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Campaign & Battle Series

The First Chechen War 1994 – 1996

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The First Chechen War

On 27 October 1991 Dzhokar Dudaev, ex-soviet General and leader of the All National Congress of the Chechen People (NCChP), won the Chechen presidential elections. On 1 November 1991, Chechnya declared independence from the Russian Federation, which refused to recognize the declaration. The next two years saw escalating violence in Chechnya as Dudaev sought to oppress opposition groups, who in turn sought to overthrow his government with the covert financial and military support of Russia. After the unsuccessful attack on Grozny by Chechen opposition forces in November 1994, in which 58 Russian servicemen were captured, the Russian government was forced to publicly accept its role in supporting the Chechen Provisional Council and on 29 November the Russian Security Council agreed to use force. On 11 December Russian armoured columns began their attack on Grozny and from December to January 1995 conducted an aerial and artillery bombardment of the city. On 3 January 1995 Russian troops were forced to retreat from the centre of Grozny but sustained bombardment led to Chechen forces beginning a retreat from Grozny on 17 January 1995. Conflict spread to the countryside, towns and villages of Chechnya with the nature of the conflict changing from urban warfare to guerilla warfare and insurgency. On 6 August 1996 Chechen forces launched an attack against Grozny resulting in the Khasavyurt Agreement of 31 August, which provided for the withdrawal of Russian troops and a future agreement on Russo-Chechen relations to be reached by 31 December 2001. The First Chechen War represents a drastic failure of the Russian forces in a campaign characterized by inadequate planning and preparation, poor intelligence and reconnaissance, competing command structures and the generally poor quality of training and troops in the Russian Army. This, combined with a reliance on out of date thinking and the decline of urban combat training, made the Russian Army ill prepared to meet a relatively low-tech enemy in urban conflict and insurgency situations.

Monographs

As an introduction to the history of Chechnya **GAMMER**, *The Lone Wolf and the Bear*, is a good place to start. The author provides an excellent overview of Russo-Chechen relations from the 16th Century arguing that Russo/Soviet influence and modernization have shaped Chechen self-perception. Gammer further argues that the context of Chechen independence has shifted from nationalism to the fundamentalist *jihād* of Wahhabism. **JAIMOUKHA**, *The Chechens*, presents an anthropological study that examines Chechen history, society and culture. The author provides a pro-Chechen overview of the conflict and a useful analysis of the progress of the war from a political perspective. **EVANGELISTA**, *The Chechen Wars*, provides a narrative of the conflict at the political level charting the background and causes of the war. He argues that while geostrategic and historical factors played a part, the key elements leading to war were leadership politics and the personality conflict between Yeltsin and Dudaev, and concludes that a more competent leadership in Moscow could have prevented conflict. A compelling personal account of the war may be found in **BABCHENKO**, *One Soldier's War in Chechnya*, which tells of the author's experiences as a draftee in 1995, and later, from 1999, as a volunteer in the Russian Army.

O'BALLANCE, *Wars in the Caucasus*, offers an excellent overview of the conflict in the form of a traditional narrative that focuses on the strategic and political dimensions of the war. He argues that the strategic importance of Chechnya to Russia results from Chechen oil reserves and refining capacity, and the regions role as an oil pipeline corridor. Such economic considerations, together with the requirement to oppose the constitutionally illegal election of Dudaev and the declaration of independence combined with the embarrassing public admission of the failed Russian covert operations were the reasons for military action. However, the author argues, Yeltsin made three major mistakes in underestimating the strength of Chechen resistance, in overlooking the possibility that Chechens might unite against a common foe and in launching a campaign in the Caucasus in the winter. **TISHKOV**, *Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society*, examines the conflict in terms of ethnography. Tishkov's approach is focused at the level of individual perception and he uses the voices of his 'informants' to analyze the motives, experiences and reactions of Chechens, combatant and non-combatant alike. Contrary to most other commentators, Tishkov disregards long-term historical and ethnic factors arguing that the roots of Chechen hostility stem from their experience of

deportation under Stalin which left the Chechens with a historical sense of injured collective dignity, exacerbated by the influence of Dudaev in a region experiencing the effects of modernisation and chronic social problems.

