

Political Culture & Democracy Building: The Case of Armenia

Aghavni Karakhanian

Director

*Institute for Civil Society and Regional Development (ICSRD)
Yerevan, Armenia*

Modern history is the history of the progress of democracy. Democratisation is one of the most frequently used words today. However, the development of democracy does not always follow a linear path. The model of representative democracy was seriously called into question in Western developed democracies. As for the young democracies, they are experiencing great difficulties in their democratisation processes. New democracies in Central Europe, East Asia and the former Soviet Union have held their first free elections. But it is one thing to adopt formal democracy and another thing to attain stable democracy. The democratisation process in post-Soviet republics once again proves the assumption that there is no universal model of democracy, or just one road to democracy or one pre-established model to guarantee its success. Moreover, each democratic experiment contains the particulars of each society which has its own historical and cultural background.

It is a widely held view that political development in ex-Soviet countries has not proceeded as fast and successfully as desired. There are many disappointed voices among both the direct participants of these processes and observers. In general, the explanation is very plain: democracy is a process that is always subject to developing and improvement and needs time. In particular, one reason for the lack of political stability and lack of trust is the underdeveloped political culture that derived from the breaking down of society's capacity for self-organisation and democratic political culture in the past system. The historical heritage profoundly affects the political culture of post-Soviet states and the capacity to create a new political order. As the reforms of the structure of political institutions continue, the more democratisation depends on the development of political culture. Although the past does not explain all political processes, this is especially evident during periods of transition, when social reality undergoes profound changes.

Over the past decade, Armenia's road to independence and democracy has experienced all the features common to the post-Soviet transition states: economic and social problems, political infighting, and uncertainty about the future. Nevertheless, compared to its neighbours, Armenia has enjoyed remarkable internal political stability after proclaiming its independence in September 1991. Today the republic is demonstrating an increasing interest in society's political behaviour and the rules that regulate it.

Processes of transformation periods are complex, difficult to define and recognise. They include important economic, political and social changes, especially in social consciousness. At the starting point of political activity in Armenia the mass

movement took control of the state apparatus and established its monopoly in politics, which was dominated by nationalist issues. And the most successful politicians and political parties were those which could convince the electorate that they would be most effective in asserting the claims of their nationality against the claims of other nationalities.

But the analytical framework based on nationalism is not sufficient to understand the political processes in Armenia during 12 years of independence. Today a new framework will help to understand the domestic political processes currently being experienced by the republic. For this it is necessary to consider political culture in Armenia in a framework of its main methodological components: values, norms, knowledge and beliefs that are connected to procedures, traditions and rituals; the political self-identification of a decision maker, an important part of which is national identity; the language of politics, concepts and symbols that are connected to political activity; political behaviour, practical choices of voices, people and activities.

Most suitable to the political development of Armenia are the methodological approach and the theoretical framework of three stages in the development of political culture during the period in question: "the mythological stage, the ideological stage, and the critical-rational stage".¹ Political culture is nothing immovable, and it is even more changeable than usually considered. We can mark out all these stages when observing the transition period in Armenia from 1988 onwards (as well as in other post-Soviet states).

In Armenia, the Soviet doctrine never reached the position of an ideological hegemony. Instead of fighting it, people tried to use it for personal gain and to preserve national culture. The more the stagnation of the 1980s developed, the more Armenian political culture was characterised on one hand by a pragmatic use of official structures and ideology, and on the other hand by a desire for full realisation of national ideas of liberation and unification – the Karabakh movement.

The first period of 1988 to 1990 was characterised by mass movements and the gathering of people around these certain shared goals. Political meetings lasting many hours were broadcast on radio and television. Emotional devotion, rather than rational deliberation, made the rise of the small republic possible. The characteristic forms of political activity during this period were mass gatherings and rallies, boycotts, sit-ins, and the collection of signatures. Under the leadership of charismatic leaders, rituals of common behaviour emerged, which allowed mass emotional involvement. Political discourse was also ritualistic in its character, often consisting of repetitive exclamation of certain values formed into "magic" slogans.

