA appears to work through and with the UN and OSCE only when it suits it (witness its policies towards Iraq and former Yugoslavia).
- Most internal threats described are already extant, most obviously in the North Caucasus (and especially in Chechnya). Unofficial extremist groups and even governments are believed, not without some reason, to be fishing in these troubled waters.

- There is a real possibility of the revival/start of armed conflicts in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, Russia's vital backyard. Here again, outside meddling is feared.

These developments, particularly in the context of the last two, are deeply disturbing to Russians because the USA and NATO have, in their eyes, unilaterally torn up the international rule book. It is a fundamental principle of the UN Charter and international law that there should be no outside interference in the internal affairs of states save when interventions are sanctioned by the UN Security Council. In its attack on Serbia in the spring of 1999, NATO drove a coach and horses through this principle. In effect, the western powers now seem to maintain that law takes second place to morality and that when they decide, regardless of the opinions of others, that their concepts of justice demand it, it is permissible to make war on a state to impose their will. Where will NATO next choose to exercise its self-appointed role as combined judge, jury, policeman and executioner? Perhaps Javier Solana, then NATO's secretary-general, gave the answer when he used an alliance symposium in September 1998 to describe the Caucasus, as well as the Balkans, as a troubled region from which NATO "cannot remain aloof." He went on to add: "We are not condemned to be the victim of events that lie beyond our control – we can shape the future." To most Russians, such actions and words seem to be proof of hegemonistic ambitions to the detriment of their interests.

Already in Russia, there is an impression that the West, fearing a Russian revival, is trying to keep the country down. Western alleged misdeeds include: attempting to force inappropriate reform medicine down Russia's throat while failing to give real help to the ailing economy; stealing Russia's markets, including blocking the sale of arms and nuclear technology; endeavouring to turn Russia into an economic colony, a provider of cheap raw materials and a market for dumping; inciting Ukraine and other CIS states against Russia; trying to limit Russian influence in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia with a view to controlling energy sources and transit routes; encouraging Balts and others to repress Russian minorities; establishing military and political hegemony through the expansion of NATO and the crushing of such Russian friends as Iraq and Serbia; perhaps even encouraging the disintegration of the Russian state (hence the increasingly vociferous condemnation of anti-terrorist actions in Chechnya).

The anti-US/NATO tone of the new military doctrine is not really surprising, given the generally backward-looking, soviet mind-set of the Russian military. It is, however, superficial to dismiss it as an evocation of a threat as a justification by the military and the MIC (military-industrial complex) for increased defence spending. It is important to bear in mind that it will strike a chord with most ordinary Russians. Westerners will probably dismiss such Russian grievances as cited above as mere scapegoating and such fears as groundless. This does not make them any less real to Russians. Many will accept the contrast between a West trying to create a unipolar world dominated by the USA and all too ready to use force to get its way and a Russia trying to build a multipolar world based on the equal rights of nations, on consideration for national interests and on international law – the only true basis "for social progress, stability and international security."

There is, in Russian eyes, a stark contrast between the West's behaviour and Russia's stated approach to ensuring military security. The latter, as outlined in the new military doctrine, includes the following provisions:

- Russia proceeds from the immutability of the system of generally recognized principles and rules of international law and will do nothing detrimental to international security or

the security of other states;

- Russia will not be the first to initiate military operations against any state or coalition;
- The RF retains nuclear weapons to deter attack on itself or its allies and will retain other forces of a suitable strength and readiness to achieve the same end;
- Russia gives priority to developing and strengthening CIS collective security;
- Russia considers as partners all states whose policies are not inimical to the RF and do not contradict the UN Charter and she affirms the principles of equitable relations and good-neighbourliness in international relations;
- Russia prefers political, non-military means to prevent, localize or neutralize any threats [though not, apparently, in Chechnya];
- The RF complies with existing arms limitation treaties [an assertion rejected by US analysts as regards CBW weapons], wishes to preserve and strengthen the ABM treaty; and is prepared for further, multi-lateral reduction of nuclear arms to minimal levels consistent with strategic stability. Russia seeks to make the NPT treaty universal, halt tests and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons;
- Russia wants to expand CBMs and achieve military transparency.