DUNLOP, *Russia Confronts Chechnya*, examines the history of Russo-Chechen relations and the roots and causes of the conflict up to the outbreak of war in 1994, arguing that the Russian leadership demonstrated little understanding of the historical relation between Russia and the Chechen people, whose own relationship with Russia is sharply defined. For the author, the war was a result of Russian failure to appreciate the likely strength of Chechen opposition and the influence of the Russian 'war party' who believed that opposition should be crushed and that ethnic grievances could be resolved through the use of force. Dunlop further argues that Russia did not exploit all the peaceful means to resolve the problem, in particular by failing to conduct serious negotiations with Dudaev, while its covert support of Chechen opposition groups damaged its credibility as an impartial mediator. **CORNELL**, *Small Nations and Great Powers*, notes that all Caucasian conflicts in recent years have been cases of ethnic-based autonomous regions revolting against respective central governments, and that although religion is a factor, the key issue is ethnicity resulting in primarily political conflicts over territory and ownership. Cornell further argues that the dissolution of the Soviet Union created a geopolitical void in the Caucasus that enabled ethnic groups to pursue agendas of autonomy and independence. In the case of Chechnya a combination of factors such as Chechen demographic majority in the region, strong anti-Russian feeling resulting from the deportations under Stalin and the existence of natural resources that could make it a viable state combined to produce a credible autonomy struggle. For Cornell the standard reasons given for why the war started are not sufficient. Although strategic concerns, the danger of secession and the incompatible personalities of Yeltsin and Dudaev were important, the key causes for Cornell are the signing of the Baku oil consortium and the failure to topple Dudaev by means short of direct military intervention. Cornell further concludes that the war could have been prevented, had it not been for the personal enmity between the individuals governing Russia and Chechnya.

GERMAN, *The Chechen War*, argues that the war was in part a result of the situation created by the transition of the Soviet Union into the Russian Federation. While regional authorities across the Soviet Union governments adopted nationalist agendas the crisis in central government, culminating in the 1991 coup, took precedence over all peripheral matters, hence Russia's failure to intervene decisively when Chechnya declared independence in 1991. German further argues that the nature of Chechen independence, which included a lack of genuine reform efforts, militarization, and a failure to improve the economy, created conditions which hindered mediation and precluded the possibility of a negotiated system. Ultimately, the author sees the decision to go to war as a failure of the democratization process in Russia, in that the decision was made in secret by members of the Security Council and the security ministries.

SEELY, *Russo-Chechen Conflict, 1800-2000*, analyses the changes in Russia's Chechen policy within the context of the transition of power from the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation, arguing that the October 1993 putsch, led by the Chechen Speaker of the Supreme Soviet, Khasbulatov, effectively ended ten years of a liberal agenda in Russian politics. Seely emphasizes the role of corruption and criminality in Russo-Chechen relations, arguing that Dudaev's regime was effectively tolerated because of the interests of the FSK, the army and oil producers in Russia, all of whom are alleged to have profited greatly. Seely further argues that ultimately Russian fears that Khasbulatov would come to dominate Chechnya forced Yeltsin to take action by supporting the Chechen Provisional Council against both Dudaev and Khasbulatov. The author concludes with a narrative of Russian military operations in Chechnya from the initial advance, through the assault on Grozny and in mountain operations in the final stages of the war, highlighting the poor standard of the Russian army.

HERSPRING, *The Kremlin and the High Command*, examines the relationship between Yeltsin and the military, concluding that much of the blame for Russian failure can be attributed to Yeltsin, who cut military budgets during the war, detached the General Staff from the Ministry of Defence, and publicly criticized the military while failing to initiate any meaningful reform of the Russian post-Soviet armed forces. **KNEZYS & SEDLICKAS**, *The War in Chechnya*, offer an exhaustive account

of the First Chechen War that focuses primarily on the military aspects of the conflict. Commencing with a brief narrative of Russo-Chechen relations and the independence movement the authors examine the development of the post-independence Chechen forces and the Russian mobilization. They continue with an excellent account of the various stages of the campaign at the operational and tactical level, analyzing both Russian and Chechen methods and tactics. Of particular interest is the English translation of a report reputedly prepared by General Colonel Vorobjov, assistant commander of the Land Army, which succinctly details Russian military failings in preparation, training, readiness, command, coordination, equipment supply and quality, intelligence and technical and rear area support (p. 81-85). The authors further examine the conflict in wider Chechnya with an analysis of Russian and Chechen actions and tactics in both lowland and mountain areas and the Chechen adoption of terrorist actions. **SIRÉN**, *The Battle for Grozny*, concentrates on the issues of why Russia launched the campaign and why she failed to achieve the swift results that were expected. After examining several theories in turn he concludes that the conflict can best be seen as the culmination of a series of events and factors in which personality politics and the influence of the ‘war party’ in the Kremlin were the key factors. Sirén proceeds to offer an excellent concise appraisal of the Russian military, arguing that failure was underpinned by poor planning and preparation, the lack of training, low morale, and poor command structures characterised by a failure in communication between the separate ministries conducting the campaign.