As with many radical mass movements, the mass movement which arose in Armenia at the end of the 1980s experienced a total change in character when it came to power. Firstly it strove to mobilise support behind slogans promising an entirely new political and social order. Some of the myths circulating within the movement were expressed by short sound-bites. These myths were simple ideas, which were able to mobilise the people. The slogans stated that only freedom solves all problems and brings along wealth, democracy and a blossoming national culture and so everything will be all right when freedom comes. And one has to sacrifice in order to become free, "now or never". The whole movement was based on the idea of self-fulfilment through collective identity, freedom, and a return to the national traditions. The political movement of this period had its own attributed myths and was characterised by black-and-white, 'either-or' thinking. Everything that even

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remotely represented the other side was immediately declared to be bad, whereas one's own actions were naturally good. Political debates were characterised by utopian visions of a bright future where everybody will be happy by default. Political thought was directed towards a mythologised past, and towards the future. The present received very little consideration - besides the feeling that something very important was happening.

Large mass demonstrations united the participants with emotional high voltage. 90-95% of Armenians showed interest in politics. Symbols, myths and rituals had a heyday, and the function of words during the mass rallies was magical. Speeches, songs and slogans, jointly holding hands, joint singing and waving flags represented a collective witchcraft, the symbolical fight of a small nation for its independence.

The Karabakh movement started before the dissolution of the USSR. It was quite natural that by using the same mythological foundations, the mass movement intended to express democratic values in the forms used before. Thus, new content was poured into old moulds.

In the first stage of the transition, where the new relationships and institutions had not yet taken shape, there was no variety in political interests. Political developments in Armenia since the late 1980s navigated the transition of leading political forces from being a radical mass movement to being a party of government. There was much confidence placed in the people and institutions representing the movement. This 85-90% trust in the Supreme Soviet lasted until the end of June 1990. Despite the arrest of the Karabakh Committee in December 1988 (that suggested that relations between the nationalist movement and the Armenian Communist Party leadership would be characterised by great antagonism), in June 'a kind of condominium between the Communists and the nationalists',² as specified by Ronald Suny, was ushered in. Under this 'condominium' leading figures in the Karabakh Committee were invited to participate in sessions of the republic's Supreme Soviet. Later on, the new regime once it came to power took on a 'mixed character' despite the criticism of Communist rules. After the victory of the Armenian National Movement (ANM) in the June 1990 elections to the republican Supreme Soviet it formed the country's government, distributing ministerial portfolios to representatives of the old Communist elite.³ (It was also able to buy off potential political opponents. In this respect the political activity of this period in Armenia, in some ways, has more similarities with the Baltic popular fronts than the nationalist movements in neighbouring Georgia and Azerbaijan.)

These important tendencies lasted until the declaration of independence in September 1991 that began to the second, ideological stage of Armenian politics where true democratic political culture finally began to emerge. Firm ties between political discourse and political practice tended to be established. A multitude of opinions emerged and the discourse became problem-solving by character. The articulation of interests and debate between political actors became central to political discourse.

Rationality in political life increased with the election of the National Assembly and referendum on Armenia's constitution in July 1995 and with the creation of new political parties.⁴ An ideological dialogue emerged inside the national movement, and the time for a united mass movement was over. The mythological stage was not very long in Armenia because the mass movement was centred around one power, ANM, and people were united on the Karabakh issue. The population of

Armenia was not divided into groups: those who wanted active political mass movements appeared to be all the people.

Armenian politics in this stage tended to find an agreement about the goals and the means to achieve these goals. Both the electorate and politicians knew these relations so that by supporting one political programme or another one might (in theory, at least) change political practice. This presupposed economic and political stability, as well as general political experience. This stage witnessed the emergence of new political actors (parties, citizens' movements and expert-groups) able to feel, express and defend the interests of the main social groups upon which public policy was to be formulated. Mythological, suggestive symbols had been replaced by the key words characterising political ideologies - market economy, open society, rule of law, etc, and the argumentation of political leaders for a position very often was more closely connected to the Western ideological narratives than to the political practice of the country. At the same time, the political programmes were formulated and defended through theoretical concepts and political activity became more professional.

The domestic political scene had been stable since independence and the same political party, the ANM, and the same leader were continuously in power from 1990 to 1998. This consolidation of its hold on power by the leading political force was greatly affected by a number of factors, different in character, such as military successes in Karabakh, as well as by the ethnic homogeneity of the population, the relative unimportance of regional, clan and other subethnic groups and even by the republic's lack of natural resources. Moreover, the relatively smooth transition from Communist Party rule in Armenia was facilitated as well as by the political strategy of mass movement leaders to strike informal and formal pacts with leading personalities and groups from the Soviet era elite, the early subordination of paramilitary groups to central political control, and the creation of a powerful state apparatus.⁵

To this relatively smooth transition contributed the social basis of the mass movement, the broad character of its membership, which contained representatives of the old nonconformist intelligentsia, younger activists who had become politically active in the mid 1980s, as well as former Communist Party representatives.