Having outlined the threats to the RF and the principles underlining Russia's response, this section of the doctrine goes on to list 28 basic tasks for ensuring military security in both peace and war. There is nothing in this list, which amplifies on the 1993 doctrine but is substantially the same, to which an unbiased observer could take exception, though hostile spin-doctors could (and doubtless will) perceive sinister, proto-soviet overtones.

In dealing with "Leadership in ensuring military security", the new doctrine redefines relationships that were set out in the 1993 version.

- The position of the president as supreme commander is confirmed, but he now "heads" (Russ: vozglavlyayet) all security-related activity instead of exercising "overall leadership" (Russ: obshcheye rukovodstvo).
- The MoD coordinates (Russ: koordiniruyet) activities concerning defence, draws up concepts for the organizational development and conducts procurement for the MoD and other forces. In 1993, the defence minister was described as exercising "direct leadership" (Russ: neposredstvennoye rukovodstvo) of the armed forces.
- The General Staff is, as in 1993, "the basic organ of operational control" responsible for operational planning, readiness, training, mobilization and command and control of the Armed Forces. Now, however, it also fulfills these responsibilities with regard to "other troops".
- Military district (operational-strategic) headquarters exercise operational command and control of inter-branch groupings of the Armed, and other, forces within their established boundaries and within a unified system.

Assuming, given the important nature of the document, that the wording is carefully chosen, what are we to make of these changes? The answer is far from clear to this commentator. Is the president trying to distance himself from any military failures, while leaving open the possibility, as supreme commander, for claiming credit for any successes? The MoD seems to be responsible for policy and the General Staff for the execution. There is, however a struggle for primacy between the two and the General Staff seems to be making progress. The MoD, and even more the General Staff, is gaining in importance vis-à-vis the other power ministries. Given the latter's manifest inability to cope with the internal and border problems besetting Russia, this makes much sense. However, it also represents a considerable political shift away from a fear of the

army towards some reliance on it in internal affairs, and also a recognition that external threats are not a thing of the past. The enhanced, semi-autonomous status of military districts flagged up during military reform is confirmed.

Under the rubric of "State military organization", policy on nuclear weapons' use is defined.

- Nuclear weapons are said to be an effective deterrent against aggression directed at Russia or her allies and a factor in maintaining international stability and peace.
- Nuclear force levels are determined by the need to guarantee infliction of "intended damage" on any aggressor or coalition under any situational conditions (ie, a second strike capability is required).
- "The RF will not employ nuclear weapons against parties to the NPT treaty that do not possess nuclear weapons, except in case of an invasion or any other attack on the RF... [its armed forces], its allies or on a state with which it has a security obligation, carried out or supported by such a state that does not possess nuclear weapons, together with or in the presence of allied obligations with a state possessing nuclear weapons."
- Nuclear weapons can be used in response to large scale conventional as well as WMD attack on Russia or its allies in situations critical to national security.

The meaning of the third sub-paragraph is, to say the least, opaque. It would appear, however, that the new doctrine is restating the 1993 position. Nuclear weapons can be used in defence against other nuclear powers and against non-nuclear aggressors that are allied to nuclear states or support aggression carried out by such states. The reliance on nuclear weapons to deter or defeat aggression is explicit. While not explicitly stated in the doctrine, as it is elsewhere, first use is not ruled out. These provisions are the logical corollary of Russia's conventional military weakness, a situation implicitly acknowledged in the section on "State military organizational development" which amounts to a list of failings that require rectification.

## **MILITARY-STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES – THE NATURE OF WARS AND ARMED CONFLICTS**

Modern war can be classified in three different ways:

- By goals – wars may be just (defensive) or unjust (aggressive);
- By means used – they may be conventional or nuclear (including other kinds of WMD);
- By scale – they may be local, regional or world-wide.
- There is also a sub-war category of armed conflict.