KULIKOV, *The Chechen Operation*, provides a detailed account of the operation plan and the composition of both Russian and Chechen forces, concluding with an analysis of lessons learnt. **SPEYER**, *Chechnya: Urban Warfare Lessons Learned*, focuses on Chechen urban tactics. **GALEOTTI**, *The Kremlin’s Agenda*, was published before the conclusion of the war in 1996 but provides a handy brief summary of the main failings of the Russian military and is highly critical of the role of Grachev. **LAFFIN**, *The World in Conflict*, offers a brief narrative account of the conflict placing considerable emphasis on Russian incompetence. **CIMBALA & RAINOW**, *Russian and Postmodern Deterrence*, in their chapter on Chechnya provide a competent overview of the course of the war, Russian and Chechen strategy and tactics, and a summary of lessons learned. **SAFRANCHUK**, *Chechnya*, examines the conflict as an example of asymmetric warfare. The author compares Russian and Chechen forces, concluding that at the individual and unit level the Chechens enjoyed superior capabilities over the Russians. The author proceeds to an analysis of the Chechen experience, through an examination of the military, security and political components of the campaign. **DILEGGE & KONYNENBURG**, *View from the Wolves’ Den*, present extracts from interviews held with senior Chechen personnel discussing the development of Chechen tactics logistics and intelligence. **SUMNER**, *Success of Terrorism in War*, attempts to evaluate the strategic contribution that terrorism played in Chechnya’s success, arguing that Budennovsk was the turning point of the Chechen War. **NIKOLAEV**, *A Hotbed of Terrorism and Destabilisation*, briefly examines the influence of international terrorism and criminality in Chechnya.

LAMBETH, *Russia’s Airpower in Crisis*, examines Russian air operations in Chechnya, arguing that the conflict offered a tailor-made test of Russia’s regional security doctrine. The author examines issues such as the establishment of air control, air support to ground operations, and airlift arguing that the Russian air force was able to provide support to the ground forces despite the poor military plan and problems created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Lambeth concludes with an analysis of lessons that can be drawn from the air campaign, observing that financial deprivation restricts the capability and future of the Russian air forces. **GORDON & DAWES**, *Russian Air Power*, analyse the make up and weaponry of the Russian air forces and provide a narrative of Russian air operations during the campaign. The authors also briefly examine Chechen air forces and air defence systems. **DE HAAS**, *Russian Security and Air Power*, offers an appraisal of Russian air power and the actual use of air forces, arguing that Russian air operations may be characterized as a failure in that it did not guarantee victory on the ground or have a decisive impact on Chechen resistance. De Haas also provides a brief analysis of Chechen strategy and operations.

LAPIDUS, *The Dynamics of Secession*, argues that the primary causes of the conflict lie in the historical legacy of Russo-Chechen antagonism in which deportation was a key formative experience that further strengthened Chechen group solidarity. The author sees the process of Soviet state

breakdown and federal renegotiation as the catalyst for conflict in which the role of personalities proved decisive, not least in the failure of both governments to conduct direct negotiations at the highest level. **LAPIDUS** restates this position in, *The War in Chechnya*, in which she further examines the response of the international community, regarding the Chechen war as both a failure of Russian policy and of Western governments. **TOFT**, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence*, examines the role that territory plays in ethnic conflict and asks why settlement was achieved between Russia and Tatarstan but not Chechnya. The author looks at how the Russian State and the Chechen ethnos viewed the disputed territory and how these views conditioned their negotiations, concluding that Chechen settlement patterns gave the ethnic group both the legitimacy and capability to push for independence, while concerns over precedent setting dominated the Russian position. **THOMAS**, *The Russian Armed Forces in Chechnya, 1994*, examines the decision making structures that led to the use of force in Chechnya as opposed to a peacekeeping option similar to that employed in Abkhazia and Ossetia. The author argues that the contemporary absence of a Russian peacekeeping doctrine and a formal decision making process played a key role as did the fact that peacekeeping options appear not to have been presented to Yeltsin due to the influence of his inner circle. **KHASBULATOV**, *The Kremlin's Chechen Policy*, should be read with his role in Chechnya and his conflict with Yeltsin in mind. He traces events from 1995 arguing that the Kremlin was not willing to enter serious negotiations despite the 30 July Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities, and calls for stronger international intervention and guarantees as the bulwark of a negotiated peace. **GOLDMAN & NICHOL**, *Russian Conflict in Chechnya*, assess Russian political reactions to the war and the implications for the United States. **CEM OĞUZ**, *From the Idea of Caucasian Unity*, looks at the role of the Confederation of the Peoples of the Caucasus (CMPC), arguing that though the CMPC called on Caucasian peoples to defend Chechnya, deep divergences in approach between the Chechens and other CMPC members existed and once war had broken out the Confederation abstained from involvement.

