


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European Security After Kosovo**

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RUSSIAN THINKING ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AFTER KOSOVO

Dr M A Smith

The development of a post-Cold War European security system has moved into a new phase in 1999, due to three developments.

- The widening of NATO include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in March 1999. The accession of these states meant that former Warsaw Pact territories had now joined the Atlantic Alliance.
- The proclamation of a new strategic concept for NATO in April 1999, at the Atlantic Alliance's 50th anniversary summit in Washington.
- The NATO attack on Yugoslavia in March 1999 for Serbia's failure to sign the Rambouillet Accord that was to have accorded autonomy to the Serb province of Kosovo. This was the first time in NATO's history that the alliance had ever been involved in serious military conflict.

This paper reviews these developments from a Russian standpoint and outlines the directions in which Russian policy is likely to move as a result of recent experience.

RUSSIA AND NATO WIDENING

Russian opposition to NATO widening throughout the 1990s has been consistent and well documented. The signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997 provided a framework for the regulation of NATO-Russia relations, and was in some ways a sop to Russia to compensate her for having to accept the accession of former Warsaw Pact states to the Atlantic Alliance. It also revealed that NATO believed it was important to develop a partnership with Russia in the development of a post-Cold War European security structure.

However, the Founding Act has failed to assuage Russian concerns about the future evolution of NATO. There is a strong Russian fear that NATO, in its search to define a post-Cold War role for itself, could dominate Europe, and also possibly usurp the functions of the United Nations and OSCE. From the Russian standpoint, this is highly undesirable, as it would further reduce the relevance of Russia in the management of both European and global security, and increase the likelihood of a security order emerging in which Russia would not be able to ensure that her security interests were being taken into account. These fears have grown stronger since NATO decided that it would elaborate a new strategic concept.

Although the formal accession to NATO of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in March 1999 came as no surprise to Moscow, given that NATO had formally decided to accept these states in 1997, it met with a predictably negative response. It was seen as a development that would upset the balance of power in Europe. The head of the MOD's main department for international military cooperation, Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, took an extremely negative view, seeing it as undermining the existing balance of power in Europe. Ivashov saw NATO enlargement as "diminishing Russia's geopolitical and military-strategic space."¹ Precisely how the

accession of the Central European states had this effect is not clear, as these states were not in fact part of Russia's "strategic space." It may be that the expansion of NATO eastwards caused Ivashov to feel that Russia would be encircled, and that it could constrain the projection of Russian military power beyond Russia's borders, should Moscow ever feel it was necessary to do so. Ivashov sees NATO as an expansionist bloc attempting to project its influence. He warned that "NATO is trying to project its military strength beyond the zone of its influence, including to Russia."²

According to Ivashov, says that the Russian approach to managing European security is that of cooperation with NATO and its individual member states, while reducing armed forces and decreasing military activity; the widening of NATO runs counter to this approach. He argued that Europe should have a "comprehensive collective-security system in which political processes, an economic development strategy and a clear-cut international legal system relations will prevail." He went to state that "military strength can and must play a role in this system but should be limited and controllable by European political organisations. This military strength must belong not only to NATO, but also to other European countries. It should be an instrument of security, not attack or defence."³

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) warns that NATO expansion could lead to the "emergence of new dividing lines." It considered the act of NATO widening risked undermining attempts to create a single Euro-Atlantic zone of stability, democracy and cooperation, and said that Russia would use the Russia-NATO Permanent Joint Council and Founding Act to create a partnership relationship with NATO. NATO widening could undermine this emerging relationship, and could lead to a throwback to the Cold War. The Ministry advocates instead a pan-European security system that would protect the interests of all states, irrespective of whether they belong to a military-political alliance. The MFA stated that a "dependable system for security in Europe can only be created on a pan-European basis with scrupulous observance of international law and by using the OSCE as the most representative and universal pan-European organisation."⁴ Foreign minister Igor Ivanov expressed similar thoughts in December 1998, when he argued that "the OSCE should become the centre of gravity of the new system of relations between the states and organisations of the Euro-Atlantic space".⁵

It is presumably the OSCE that Ivashov has in mind as the organisation that would control the use of military force in Europe, including that of NATO. How the OSCE would exercise this control is not made clear. Russian thinking on this matter may be elucidated at the OSCE summit in November 1999, which may discuss a European security charter, a concept which Russia has favoured for several years.