World war can result from escalation of armed conflict, local or regional war. It will be characterized by decisive goals and will thus require total mobilization. There will be a high probability of escalation from conventional to nuclear warfighting, with disastrous consequences for all mankind.

Regional war may result from an expansion of a local war or armed conflict. It will be characterized by most or all of the following features: decisiveness of operational-strategic goals, requiring total strategic deployment of armed forces and the economy; warfare in all spheres; coalition operations; mass use of PGMs, electronic and other new forms of combat; attacks throughout the territory of the opposing sides, including potentially decisive strategic air operations; the constant threat or actual use of nuclear weapons.

In either world or regional war, goals can be achieved, indeed the outcome decided, during the initial period, which will be characterized by an intense struggle for the strategic initiative, efforts to preserve state and military command and control and to achieve information and air superiority.

Local war will be waged by forces within the conflict area, if necessary reinforced from other axes or as a result of partial strategic deployment. Goals will be limited, as therefore will be the forces employed and the geographical scope. The information struggle will be acute.

Armed conflicts can result from border disputes or from attempts to resolve ethno-national or religious and other non-vital contradictions. They may be either internal or international, but either way they will be waged for limited goals and with limited means. They will be characterized by: the high involvement and vulnerability of the local population; the use of irregular units; widespread sabotage and terrorism; blockades and attacks on lines of communication; a complex morale and psychological situation for the troops; the forced diversion of large forces to secure the rear; the danger of escalation into civil or local war.

The features of modern warfare include the following:

- "Wide use of indirect strategic operations" (political-diplomatic, economic sanctions, information warfare, blockades, etc);
- Massive information preparation (information blockade, aggression) and the confusion of public opinion on local and world scales;
- The disorganization /disabling of state and military C2 and fire control systems;
- The use of non-contact and non-traditional methods, long range electronic-fire engagements and employment of the newest weapons (including those based on new physical principles);
- Disastrous consequences of attacks on power stations, especially nuclear, chemical and other dangerous industries, etc;
- A high probability of war spreading and escalating;
- The participation of irregular, including unlawful, forces along with regular ones.

This section, which has no counterpart in the 1993 doctrine, presents some points of interest.

- Inter-state war is seen in black and white terms. An attack on another state is seen simply as aggression, with no mitigating allowance being made for a higher moral purpose such as NATO's desire to protect the Kosovar Albanians from excessive state repression. For Russia, as for China and many other countries, non-interference in the internal affairs of states is still a basic principle of international relations.
- In Soviet times, a world war was defined as an attempt by international capitalism to extirpate the forces of socialism. Perhaps the new military doctrine contains an equally paranoid echo of this thinking, with a world war being seen in the context of an effort to crush or dismember Russia.
- Regional war is not seen as necessarily limited, either in its goals or in the means used to pursue them. Moreover, escalation from such local wars or armed conflicts as those over Nagorno-Karabakh, Kuwait or Kosovo is considered all too possible.
- The old Soviet stress on the potentially decisive nature of the initial period of war (defined as the period of mobilization, concentration and deployment) has been revived. The implications are profound, given that this view leads inevitably to a stress on the

importance of pre-emption. As in 1914, military necessity may limit the time available to politicians and diplomats to achieve a peaceful settlement of disputes.

- Some of the features of modern war hark back to ideas that were developing in the mid eighties as a result of the revolution in military affairs. Others reflect a close study of recent conflicts, particularly the stress on information warfare and the use by aggressors of irregular forces, like the KLA, alongside conventional ones.

There is little that is new, surprising or indeed alarming under the rubrics of "The principles of employing," and "the missions of, the armed forces and other troops." Points to note are as follows.

