Subsequent Mark's saw the gradual introduction of improvements that were designed to have the minimum of effect on overall production.

The advantage of the British Mark’s was that they were designed mainly to help infantry to break into entrenched positions, a role for which, despite their mechanical drawbacks, they proved eminently suitable.  GHQs interest in the tank was crucial in persuading the War Office (WO) to pursue a concept which it had seemingly abandoned in June 1915 after a series of unsatisfactory trials of various designs in the preceding months.

Concurrent with British technical development of the tank was the development of doctrine. Despite the somewhat ambitious claims made for the tank by the advocates of ‘Mechanical Warfare’ Haig and the WO saw the tank in more practical terms as an adjunct that would support a ‘traditional’ artillery/infantry attack. Where German doctrine of May 1918 stated that “The infantry and tanks will advance independently of one another. No special instructions regarding the co-operation with tanks will be issued,” successive WO publications emphasised the role of the tank in supporting infantry in obtaining their objective and the need for all-arms co-operation.

The JSCSC Library holds a number of contemporary publications issued by the War Office and the General Staff relating to the use of tanks, training, and all-arms co-operation.

(Photograph courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, Q6299, Crown Copyright)