Even moderate observers such as Aleksey Arbatov see NATO widening as a threat to Russia. He argues that NATO has moved from being a defensive to an expansionist alliance, and that its armed forces and operational plans now have an aggressive character. He warns there are many cases of victims becoming victimisers, and takes no comfort in the fact that NATO is an alliance of democracies, noting that the great European colonial powers were democracies, and that being a democracy did not stop the USA from "carpet bombing" Vietnam in the 1960s. He is concerned that NATO appears unable to tolerate coexisting with either small or big enemies, and this makes NATO the main security problem in Europe and the main hindrance to Russo-Western cooperation.⁶

This negative assessment of NATO widening is held across the Russian political spectrum. The Communist Party predictably opposed it, as does Yabloko. On 12 March, Yabloko's deputy chairman Sergey Ivanenko said that NATO was "mechanically continuing its former policies", and like the Russian leadership, Yabloko favours the creation of a collective security system in Europe.⁷ NATO widening was also opposed by Yury Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow and a possible presidential candidate.

The only voice to welcome NATO widening was that of Sergey Yushenkov, the deputy chairman of Russia's Democratic Choice. He said that NATO widening did not threaten Russia, and consolidated rational forces.⁸ There is an argument that NATO widening might benefit Russia, in that it would make the new members feel more secure and so less likely to be hostile to and suspicious of Russia. As the new states would be subject to alliance requirements and discipline, they would be more predictable, which in turn would enable Russia to feel more secure. This is probably the line taken by Yushenkov, and in some ways is an extension of the argument that NATO's existence and the US-Japan security pact benefited the USSR during the Cold War, as it prevented German and Japanese rearmament. However, this argument is not accepted by the current government in Moscow, which sees NATO widening more in terms of the encirclement and containment of Russia, which aims at isolating Russia from the rest of Europe and treating her as an inferior partner.

NATO'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

NATO's new strategic concept⁹, which was promulgated at the 50th anniversary Washington summit of the Alliance in late April 1999, also met with disapproval, as in Moscow's eyes, it appeared to sanction the sort of interventionist role that resulted in Operation Allied Force. Moscow disagreed with the concept, as it appeared to justify NATO acting as global policeman, rather than as the collective defence organisation it had been since 1949, and so threatened to undermine the UN system of collective security. It was seen as an attempt to create a unipolar (ie US-led) international system instead of the multipolar international system favoured by Moscow with the UN as the principal global security organisation and the OSCE as the main security organisation in Europe. The MFA claimed that

*"the final documents of the NATO summit are in essence a claim for a dominant role by the alliance in European and world politics...such an approach does not comply with the interests of stability in Europe and the international commitments undertaken by NATO's member-states within the framework of the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe...Russia believes in comprehensive and equal security for all states on the continent, irrespective of whether or not they belong to military and political unions."*¹⁰

In early 1999, Boris Kazantsev, the deputy director of the department of all-European cooperation in the MFA, expressed concern about the new concept before it was adopted. In *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, he wrote that NATO was moving away from its traditional role of collective defence as stated in Article 5 of the NATO treaty to a wider role of maintaining collective security beyond the Alliance's zone of responsibility. Kazantsev commented that

“in this way a transfer was being implemented from defence of the geographical zone of responsibility of NATO to the securing of the interests of its members in any region of the world. By this it is proposed to strengthen the right of NATO to carry out operations using force “in case of necessity” with a UNSC mandate.”¹¹

Kazantsev noted that the new concept said that NATO would undertake actions to counter threats outside NATO's sphere of action, and that in such cases it would only be desirable (rather than necessary) to obtain a UNSC mandate. Kazantsev argued that NATO, led by the USA, was assuming a global role in resolving conflicts. He saw this as usurping the role of the UN and the OSCE, and hindering the peacekeeping potential of both these organisations.

Defence minister Igor Sergeyev stated that he was especially concerned about two aspects of NATO's new concept, which he claimed spoke of the “possibility of using the alliance's forces beyond the boundaries of its zone of responsibility throughout the entire Euro-Atlantic space and without the sanction of the United Nations.” He said that NATO's new strategic concept necessitated changes in Russia's own national security doctrine.¹²

RUSSIAN POLICY DURING THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

The commencement of NATO's Operation Allied Force in March 1999 against Yugoslavia, following Belgrade's decision not to sign the Rambouillet Accord on Kosovo preceded the promulgation of the new strategic concept. However this action confirmed Russian fears that NATO was seeking to dominate Europe and impose a security order by *diktat* on the rest of continent.