Besides involving compromises with the radical ideals of their original programme during this period, political life in Armenia displays many of the features of regime consolidation. The early part of the regime consolidation phase in the republic was characterised by struggles between the political leadership and various informal groups, typically paramilitary organisations with links to organised crime, for state control, which gives access to most if not all of the economic resources of the republic. Besides offering wide opportunities for personal enrichment, control over the state budget is a vital instrument for political groups which want to bolster their position vis-à-vis their rivals.

However, in contrast to the first phase the mass public had become demobilised. Attempts by nationalist groups to organise the mass rallies, petitions and hunger strikes which dominated politics until a few years ago, invariably ended in failure. People were demoralised and apathetic; if previously there was a sharp polarisation between those who supported the nationalist movement and those who supported the status quo, now many could not even be bothered to vote, as the turnout in parliamentary by elections indicates.

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As the regime began to consolidate itself, political groups tended to confine themselves to mobilising limited groups of supporters, usually already occupying influential political or economic positions in the regime, to take control of key branches of the state apparatus which either gave access to the so-called 'power ministries' (the ministries of defence, internal affairs and national security), or to economic resources, such as those with control over privatisation, state property committees, parliamentary commissions, etc.

Such political struggles appear similar to those which take place in western democracies. But in Armenia, where, according to expert assessments, the political culture was defined as propitious for an authoritarian regime, such political struggles could reinforce a trend towards authoritarianism. This could happen also because of the simplifying of societal life, a tendency to evaluate everything according to the scale "good-bad", the weakness of civil society, the corruption of the legal system and especially the absence of a strong middle class.

Political passivity creates premises for irresponsibility, and there appears the threat of self-interestedness in politically and economically privileged people in the society. People expect a lot from the state but little is done to change anything, and this produces alienation from state life and increasing chaos of values. The gap between the political elite and citizens in Armenia, being a problem of political culture and the political system itself, became deeper by fragmentation and specialisation, the diffusion of social energy that is accompanied by big emotional disappointments, disillusionment, and the inner turmoil which some researchers have called "ideological and moral vacuum". Transition within this stage is very complicated and contradictory because of the logic of the development of the political culture itself. The concentration of social energy needed for achieving a political breakthrough is no longer necessary, as the extraordinary situation does not last for long.

The political leadership in that period had managed to mobilise the country's resources for the war effort in Nagorno Karabakh through the 'power ministries' which rapidly acquired a central position in the new regime. With control over the state apparatus increasingly concentrated in a small group, these ministries, particularly the ministry of internal affairs, increasingly became the target of opposition attacks. Whilst before 1994 opposition rallies tended to coincide with setbacks in the war in Nagorno Karabakh, after the military predominance in the winter offensive in Karabakh the main theme of the opposition rallies and attacks (being in fact mostly self-serving) was now the abuse of power and corruption. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that despite the fact that the first major political crisis was the so-called 'militia crisis' of July-August 1990 as the Armenian Parliament first refused to enforce a decree ordering the Armenian National Army to hand in its weapons to the republican authorities but finally ordered its immediate dissolution and imposed a state of emergency, the various militias in Armenia have not subsequently played an independent role in Armenian political life.

As the 1995 parliamentary elections approached the political atmosphere in Armenia became increasingly tense. If for no other reason, the fate of ruling parties in other post-Soviet republics made the political elite fear for the outcome of the electoral contest. This anxiety was heightened by opposition promises to prosecute those who had made illegal profits from the division of state property. On 28 December 1994 the opposition Dashnaktsiutun party, in the run-up to the July 1995 parliamentary elections, was banned from political activity inside Armenia and its leader imprisoned. A referendum was held at the same time and saw the

approval of a new constitution according to which the president would have wide powers, particularly over the judiciary. International observers expressed strong reservations about the democratic character of the elections. Whilst a team from the OSCE confined itself to the comment that the elections had been 'free but not fair', an American group 'observed an alarming trend to suppress political competition and consolidate the position of the ruling regime' and a British group found the elections neither free nor fair.⁶ But despite all these negative signs this election nevertheless was a turning point in the political life of Armenia, as it contained some element of genuine party competition, although the competition was within limits.