LIEVEN, *Chechnya*, is based on his personal experience as a journalist in Russia and Chechnya during the war. He seeks to explain Russian defeat in terms of the condition of the Russian state and society in the 1990's, arguing that Chechnya was an absolute failure resulting from systemic crisis in the Russian military, which in itself reflected wider weaknesses in the state and society at large. Lieven further argues that the reasons for Chechen victory can be explained in terms of their history, society and culture. Though lacking in detail at the operational and tactical level, Lieven provides a readable narrative of the conflict and useful chapters on the failings and weaknesses of the Russian military. **SMITH**, *Allah's Mountains*, is another journalist who covered the war in Chechnya and his personal experience informs a traditional narrative of the conflict which highlights the human dimension of the war. **GALL and DE WAAL**, *Chechnya*, both covered the Chechen conflict for *The Moscow Times* and their book uses personal accounts and interviews to provide a highly readable and straightforward narrative of the conflict, which focuses primarily on personalities and the political dimensions of the war. **BENNETT**, *Crying Wolf*, examines the history of Russo-Chechen relations and the causes of the war. Writing with a distinct pro-Chechen bias her primary focus is on the human dimension of the conflict, Russian repression and the political manoeuvring of the Russian and Chechen elites. **BIRD**, *To Catch a Tartar*, eschews conventional narrative in favour of an approach that moves between contemporary and historical events. In common with the majority of journalists who have written books on the subject, Bird concentrates on portraying his experience of the human dimensions of conflict.

PANICO, *Conflicts in the Caucasus*, offers a useful overview in his narrative account of the conflict to July 1995. **SMITH**, *A Chronology of the Chechen Conflict Parts 1 to 4*, provides an in-depth chronology of key events from Chechen opposition moves on 4 July 1994 to Col-Gen Shkirko's December 1996 announcement of the intention to withdraw all Internal troops. **BLANDY et al**, *The Chechen Conflict*, looks briefly at the background to the conflict, Russian military failings, air operations and technological lessons. It includes the Russian order of battle for ground forces and statistics for equipment and troop losses. **ROTH**, *Russia's Military Doctrine*, examines the conflict in relation to Russian military doctrine, use of force, and Armed Forces capability to achieve success. The author concludes that Russia urgently needs military reform, improved processes to selectively commit forces, and a less offensively oriented doctrine.

OLIKER, *Russia's Chechen Wars*, offers a concise analysis of Russian and Chechen tactics and operations and their evolution during the conflict concluding with a chapter on lessons learnt. **FINCH**, *Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya*, identifies key areas of failure by the Russian Military arguing that ill-defined objectives, a reliance on mass, poor employment and distribution of forces, poor implementation of manoeuvre warfare, inadequate security and critical leadership failures all played their part in Russia's defeat. **PIKE**, *Urban Operations in Chechnya*, examines key lessons from Russian urban operations in Chechnya and compares them with US doctrine and practice, concluding that though US armed forces are better prepared there are valuable lessons to be implemented. **THOMAS**, *The 31 December 1994 – 8 January 1995 Battle for Grozny*, provides a good account of the battle at the tactical level and an analysis of Russian and Chechen tactics. **JENKINSON**, *Tactical Observations from the Grozny Combat Experience*, provides an excellent account of the first and fourth battles for Grozny and the complexities of urban warfare, together with useful tables summarising lessons learned. **GRAU**, *Russian Urban Tactics*, provides a succinct analysis of initial Russian failings and the subsequent improvements in Russian urban tactics as lessons learned were applied, and **EDWARDS**, *Mars Unmasked*, provides a concise overview of the campaign.