As Operation Allied Force began just 12 days after Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined NATO, it is very likely that these two events were seen by many in the Russian leadership as linked and part of a common strategy. Indeed, foreign minister Igor Ivanov suggested as much in his speech to the Duma on 27 March 1999. When criticising NATO's military action against Yugoslavia, Ivanov commented that, "having only just acquired three new members, NATO has immediately demonstrated its aggressive nature."¹³

The Russian leadership saw the NATO action as going beyond merely upsetting the European balance of power and undermining attempts to create a single democratic space in Europe. It saw NATO's actions as imperialistic, and as part of a US strategy to establish a global hegemony. Moscow was also angered that NATO had not adequately consulted it on this issue in the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, so making a mockery of the 1997 Russia-NATO Founding Act.

As NATO had acted without the specific authorisation of the United Nations Security Council, the bombing of Yugoslavia was seen as undermining the United Nations and the entire post-1945 global security system. On the day Operation Allied Force commenced, Yel'tsin stated:

Only the UN Security Council has the right to take the decision on what measures, including measures of force, should be undertaken to maintain or restore international peace and security. The UN Security Council has not taken any decisions with regard to Yugoslavia. Not only has the UN Charter been violated but also the founding act on mutual relations, cooperation and security between Russia and NATO...

*In effect what we have here is an attempt by NATO to enter the 21st century in the uniform of world policeman. Russia will never agree to this.*¹⁴

The then prime minister, Yevgenny Primakov, condemned NATO's action in similar terms. He said NATO's attack on Yugoslavia was "a strike against the world order which has taken shape and became confirmed following the Second World War and it seemed it would develop after the end of the Cold War." He noted that "NATO undertakes operations which are outside the framework of the objectives that were the *raison d'être* for setting up this organisation in the first place...this is an assault...on the world order."¹⁵

The Russian leadership faced a tremendous dilemma during the Kosovo conflict. On the one hand, it could not be seen to condone NATO's use of force against Belgrade, yet at the same time, neither was it willing to risk a major confrontation with the West. Moscow lacked the military strength to oppose NATO, and also wanted continued cooperation with the West for financial reasons. Moscow also probably did not desire that its relations with the West be jeopardised because of the intransigence of the Milosevic dictatorship. On the other hand, the Yel'tsin leadership genuinely opposed NATO's decision to use force without UN authorisation, and it also had to take into account nationalist forces within Russia that were even more hostile to NATO policy and would demand more vigorous opposition to the Atlantic Alliance.

The rhetorical response was predictably harsh. In addition to the attacks on NATO for undermining the United Nations and the OSCE, NATO was also accused of attempting to dismember Yugoslavia by separating Kosovo from the rest of the Yugoslav federation. On 31 March foreign minister Igor Ivanov accused the USA of planning to introduce ground forces. He later stated that NATO planned to break up Yugoslavia.¹⁶ Ivanov also accused NATO of committing genocide and repeated Belgrade's line that Kosovan Albanian refugees were fleeing NATO bombs. Ivanov also said that NATO was planning to set up a KLA government in Kosovo, and warned that Montenegro and Vojvodina could face a similar fate. The Russian leadership depicted the KLA as an effective ally of NATO, and NATO's claims that it was not seeking to dismember Yugoslavia were not accepted.

The fiercest attack came from Yel'tsin on 9 April, when he accused the USA of wanting to seize Yugoslavia and make it their protectorate, and said that Russia could not let this happen. He said that he had warned NATO, the Americans and the Germans not to push Russia towards military action, otherwise this could lead to a European or even a world war.¹⁷ Yel'tsin repeated his claim that NATO wanted to turn Yugoslavia into a protectorate ten days later on 19 April.¹⁸

Alongside the verbal condemnation of NATO policy, Russia ceased all cooperation between its Ministry of Defence and NATO that took place within the framework of the Russia-NATO Founding Act. Various other forms of cooperation with western defence ministries were cancelled. Russia also sent an intelligence gathering ship from the Black Sea to the Adriatic in late March, and the General Staff warned that it would supply Yugoslavia with intelligence information.