Despite the fact that it is necessary to have an enabling environment with a free press, genuine political debate, and people's awareness of their rights in order to establish democracy, the election process remains an important, although not the only, element and foundation for democratisation processes. Democracy does not just consist of periodic elections and the orderly conduct of elections. In many cases it seems more likely that the democratic features of the elections owe more to the weakness of regimes than to an adherence to democratic principles. Anyway the conduct of election processes allows the establishment of a framework which demonstrates the transformation of political culture.

The presidential election of September 1996 which resulted in the re-election of president Ter-Petrosian was considered fraudulent too. The tenacity of the Armenian opposition demonstrated that his main opponent, Vazgen Manoukian, was the real winner. Many opposition activists were arrested while leading the crowds of people storming the parliament.

This has proved to be a particularly complex process in the republic because the salience of ethnic conflict in the first phase of their political development saw the dispersal of state authority. Whilst the struggle for Karabakh has ended in a remarkable victory, the population has been ground down by a catastrophic economic and social crisis. So alongside the government accusations of widespread corruption, the failure of the economy to deliver an improved standard of living, and because the economy is subject to an external blockade from Azerbaijan and Turkey and has practically no exploitable natural resources, the Karabakh issue that has dominated Armenia's domestic and foreign policy agenda became the main reason for governmental crisis two years later. A strong sense of national identity accompanied the early days of independence and the Karabakh movement succeeded in uniting the nation. For a people whose history was forged in the twentieth century's first genocide, the struggle for the Karabakh was that of a people striving to determine their own national status and to right an old political wrong. (Claimed as Armenian by both history and demography, Karabakh was ceded to Azerbaijan by the Russian Communist Party in 1921.) In 1997 the Armenian president urged people rather to accept a phased solution to the conflict based on a proposal from the OSCE's mediation efforts (the Minsk process), in which demilitarisation of the enclave would be followed by negotiations with Azerbaijan on its final status. Charged with defeatism over Karabakh, Ter-Petrosian resigned in February 1998.

The presidential election (the second in two years) a month later on 16 March merely exposed the fractures in Armenian society. The former president of Nagorno-Karabakh and prime minister of Armenia Robert Kocharian was elected president; he improved his position by legalising the banned Dashnak Party and the release from prison of its leaders. Armenia's last Soviet Communist Party leader,

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Karen Demirchian, garnered 40 percent support in the first ballot in March 1998, a protest vote for the present and nostalgia for the days which were communist, but "everybody had jobs". It seems that at that moment Armenian society yearned more for the stability of the old Soviet era than for the Karabakh.

In the run-up to the May 1999 parliamentary elections, a new - Communist-Yerkrapah movement - parliamentary bloc, the Union Alliance (UA), was formed. As a result the UA won 61 seats of the 131-member parliament, Demirchian became parliamentary speaker and Sarkisian was named Armenia's prime minister. The true motives behind this political marriage will probably remain a mystery. On October 27, 1999, five gunmen stormed Armenia's parliament building and killed Sarkisian, Demirchian and six others. These events led to a political crisis striking the very basis of statehood. The president was balancing on a tightrope of possible resignation, governments were falling one after another (three in seven months) and the army was close to splitting. But the authorities managed to consolidate power and by spring 2000 political stability was restored.

To some extent the development of the political culture in Armenia is dependent on the stability of the economy and free media. Monitors during the 1998 presidential elections noted that in the second round in particular there was a marked attempt on the part of journalists to provide as objective an analysis of political events as possible. "The overall pattern of election reporting suggests that most media outlets had no clear strategy for covering the campaign, and that they placed themselves, possibly inadvertently, at the service of the candidates by relying heavily on campaign managers to provide information ... The sincere aspiration to objectivity evinced by most Armenian journalists is paralleled by the failure of many of them to adequately comprehend this concept."⁷

Despite the commitment of the Armenian authorities to run a "free and fair election", this was not going to be an easy thing. However, unlike many countries in the former Soviet Union the population of Armenia is politically aware and more likely to become involved in the electoral process. This was demonstrated in the parliamentary elections of 1999.