- The overall tone is defensive.
- The MoD armed forces are explicitly given a central role in localizing and neutralizing internal armed conflicts and restoring law and order. This presumably reflects the incapacity of the Internal Troops to sort out the problems of the North Caucasus on their own, but it is a major departure from the traditional limitation of the armed forces to the external role; in the past, the army has resisted involvement in actions undertaken against Russia's own citizens.
- The armed forces must be equipped, trained and ready for the full range of defence tasks, from nuclear and conventional war of any scale, through peacekeeping to dealing with domestic armed bands and terrorists.

## **MILITARY-ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS**

This section addresses the economic and, to a limited extent, the moral component of Russia's military power.

- The "objective" financial and material needs of the military must be met.
- An independent S&T, technological and productive base must be developed to meet the military's needs, especially for a new generation of armaments. Priorities in this area are: qualitatively upgrading strategic arms; developing C3I and fire control systems; strategic warning; electronic warfare; mobile, precision non-nuclear weapons and their information support; reducing and standardizing the numbers of different weapons and equipments.
- Maintaining the manpower and economic base for mobilization in the event of major conflict continues to figure largely in governmental and military considerations.
- There must be an increase in the level of social support for the military and for servicemen and their families. This must involve improving the latter's standard of living and implementing social guarantees prescribed by legislation.
- The MIC must be restructured and converted without detriment to the development of new technologies and S&T capabilities. It must be guaranteed the necessary financial and logistic resources and skilled cadres must be retained in military production. State support for key MIC enterprises will be necessary (including to create new mobilization capabilities and replenish state reserves). Contractual and competitive principles must be realized in procurement and a system of economic incentives introduced in the development and production of military and dual-purpose products.

The content of this section is all but a re-hash of the 1993 equivalent, which was, in its turn, very Soviet in its approach. There is little new thinking in the field of defence economics, at least within the military and the MIC. For instance, although warfare is becoming increasingly high-tech, the army continues to foresee a possible need for multi-million armed forces and the maintenance of the mass mobilization base is a recurring

theme in the new doctrine as in the old. Russia, in its current economic plight, cannot afford either the direct or the opportunity costs that are implied. Judging by the last decade's continuous and constantly growing volume of complaints about lack of adequate pay, housing, food, fuel and the decline of military prestige, the government cannot even look after its soldiers properly. It has also allowed the MIC to decay in parallel with the army. As the economy and government finances are in even worse shape than they were six years ago, demands for improvements in the serviceman's lot are grounded in pious hope rather than reality, as is talk about reviving the currently moribund MIC.

## **INTERNATIONAL MILITARY AND MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION**

Apart from some vague generalizations about mutual advantage, good neighbourliness and the interests of international stability and security, this section boils down to three aspirations.

- Priority importance is attached to military and military-technical cooperation with CIS countries, based on the need to consolidate efforts to establish a unified defence space and ensure collective military security.
- The RF's military-political position in "various regions of the world" needs strengthening.
- Russia wishes to maintain its conventional arms exports in order to bring in the currency required for state needs, the developing of military production and for structural reorganization of the MIC.

The 1993 doctrine also stressed the importance of making the CIS a meaningful military alliance. Eight years of largely negative experience do not seem to have introduced a note of realism in this area. The same is true of the hope that the MIC and army procurement can be sustained by arms exports. The MIC owes about R97 billion to its suppliers and is owed about R20 billion by the government. Its deliveries to the armed forces have been negligible for many years. Arms sales abroad have been running at around \$2-2.5 billion per annum (with an exchange rate now about R24 to \$1) and are unlikely to grow further. The fact is that Russia's economy is still largely militarized; defence conversion and privatization have been very limited, as has rationalization. The MIC has vast over-capacity but is doing little productive work. Without radical reform and substantial downsizing, it will continue to be a drain on the economy while still failing to meet the military customer's needs for advanced weaponry. The new doctrine seems to envisage a perpetuation of the old system.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