However, alongside these measures, the Yel'tsin leadership made it clear that it would not become involved militarily, and neither would it supply Yugoslavia with arms, despite a Duma appeal in April to do so. The day after the Duma appeal, Yel'tsin ruled out arms supplies and said that Russia would only use diplomatic means to resolve the crisis. Interestingly, in early April deputy foreign minister

Aleksandr Avdeyev said that the Yugoslav leadership was responsible for the crisis.¹⁹ This was followed a few days later by a comment by Igor Ivanov stating that neither Washington nor Moscow desired any situation that would harm bilateral US-Russian relations.²⁰

Russia did seek to use the UN to halt NATO's military action, by introducing a resolution to the UN Security Council to that effect on 26 March, which was defeated by nine votes to three. However there was a wish to cooperate with the West to bring about a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. Underneath the rhetoric, there was no desire on the part of the leadership to break with the West, and there was probably a realisation that Milosevic bore a high degree of responsibility for the crisis. In addition to Avdeyev's comments, Yel'tsin himself criticised Milosevic's intransigence and urged him to accept peacekeeping forces.²¹

Russia's desire for continued financial assistance from the IMF was a considerable factor that influenced Russian policy. The visit of IMF director Michael Camdessus to Moscow for talks on further loans almost coincided with the commencement of Operation Allied Force. Moscow confined its "sanctions" against the West to the largely symbolic action of halting cooperation with NATO. Russian financial needs meant that it was impossible to risk a complete break in relations with the West, and these financial reasons prompted Russia to play the role of mediator and broker a diplomatic outcome. To do otherwise would have risked Russian isolation from the international community, and this was not a stance that the leadership was prepared to take. At the start of the conflict, Primakov said that NATO action would not affect Russian ties with the IMF²², and this could be taken as an implicit admission by the leadership that its financial weakness would require Moscow to cooperate with the West and play the role of honest broker.

From the outset of the conflict, Yel'tsin instructed Ivanov to arrange a meeting of the Contact Group. Ivanov sought a meeting of G8 foreign ministers in early April, and Primakov flew to Belgrade and then Germany at the end of March as part of a process of attempting to mediate a diplomatic settlement. The Russian leadership faced pressure from the Duma to pursue a more pro-Milosevic policy, including supplying arms, and some senators in the Federation Council, notably Aleksandr Rutskoy and Aleksandr Lebed also favoured military assistance to Belgrade. The Russian military probably also favoured a more pro-Milosevic policy, although it is unlikely that it sought to pressurise the Yel'tsin leadership to change course. Verbal criticism of NATO by the Russian leadership was partly aimed at appeasing the Duma and public opinion.

Yel'tsin's decision to appoint Viktor Chernomyrdin as his special envoy on Yugoslavia in mid-April can be taken as a clear sign of his desire to play the role of mediator and broker a settlement. Chernomyrdin enjoyed the blessing of the West when he was prime minister from 1992 to 1998. The West saw him then as a moderate stabilising influence in the Russian political scene. It seems reasonable to regard his appointment as a signal to the West that Russia wanted to cooperate with it over Yugoslavia. The appointment also effectively took the main thrust of the diplomatic effort away from the MFA. This was arguably a rebuff to the prime minister Yevgeny Primakov, who had been foreign minister from January 1996 to September 1998, and who was probably more hostile to NATO widening and US "unipolarity" than Chernomyrdin. Primakov's dismissal from the premiership in May 1999 would have further enhanced Chernomyrdin's authority in the formulation of Russian policy on the Kosovo crisis.

However, Chernomyrdin's task of mediating a settlement was far from easy. He was caught between NATO's insistence that it continue to bomb until its demands were met, and Milosevic's insistence that the bombing halt before Serb forces be withdrawn, that the future Kosovo peacekeeping force operate under UN auspices and consist only of non-NATO forces, and that Yugoslavia must retain some forces in Kosovo.

Although Russia and the West reached some agreement on principles for ending the conflict at the G8 foreign ministers' meeting in Bonn in early May, Chernomyrdin himself stated that NATO must halt bombing before any settlement could be reached. As a result of Chernomyrdin's "shuttle diplomacy", Russia's role did largely become that of a courier, which caused irritation in Moscow.²³ The possibility of NATO using ground forces also resulted in Russia threatening to end mediation.

On 18 May the process began which eventually led to the end of the conflict. Chernomyrdin had talks with Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari and US deputy secretary of state Strobe Talbott in Helsinki. Ahtisaari was acting as the EU's representative. Chernomyrdin then flew to Belgrade to present to Milosevic peace proposals worked out in Helsinki. Chernomyrdin still insisted that NATO halt airstrikes. The process of the trilateral Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari-Talbott talks proved to be the means by which the conflict ended. On 24 May Chernomyrdin said that these trilateral talks should lead to an end of the conflict. He also stated that Milosevic was prepared to accept the participation of NATO forces that had not been involved in combat in the international force to be deployed in Kosovo.