This whole process proves that the development of political culture is characterised by the relationship of political variety and participation; political variety meaning the availability of choices between different political developments; participation, an active interest in politics. During the first stage, participation in political life is at its maximum, and the variety of the possibilities is minimal. Then, participation goes down, and variety up. In the last stage the variety should reach its maximum: that means a pluralist society, in which the increase of participation occurs through new "communication nets", not as a mass activity.

Current politics in Armenia is mostly about image-making and not about structuring social reality. Because the new values have not yet been tested in real life, politics is characterised by intense rivalry between competing personalities, rather than competing values. The new political institutions and the norms of democratic behaviour and communication took shape by learning from the West. In this process people learned ready-made texts by heart and copied ready-made institutions. And as matter of fact, the political and economic elite learned "this lesson" much faster than the general population who do not yet feel the representation of their interests and do not understand either the need, or the content of these slogans and procedures. Consequently, participation and interest in politics goes down. The most striking fact, however, is a complete lack of trust in

political parties, especially in conditions where most of the parties have not yet formulated their ideologies.

The percentage of people preferring a given political party, or feeling close to one, is very small. Partly it can be explained by the changing sense of responsibility, as it was easy and safe to be part of a mass movement, which did not entail personal choice or responsibility. The choice was already "pre-made" by belonging to the "we" that opposed 'them'. The content of mass movement had been the restoration of the state; after that had happened, the majority of those who had desired an independent state did not feel any responsibility for it.

Besides, one can see a sharp reduction of trust in political institutions, in the parliament. It is interesting to note that since 1992, although the trust in the government, the army, the police and the court system has diminished, it is higher than trust in the parliament. On the contrary, trust in the president as a symbolic figure is constantly higher than trust in government and parliament.

Disappointment and disillusionment with politics and democracy in Armenia is inevitable, since expectations were too high and myths about the liberation movement were not possible to realise, or took much more time than previously thought. The transitional shock emanating from the rapid economic and social changes created serious problems for everyday life. The high level of corruption has added to the crisis of trust and legitimisation. Political tolerance and mutual confidence among politicians as well as tolerance among people is quite low, as demonstrated by the practical absence of the practice of creating coalitions both in parliament and in local governments in the past.⁸ The opposition, while being a consolidation factor during the first period of democratisation, has lost its constructive role. Post-soviet political opposition in Armenia fully applied its resources in the course of consolidation for national state-building. However, political mobilisation aimed at the real securing of independence and shaping a national identity is often accompanied by the emergence of convictions of political exclusiveness, prejudice about opponents and political intolerance, and particularism arises, declaring the political predominance of some political groups against others. As a result, this undeveloped opposition and political egoism cause domestic and external insecurity, and influence negatively on current social and political changes, worsening social cohesion and preventing democracy. It is very characteristic of Armenian political culture (as well as that of other post-soviet states) that authorities underestimate a system of political opposition and fail to view it as an important functional complement to any political regime. In its turn, a destructive opposition provokes destabilisation, hampering the government's struggle for democratic management. The political techniques that are now being demonstrated by the opposition in the current presidential campaign (February 2003) prove this assumption: the opposition are far from nominating a joint candidate.

The discrepancy between political culture and political institutions is visible. Whereas political reforms have been effective in changing institutions, very little has changed in the content of politics. The situation of democratic development relying only on institutional changes demonstrates a lack of power. Politics is still viewed in simplistic terms, as a form of power-struggle and nothing else, and this fact reinforces a tendency to think along "personal" lines rather than "issues" lines. Fortunately, there is still a strong desire to learn as well as resilience and belief in the future.

Conclusion

Armenia, as other ex-soviet countries, is passing from state centralism to citizens' participation in governing and the individualism of the market. It stresses its commitment to the norms of democracy and human rights. The republic has already entered the World Trade Organisation and is a member of the Council of Europe. The stable domestic political situation has allowed Armenia to progress with far-reaching economic reforms, especially in privatisation and reform of the banking system. It has endeavoured to create a liberal investment climate to attract foreign investment but still foreign investment has remained at a low level. Still it is passing through its second - ideological - stage, towards democracy and active citizenship. Most democratic institutions are not yet developed and the political mode and culture of political behaviour are still unstable.