Rightly or wrongly, Russia's current military and political leadership sees the USA and its perceived NATO poodle as presenting a threat. While old, Soviet style thinking has much to do with this, the West cannot be absolved from some responsibility for creating a climate in which this perception has been able to grow, even in the population at large. NATO enlargement, high-handed actions in Kosovo which circumvented international law, the UN and the OSCE, attacks on Russian friends and interference in what Russia regards as its rightful sphere of influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia all combine to give the impression that the West is determined to remodel the world according to its wishes, no matter what Russia wants. This, in the Russian view, increases the likelihood of local and regional wars, with the attendant potential for escalation. Those who believe that significant forces in the West want not merely to marginalize the RF but to destroy its very

unity will also perceive an outside stimulus to internal threats.

The new military doctrine is an immediate response to this increasingly pessimistic Russian view of current trends. Col Gen V Manilov, the principal author, is quoted by Reuters (12 October) as saying: "Recent events, including in the Balkans and North Caucasus, meant that we had to complete work on the draft started more than two years before." If the new doctrine's stated and implied intentions are more than rhetoric and are carried through, some undesirable Russian reactions to increased threat perceptions can be anticipated.

Prompted by disillusionment, the trend, never strong, towards Russian collaboration with NATO will be replaced by competition.

In pursuit of "a multipolar world" in which the RF exercises real influence, Russia may:

- Seek powerful, potentially anti-western allies, particularly China;
- Support (including with arms sales) such anti-western states as Iraq and Libya;
- Undermine westward-looking governments and attempt to replace them with "friendly" regimes in areas deemed to be in Russia's sphere of influence;
- Encourage terrorism and organized crime to distract and undermine hostile states;
- Foster panslavism to create a union of post-Soviet slavic states (including Ukraine) and influence east-central Europe;
- Exploit nationalist sentiment to demand further belt-tightening in the interests of a military revival to preserve national unity and independence and recover great power status.

Military doctrine, old as well new, certainly seems to demand a striving for great military power. Such a policy would be mistaken. In today's world, armed strength is not the only, indeed, arguably, not the greatest source of influence. Economic muscle is at least as important, if not more so. Russia's GDP has declined by an average of about 9% per annum since 1990 and is now only slightly larger than Mexico's. According to the UN's Human Development index, the country is 58th in the world, alongside Suriname and 11 places behind Mexico. For Russia to become truly important, it must reverse its economic decline and realize its undoubted potential. A sure way to prevent this from happening is to saddle the country with the sort of excessive military burden that was such a major factor in the collapse of the USSR. Moreover, the effort required even remotely to challenge the USA would be doomed to failure through the very lack of economic strength and technological backwardness.

By devoting itself to economic revival in the short to medium term, Russia would lay down the essential foundations for a subsequent restoration of military power. At the same time, it would lessen the internal threats that now loom so large in the new military doctrine by improving the population's material circumstances. This would require a policy directly opposite to that proposed by the doctrine. By emulating the Frunze reforms of the mid twenties (when there was a genuine external as well as internal threat) and cutting the armed forces in half, to 500-600,000, together with a demilitarization of the economy, the economic (if not the political) basis of improvement could be created. Such a relatively small force, if of high quality, would be ample to meet internal challenges and those of local and even perhaps some regional wars. The maintenance of nuclear forces would deter major invasion and even regional adversaries.

Regrettably, there is no reasonable prospect of the triumph of such radical thinking in today's Russia. The country just cannot come to terms with the loss of superpower

status, nor overcome its paranoia about external threats, and its leadership continues to regard military power as the only means of ensuring its security. That is Russia's tragedy – and ours also.

The Conflict Studies Research Centre

Directorate General Development and Doctrine  
Royal Military Academy Sandhurst Camberley  
Telephone : (44) 1276 412346  
Surrey Or 412375  
GU15 4PQ Fax : (44) 1276 686880  
England E-mail: [csrc.dgd&d@gtnet.gov.uk](mailto:csrc.dgd&d@gtnet.gov.uk)  
<http://www.ppc.pims.org/csrc>