SMITH, *Commonalities in Russian Military Operations*, compares Russian operations in Chechnya to those in Stalingrad, arguing that the Russian approach, characterised by the massive use of force, extensive collateral damage and acceptance of high casualty rates, does not work. **NUSSIO**, *Tanks in the Street*, uses computer simulation to analyse the engagement of the 131st MRB and the 81st MMR who were destroyed by Chechen fighters during the December 1994 assault on Grozny. The author seeks to identify possible alternative outcomes resulting from different tactical approaches and concludes that training and dismounted security are essential in urban armoured operations. **HARRIS**, *Tanks: Fulfilling a Role*, examines Grozny as one of three case studies examining the role of armour in urban combat, concluding with Nussio that effective training is fundamental if tanks are to play an effective role in Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). **WALLWORK**, *Artillery in Urban Operations*, examines the two major battles for Grozny from an artillery perspective and provides an analysis of artillery equipment and of lessons learned. The author concludes that an understanding of the use of artillery in urban operations is vital and highlights the need for the establishment of suitable artillery doctrine and procedures for urban operations. **CASSIDY**, *Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya*, examines Russian experience in the context of asymmetric warfare in Afghanistan and Chechnya, attributing Russian failure to the paradoxes of asymmetric conflict. The author concludes that both conflicts offer valuable lessons for the development of military doctrine and practice. **SUMNER**, *Success of Terrorism in War*, examines the use of terrorism as a tactic by Chechen forces arguing that the Budennovsk hostage siege was the turning point in the war and that terror tactics ultimately led to Russian defeat.

LUTZ, *Russian Strategy in Chechnya*, argues that poorly defined objectives, inappropriate strategy, and poor force structure underlay Russian failure. The author analyses the air campaign concluding that air power was successful when directed against conventional forces but failed as the war evolved into a counterinsurgency campaign. **FOX**, *Urban Close Air-Support and Non-Lethality*, examines the use of close air-support (CAS) in urban operations and the use of non-lethal weapons (NLWs) from CAS platforms. He argues that failings in the Russian Air Forces forestalled effective use of air power in Grozny, leaving the Russian military with no other option than the use of overwhelming firepower, concluding that had the Russians possessed NLWs the outcome may well have been different. **BAEV**, *Russian Misuse of Air Power in the Chechen War*, argues that overall the Russian air forces performed well but that the uses to which air power was put undermined the effectiveness of the campaign and did much to polarise popular opposition among the Chechen populace. The **CONFLICT STUDIES RESEARCH CENTRE**, *Frontal and Army Aviation*, provides an excellent brief analysis of Air Force and Army Aviation operations.

SHAPPELL, *Pseudo Democracy, Real War*, argues that Russia falls far short of Western standards of democracy. He analyses the political decision making process in Russia's execution of the war in Chechnya, arguing that Russian policy in its 'near abroad' could well be translated to wider foreign

policy decisions with implications for US security. **LAVAN**, *The Chechen War and Russia's Transition to Democracy*, also pursues the theme of democracy in Russia arguing that the Chechen war demonstrates the authoritarian nature of the Russian State, in which a small number of ministers and advisors exercise true power. **SMITH**, *Chechnya: the Political Dimension*, looks at the impact of the Chechen conflict on Russian politics to 1995, whilst **WARE**'s three research papers provide a broad overview of the political implications of the conflict at the national and international level.

KHAN, *The Muslims of Chechnya*, sketches a broad overview of the history of Islam in Chechnya and Russo-Chechen conflict. Writing before the conclusion of the conflict, the author concludes that history demonstrates that the Chechens will not give up their struggle for independence. Writing in 1993, **HENZE**, *Islam in the North Caucasus*, traces Russo-Chechen relations from the nineteenth century and the character and impact of Islam on Chechen society, arguing that there is little evidence of radical Islamic motivation in the events of 1991 or their aftermath, and that contemporary Chechnya was comparable to moderate Turkey.

Periodicals

A JSCSC Library Catalogue search currently returns 253 results for periodical articles relating to Chechnya. This Readers' Guide highlights a selection of articles that address the land and air campaigns, and the Russian military in general. Readers' wishing to search for additional references should enter the search term "Chechnya" in the Library Catalogue and select "Periodical Article" from the Media drop-down list.