Armenia's political development for the last decade is characterised by all the features and conditions of transitional democracies and democratic consolidation processes. Still the theories have lagged behind data and political reform has lagged behind economic reform in Armenia. Even so, the development of Armenian political culture is closely connected with the development of its economy, bringing with it some clarification of political interests. It is a long process, and it does not run smoothly, for it has to digest its own negative experiences.

Actually, political activity in Armenia can be defined as "subject" political culture. That means that the population is orientated to a political institution without feelings of personal responsibility; feelings in evaluation of political phenomena dominate, mythological thinking (political myths reflect the population's wishes and help to organise the activities of society) prevails, the distinct ideologisation and politicisation of social life and incapacity to solve problems collectively is evident.

Political life is defined less by political programmes than by possibilities to use forms of Western political experience (like running electoral campaigns). Therefore, actual behaviour differs significantly from programmatic truths. The result of such political activity is that during that stage, people are removed from decision-making, which causes mistrust and delegitimisation of power. This political apathy is caused partly by the absence of real opposition as a political institution in Armenia. The activities of social and political organisations in the republic indicate that after 12 years of transformation from a parliamentary form of governing to a presidential one,⁹ only the formal existence of many democratic institutions, ie parties and democratic movements (including constructive opposition) may be certified.

Anyway, one can state that Armenia has successfully passed through regime consolidation, which is a necessary condition for democracy because if a regime cannot provide basic guarantees of personal security for its citizens and establish a bureaucracy which operates according to consistent rules there can be no question of democratic elections. This has proved to be a success in maintaining a clear policy of democratisation.

Trying to predict Armenia's future development of political culture, one can mark out two possible scenarios. The pessimistic view is that the creation of the necessary experience will still take a long time. The optimistic scenario is that the democratic goal will be achieved in a few years and will be connected to the forthcoming presidential and parliamentary elections in 2003: to be exact, in the post-election period. But this presupposes a gathering of political actors with

common interests and the resolution of political programmes that reflect the real interests of these actors, as well as presenting these programmes as detailed and clear alternatives during the election campaign.

Still, in the years to come the republic will be able to reach that critical-rational stage of development where politics will follow real interests, firm cooperative agreements between grass-roots movements and political institutions, ideological slogans and definitions will be tied more closely to political life, gaining content that is anchored in political practice. Meanwhile the stage of interest formation is only starting.

The development of democracy takes years, if not decades. Liberal democracy took shape in Western Europe and North America during a very long process. And it took many decades between 1828-1900 while they struggled with the first wave of democratisation.¹⁰ In new democracies such as Armenia democratisation processes take much more time than one might suppose.

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ENDNOTES

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- ¹ Kari Rummukainen & Johanna Berger (eds), *Pathways to Democracy*, 2nd Year, SOCRATES, 1999, www.akademia.org
- ² Ronald Grigor Suny, *Looking towards Ararat. Armenia in Modern History*, Indiana University Press, 1993, pp23-36.
- ³ Gagik Harutunian until July 1992 and Khosrov Harutunian until January 1993.
- ⁴ Parties remain the most important mediating institutions between citizens and the state. The existence of minor 'protest parties', especially those on the right, is considered to act as a channel for disaffected voters. From the other point of view, party fragmentation or polarisation is associated with lower levels of democratic support overall. At the moment, more than 114 political parties and associations have been registered by the Ministry of Justice. Armenian parties address the entire nation and correspondingly speak in the name of the entire nation. The programmes of the parties do not differ very much. To a certain extent, the political parties of Armenia are groups of people with fuzzily defined ideological principles and are united around the person of a charismatic group leader. The loss of a leader (a physical loss as in the case of Demirchian or Sarkisian) or a gradual fading away of the leader's charisma automatically bring decline in the ratings of the party or even the complete disappearance of the party from the political arena.
- ⁵ Between December 1994 and March 1995 almost the entire Communist parliamentary faction was expelled from the party by the Central Committee for consistently voting with the government.
- ⁶ National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, *Report of the Survey Mission to Armenia*, March 15-31, 1995.
- ⁷ *Monitoring the media coverage of the March 1998 presidential elections in Armenia*, Final Report, European Institute for the Media, July 1998.
- ⁸ Except the Demirchian-Sarkisian Union Alliance during the 1990 parliamentary elections.
- ⁹ By its constitutional arrangement Armenia is a semi-presidential republic.
- ¹⁰ Huntington, SP, *The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, pp13-26.

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