On 1 June, Chernomyrdin flew to Germany for a further round of trilateral talks, in which German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder also participated. These talks agreed on the final set of proposals that were presented to Milosevic by Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari in Belgrade on 3 June. The proposals were not for negotiation, they were very much "take it or leave it", with the implication that NATO would step up its military action were Milosevic to reject them. Milosevic accepted the proposals. This effectively led to the end of the conflict. Yugoslav forces started withdrawing from Kosovo on 10 June. This resulted in NATO suspending its bombing campaign. Once the bombing had been suspended, Russia was able to support United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, which laid out the principles for a Kosovo settlement. The Resolution was passed by the Security Council on 10 June.

This effectively ended the Chernomyrdin mission. KFOR forces began entering Kosovo from Macedonia on 12 June. Although KFOR was operating under UN auspices, it was in reality very much a NATO led force. Russia stole a march on NATO by entering Kosovo first, by sending forces from SFOR in Bosnia which travelled through Serbia, entered Pristina and took control of the airport on 11 June. This seemed to be a measure taken by the Russian military to strengthen Russia's hand in negotiations with the USA over the role to be played by Russian forces within KFOR.

The Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari proposal accepted by Milosevic on 3 June differs little from either NATO's five demands put forward on 12 April, or the principles agreed by the G8 on 6 May. The G8 plan, Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari proposals and UN Security Council Resolution 1244 all call for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords.

The Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari proposals state that an effective international civil and security presence would be deployed in Kosovo under UN auspices with "substantial NATO participation." This presence is to be deployed under unified command and control. A footnote to the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari proposals states that it is understood that NATO considers an international security force with "substantial NATO participation" to mean unified command and control and having NATO at the core. This in turn means a unified NATO chain of command under the political direction of the North Atlantic Council in consultation with non-NATO force contributors. All NATO countries, partners and other countries will be eligible to contribute to the international security force. Annex 2 to UN Security Council resolution 1244 said that the international security presence would have "substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organisation participation", and would be deployed under unified command and control.

Although these agreements all affirm Yugoslavia's territorial integrity, the references made to the Rambouillet Agreement imply that Kosovo's final status could come up for review, as the text of the Agreement stated it was to last for three years from time of its entry into force. After three years, an international meeting is to be convened to determine a mechanism for a final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of will of the people, opinions of relevant authorities, each Party's efforts regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act.

The Rambouillet Agreement also intended that NATO would constitute and lead a military implementation force to ensure the fulfilment of all provisions of the Agreement. Non-NATO nations could also take part, but the implementation force would operate under the authority and be subject to the direction and the political control of the North Atlantic Council through the NATO chain of command.²⁴

The outcome of the conflict indicates that much of the Rambouillet Agreement may be realised. It also makes clear that the Chernomyrdin mediation mission largely accepted NATO's agenda regarding Kosovo, despite the initial outrage and condemnation of Operation Allied Force. Rather than persuading both NATO and Belgrade to compromise, Chernomyrdin managed to persuade Milosevic that he had no choice. Milosevic may in the end have capitulated when he realised that Moscow was not going to "pull his chestnuts out of the fire" and assist him, and Chernomyrdin may well have convinced him of the futility of such a hope.

Given Russian opposition to the use of force by NATO over Kosovo, and to NATO's new security concept, the acceptance of NATO's Kosovo agenda must have been reluctant, as the high degree of eventual cooperation could almost be seen as a Russian endorsement of NATO's use of force. That is very probably how it was seen by many opposition forces in Russia, which explains the Duma's call for Chernomyrdin's dismissal as Balkan envoy on 10 June.

Chernomyrdin's acceptance of NATO's position reflected the Yel'tsin leadership's unwillingness to risk a major confrontation with the West, not least for financial reasons. The Yel'tsin leadership's awareness of Russia's own economic and military weakness made it unwilling to adopt an uncooperative approach towards the West over Kosovo. Russia's military weakness made confrontation with NATO unwise, and refusal to cooperate in seeking a diplomatic settlement ran the risk that NATO would have resolved the conflict on its terms without any Russian involvement. This would have resulted in Russia having no influence at all in the post-conflict settlement. Chernomyrdin's mediation has enabled Russia to have continued influence in the settlement process, even if this process is largely dominated by

NATO. As Chernomyrdin himself said on 22 June, Russia now has the opportunity to "go to the Balkans and stay there."²⁵

The Russian military were extremely unhappy with the Chernomyrdin-Ahtisaari plan, with Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, the head of the MOD administration for international military cooperation, stating that parts of it threatened Yugoslavia's sovereignty. The surprise deployment of Russian forces in Kosovo on 11 June appears to have been undertaken by the military behind the backs of both Chernomyrdin and the MFA. This action can be considered as a case of the military pursuing its own foreign policy, with the aim of presenting NATO with a *fait accompli*, whereby Russian troops could create "facts on the ground" and establish their own sector in Kosovo as part of KFOR. This bid failed when Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary made it impossible for Russia to reinforce the units deployed from Bosnia by refusing overflying rights to Russia.

THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY: SOME RUSSIAN VIEWS

The G8 summit in Cologne in June marked an attempt by the West and Russia to resume business as usual following the strains in relations caused by the Kosovo crisis. The forgiving of part of the Russian debt can be regarded as a reward for Russian cooperation over Kosovo. However despite the move back towards a more cordial relationship, Russia remains extremely unhappy with the role that NATO now seems to envisage for itself, as exemplified by NATO's handling of the Kosovo crisis.

Statements made following the conflict make clear Moscow's dissatisfaction with the current security regime in Europe. On 11 June, an MFA official said that the Russia-NATO Founding Act of 1997 needed rethinking. He accused NATO of violating that act by using military force against Yugoslavia.²⁶

On 8 July, foreign minister Igor Ivanov described the NATO action against Yugoslavia as a "major conceptual challenge" facing modern Europe, and he said it raised the question of whether Europe will remain unified or will again face division and confrontation.²⁷

These criticisms of NATO have been accompanied by calls to strengthen the UN's role in peacekeeping. Russia sees two trends emerging in the post-Cold War international system. The first, which Russia opposes, is that of a US led unipolar international system, with NATO playing the role of world policeman, usurping the traditional role of the UN. The second, which Russia supports, is that of a multipolar international system, with several power centres, and the UN as the main security organisation, with the OSCE playing the major role in maintaining security in Europe. This second trend is favoured by Moscow, as it would ensure an important role for Russia, and would in some sense satisfy her great power aspirations. However, although Russia's determination to promote a new European security system will remain unchanged, Moscow currently lacks the means to achieve her objectives.

On the military side, both the Russian political and military leaderships have stated that NATO's use of force against Yugoslavia necessitates changes in Russian military doctrine. The scenario of the command staff exercises Zapad-99 held in western Russia in late June 1999 were apparently altered in light of Operation

Allied Force; it was reported that Russian forces exercised to counter high-precision airstrikes of the type carried out by NATO against Yugoslavia.²⁸

An extremely critical view of NATO policy was taken by Aleksandr Lukin.²⁹ He saw NATO widening and the bombing of Yugoslavia as an attempt by NATO (particularly the USA) to establish a new US dominated system of international relations that would undermine the existing system of international law. He considers the aggression against Yugoslavia as a clear sign that NATO is prepared to attack any country, including Russia. He suggests as a possible scenario a NATO attempt to detach Kaliningrad oblast from Russia by force.

As a counter to NATO ambition, Lukin believes that Russia should move from a policy of cooperation in a position of subordination to cooperation combined with simultaneous containment of NATO. He argues that Russia should take the following steps:

1. Break off ties with NATO, and cease participation in Partnership for Peace.
2. Cease supporting Germany's desire to become a full member of the UN Security Council, and instead support India as a candidate for full membership.
3. Develop a strategic partnership with India and China, and strengthen military cooperation with other interested countries from the Islamic world, Latin America, South East Asia.
4. Bring Yugoslavia into the Russo-Belarusian union after Kosovo is finally settled and UN sanctions against Belgrade are lifted.
5. Build new relations with the states of Central and Southern Europe. Russia may be seen by these states as a counterweight to Germany and Turkey.
6. Continue cooperation with Western Europe within the framework of the EU, and also with individual states. Security cooperation with states concerned about US global dominance and German dominance in Europe could be possible.
7. Build a new system of security with CIS members, especially Ukraine.
8. Build up Russian military power as a counter to NATO.

Lukin also argues that Russia should ally with other interested states to restore the system of international law and the authority of the UN as the main global security organisation. He argues that this can be done without damaging the prospects for economic cooperation with the major western powers.

Aleksey Arbatov took a very critical view of Moscow's Balkan policy in an assessment written one month after the conflict ended.³⁰ He contends that Moscow has capitulated to the West over the Balkans, and argues that Russia should have its own sector in Kosovo, which could then be partitioned into an Albanian part and Serb part. He accepts this is not desirable, but feels it is preferable to a purely Albanian Kosovo which becomes fully detached from Serbia. He argues that Russia must use whatever levers of pressure on the West she can to change Russian participation in KFOR to give Russia an independent sector in north-western Kosovo. He suggests Russia can link arms control, including START-2 and START-3, plus the BMD Treaty to the demand for a sector. He says this issue is important as it does not only relate to Yugoslavia, but to the construction of the entire future security system for Europe and surrounding regions. Arbatov argues that what is at stake is the need to establish the preeminence of law over the arbitrary use of

force, and this will determine whether Russia and NATO have either a cooperative or confrontational relationship at the level of maintaining both regional and global security.