GEIBEL, *Red Dawn in Chechnya*, presents a useful chronology of the initial phases of the campaign from November 1994 to 16 January 1995. **THOMAS**, *The Russian Armed Forces Confront Chechnya*, presents a thorough analysis of the early phases of the conflict in four separate papers. The first two papers cover the period 11-31 December 1994 examining the build-up to the campaign, Russian planning and Russian and Chechen force-structure, strategy and tactics. The final two papers present a narrative of the Battle for Grozny between 1-26 January 1996 and also examine psychological factors, lessons learned, and the wider consequences of the conflict for Russia. **GEIBEL**, *Lessons in Urban Combat*, gives an analysis of the New Year's Eve assault. **THOMAS**, *The Battle of Grozny*, looks at the battle again with reference to five lessons: the need to know the terrain in which you are fighting; the need for preparation; the need for the right weapons to be deployed; the need to adapt tactics to the situation; and the need for effective communications. **RUPE**, *The Battle of Grozny*, provides a concise overview of the battle and lessons learned. **GRAU & THOMAS**, *'Soft Log' and Concrete Canyons*, examine Russian urban combat logistics in Grozny, concluding that the Russian army was poorly prepared. **ARQUILLA & KARASIK**, *Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict?*, provides an analysis of the conflict, arguing that the networked nature of Chechen society primed Chechen forces to operate with a high degree of decentralized authority and employ a wide range of netwar-oriented activities.

LIEVEN, *The World Turned Upside Down*, and **THOMAS & GRAU**, *Russian Lessons Learned*, both provide brief analyses of lessons learned from the campaign. **CANFIELD**, *The Russian Chechen Wars*, in his brief article on the lessons of the war for U.S. defence planners, stresses the importance of successful human intelligence (HUMINT), the need for effective urban combat capability, and raises important questions over the role of military force in complex situations. **RAEVSKY**, *Russian Military Performance*, argues that the Russian forces were inadequate in number and poorly trained. **SIMUNOVIC**, *The Russian Military in Chechnya*, examines the causes and effects of low morale in the Russian army during the campaign. **LAMBETH**, *Russia's Wounded Military*, examines the underlying problems of the Russian military and their effect in Chechnya. **PILLONI**, *Burning Corpses*, argues that Russia failed to apply its own military doctrine for urban operations due to a lack of training, and the resort to indiscriminate firepower had major implications for the final outcome of the conflict. **COOLING**, *Russia's 1994-96 Campaign*, argues that the campaign was an operational failure because the government did not give the armed forces sufficient time to prepare and deploy, and Grachev and other commanders proceeded with insufficient intelligence. **GOLDSTEIN**, *Russian*

Civil-Military Relations, looks at the relationship between the Russian military and its political masters, focusing on the high level of dissent over the Chechen conflict.

MARSHALL-HASDELL, *Recent Employment of Russian Air Power*, provides a good overview of the Russian air campaign conducted by both the Air Force and Army Aviation. **THOMAS**, *Air Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, focuses on which tactics and operations worked for Russia, and whether rotary or fixed wing aircraft performed better, and concludes with a number of lessons learned for the use of air power in low-intensity conflicts. **BAEV**, *Russia's Airpower in the Chechen War*, argues that despite woefully inadequate funding, poor training and maintenance, and a lack of equipment Russian air power performed effectively. However, indiscriminate bombing in anti-guerrilla operations helped strengthen Chechen resistance and attracted criticism from within Russia and from abroad. **LAMBETH**, *Russia's Air War in Chechnya*, also emphasises the effects of underfunding and a lack of training in the Russian Air Forces, arguing that though its airlift arm performed well its ground attack performance was poor.

Online Resources

Resources on the Web vary greatly in quality. However, there are a few useful sites that the Library can recommend. **SMALL WARS JOURNAL** offers a Chechnya reference library which provides access to a number of useful articles that cover both the First and the Second Chechen Wars. The site also contains the transcripts of a number of US Marine Corps interviews with key Chechen personnel, including Aslan Maskhadov. **BBC NEWS** offers an excellent site for the Chechen Conflict and the option to search its archives for news stories and articles. **AMINA.COM** provides a number of links to a variety of articles on the conflict and Chechnya in general. Finally **WIKIPEDIA** presents a useful, if somewhat partisan overview of the conflict.

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