CONCLUSIONS

Russia's opposition to NATO's role changing from being a collective defence organisation towards being a self-appointed regional, or possibly even global policeman is long-standing. It predates NATO's strategic concept of April 1999 and Operation Allied Force by several years. Russia's demand that the OSCE become the major security organisation for Europe also dates back to the early 1990s. The promulgation of the new strategic concept and the military intervention against Yugoslavia have intensified these sentiments. The events of 1999 have strengthened Russian fears that NATO is a direct threat to Russia, and that NATO could usurp the roles of both the UN and OSCE in managing global and European security. Russia's line is to continue demanding the development of the OSCE's role by promoting the idea of an OSCE European security charter.

The new strategic concept and the Kosovo intervention will probably impel Russia to try and reduce its contacts with NATO, in order to weaken the Atlantic Alliance's claims to be European security manager. If Russia is able to ignore NATO, then NATO's relevance as a security organisation may diminish. In April 1999, Nadezhda Arbatova argued that Russia should try to work out a resolution of the Kosovo crisis by cooperating with the EU, rather than with NATO.³¹ This view was echoed by the mayor of Moscow, and possible presidential candidate, Yury Luzhkov, in mid-May.³² Foreign minister Igor Ivanov took a similar line, when he chaired a meeting of the Russia-EU cooperation council in Brussels in May, saying Russia would not hold talks with NATO, thus implying that Moscow was prepared to cooperate with the EU in contrast to NATO.³³ Moscow would also like to pursue cooperation on a bilateral basis with individual states as another way of bypassing NATO and hopefully reducing it to an irrelevance. Moscow may also try and use the network of bilateral friendship treaties she signed with individual European states in the early 1990s in order to achieve this. Another possible strategy would be try and encourage the transformation of NATO into an essentially political organisation under the control of the OSCE.

Russia's prospects for achieving this are currently limited. The Russian Federation is simply not strong enough to persuade individual European members of NATO of the superior merits of the OSCE and European Security Charter. Focusing on the EU and bilateral relations outside of NATO is unlikely to bear much fruit as most EU members are also NATO members, and are not currently disposed to assert an EU identity against their NATO affiliation. Russia has neither the sticks nor the carrots to intimidate or beguile European members of NATO away from adherence to the role the Atlantic Alliance has defined for itself in the new strategic concept.

The measures outlined by Aleksandr Lukin do theoretically offer an alternative to cooperating and deferring to NATO. However, this alternative is currently only theoretical, due to Russia's present economic and military weakness. It is highly unlikely that Moscow could ever succeed in building a partnership with former Warsaw Pact states that appears to the latter to be preferable to membership of NATO. It is also extremely optimistic to assume that an anti-NATO stance would not necessarily affect Russia's economic relations with the major western states.

Lukin puts his main stake on developing a Russo-Chinese-Indian strategic triangle as a counter to a NATO bloc. The former prime minister Yevgeny Primakov also made reference to a potential Russo-Chinese-Indian strategic triangle when he visited India in December 1998.³⁴ The Russian military are pushing a policy of active cooperation with both these states. In theory this would be a considerable challenge to NATO, but again the prospects for the emergence of a Russo-Chinese-Indian alliance or quasi-alliance are currently slight. China and India disagree with many aspects of NATO policy, but not to the extent of forming an anti-NATO bloc with Russia.

Aleksey Arbatov argues that by linking arms control with Kosovo, Russia can pressure the West into giving Russia her own peacekeeping sector in the province. This is again unlikely, in view of Russia's great financial dependence on the West (which he admits) and her own interest in arms control. Moscow's ability to influence NATO or to persuade other European states to accept her own preferences regarding a European security system are very limited. Furthermore, the current Russian leadership's desire for continued western financial assistance places another constraint on Russia's ability to minimise the role of NATO in European security affairs.

Whilst a nationalist leader remains in power in Belgrade, future crises in relations between NATO and Russia are possible. If Montenegro declares independence from Yugoslavia, and if Belgrade attempts to suppress this by force, NATO may again decide to use force against Belgrade, and find Russia taking a position similar to that which she took during the Kosovo crisis. If Milosevic is replaced by a leadership even more hardline than his, Belgrade may be tempted to stir up further crises in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo. If Belgrade repudiates the June agreements that ended the NATO-Yugoslav conflict, citing the ethnic cleansing of Serbs in Kosovo as justification, NATO and Russia are likely to find themselves at loggerheads, and Russian policy will again be torn by the desire to cooperate with the West, not least for financial reasons, and by the need to appease the nationalist lobby in Russia, along with the military.

It would seem that the only opportunity Moscow may have to realise (in part at least) her vision for a security system in Europe would be by default. If a crisis were to emerge in Trans-Atlantic relations between the USA and Western Europe, which would cause Washington to reduce or terminate its NATO commitment to Western Europe, this might give Moscow such an opportunity. Conflict between the USA and Western Europe over the Bosnian crisis in 1994 did serious damage to the Trans-Atlantic relationship, and it is not impossible that future differences between the USA and Western Europe, perhaps fomented, aggravated or manipulated by Russia, could lead to NATO's eventual unravelling. In this situation, Moscow's objective of an OSCE based security system may appear more realisable. Whilst Moscow may view the development of a separate EU defence capability with some ambiguity, Russia would prefer to cooperate with EU in managing European security than with NATO. Russia's main objection to NATO appears to lie in her perception that NATO is a means by which the USA can pursue her "unipolar" strategy.

If NATO ever does unravel, and if Russia is able to rebuild her economic and military power, then the realisation of some of the policy objectives outlined by Aleksandr Lukin may become more likely. Although the development of a Russo-Chinese-Indian strategic triangle is currently unrealistic, the development of such a

relationship (or a Russo-Chinese bilateral understanding) should not be ruled out if anti-US leaderships come to the fore in these countries.

Even while she is weak, Russia under Yel'tsin and his eventual successors can be expected to direct diplomatic efforts to trying to minimise NATO's role in the managing of European and global security. Should a stronger and more nationalist Russia ever emerge, these efforts are likely to be pursued with even greater vigour. The underlying objective would be to turn the USA and her allies away from what Russia calls the attempts to create a unipolar (ie US-dominated) international system, or to create an anti-NATO or anti-US bloc with the aim of isolating the US and NATO.

ENDNOTES

- 1 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) 13 March 1999, SU/3482, B/9.
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Ibid.
- 5 SWB 7 December 1998, SU/3403, B/15.
- 6 Aleksey Arbatov, 'NATO is the main problem for European security', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16 April 1999.
- 7 SWB 13 March 1999, SU/3482, B/10.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>.
- 10 SWB 29 April 1999, SU/3521, B/7.
- 11 B.Kazantsev, 'NATO's new strategy gives rise to serious concern', Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, No.2, 1999.
- 12 SWB 29 April 1999, SU/3521.
- 13 SWB 29 March 1999, SU/3495, B/3.
- 14 SWB 26 March 1999, SU/3493, B/1.
- 15 SWB 27 March 1999, SU/3494, B/3.
- 16 Russian Public TV, 31 March 1999.
- 17 SWB 12 April 1999, SU/3506, B/1.
- 18 SWB 20 April 1999, SU/3513, B/1.
- 19 SWB 6 April 1999, SU/3501, B/10.
- 20 SWB 9 April 1999, SU/3504, B/10.
- 21 See footnote 18.
- 22 SWB 27 March 1999, SU/3494, B/4.
- 23 See FSB director Vladimir Putin's comments in SWB 13 May 1999, SU/3533, B/6-7.
- 24 For the text of the Rambouillet Agreement, see, <http://kosovainfo.com/english/politics/990305-peace.htm>
- 25 SWB 24 June 1999, SU/3569, B/6.
- 26 SWB 12 June 1999, SU/3559, B/9.
- 27 SWB 10 July 1999, SU/3583, B/7.
- 28 See Vladimir Georgiyev, 'On a Soviet scale', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 19 June 1999; Sergey Sokut, 'The Balkan variant did not proceed', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 24 June 1999.
- 29 Aleksandr Lukin, 'NATO and Russia after Kosovo', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 9 June 1999.
- 30 Aleksey Arbatov, 'Russia's last chance in the Balkans', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15 July 1999.
- 31 Nadezhda Arbatova, 'The most painful lesson of recent times', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 6 April 1999.
- 32 SWB 17 May 1999, SU/3536, B/13.
- 33 SWB 19 May 1999, SU/3538, B/11.
- 34 Dmitry Gornostayev, Sergey Sokut, 'The continued bombing of Iraq culminates in a crisis of international relations', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 22 December 1998.

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