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# **Compare and contrast the Special Relationship (SR) of the immediate post-World War II period with the position at the start of the twenty-first century**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The concept of the 'Anglo-American Special Relationship' (AASR) was famously born within the words of Winston Churchill's speech at Fulton, Missouri in 1946. Throughout his career, Churchill identified the unique nature of the relationship which he believed far exceeded the scope of other bilateral arrangements, with close ties across a multiplicity of areas. Academics, politicians and journalists are foremost among groups who have since questioned the existence, context and future prospects of the AASR, expressing views that have consistently reflected the impassioned nature of the debate. In order to frame the subsequent analysis, an initial examination of what is understood by 'special' and 'relationship' in this context is provided, highlighting also the underpinning historical and practical foundations. Evidence of other 'special relationships' and how 'specialness' is measured are both considered, although the subjective nature of both concepts makes conclusive statements impossible. The analysis suggests that a unique relationship does exist and that the AASR should be considered special. Progress of the relationship is then assessed, with a by-decade review of the first sixty years of the AASR. Both high- and low-points are examined and trends identified, exposing the importance of the relationships between key individuals, but also the enduring qualities of utility, relevance and breadth that the AASR exhibits. The breadth of the relationship is highlighted by an examination of different aspects: the 'hard' issues of political, intelligence, nuclear and military cooperation; the 'softer' areas of culture, language, business and finance; and finally how this has manifested in the two countries' dealings over Europe and Northern Ireland. Twenty-first century experience of the AASR focuses specifically on the impact of '9/11' and the subsequent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the 'war on terror'. The contemporary relevance of the relationship is also considered, not only in the context of 9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq, but within the wider issues, the breadth identified in the previous chapters. Finally, conclusions are drawn. The different schools of thought on the AASR are analyzed, with their wider motivation considered, in an attempt to explain why such a disparate range of views exists. American hegemony is also examined, with its impact for the US, the UK and the AASR itself assessed. Whilst an attempt to accurately predict the future of the relationship is unrealistic, based upon trends and key themes, the continued utility, relevance and breadth are assessed. Despite its foundations in the Twentieth century, the AASR remains a

fundamental aspect of both countries' national policy, with wider relevance for the international system. As such, the debate it generates seems likely to remain an enduring and enlightening theme.

### **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

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## **CHAPTER ONE – IS THE ‘SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP’ SPECIAL?**

“This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States... a fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples”<sup>1</sup>.

Conceived in the crucible of the anti-Nazi struggle of the Second World War (WW2), then further justified as a bulwark against perceived Soviet expansion, Britain’s ‘special relationship’ vis-à-vis the US has profoundly shaped both countries’ foreign and domestic policy considerations for over sixty years. It has manifested itself in areas ranging from military policy, through business arrangements, to wide-ranging cultural aspects and intelligence sharing. This interaction between the two countries has affected their relationships with other nation states and has been central to the post-WW2 path both have followed. Academic, journalistic and political debate continues to rage regarding the nature, texture and even existence of the relationship. At one end of the spectrum are those who claim the ‘Anglo-American Special Relationship’ (AASR) is a figment of (a largely British) imagination, created at a time when the UK’s position as a great international power had clearly ended. “Max Beloff... portrayed the notion of a special relationship as an agreeable British ‘myth’ to help cushion the shock of national decline”<sup>2</sup>. Others have sought to define the AASR’s existence in ‘time sensitive’ terms, most commonly “[waxing] fat on war”<sup>3</sup>, with the Second World War as its “apogee”<sup>4</sup>. Other commentators concur believing that the AASR exists, but seeing its scope as restricted, justified by specific requirements such as providing Britain with a role as a ‘trans-Atlantic bridge’; “British policy has been Janus-faced, peering eastwards at the events in Europe, and westwards to the outer world”<sup>5</sup>. Finally, many observers acknowledge the existence of the AASR, and differ only regarding interpretation, whether over the degree of ‘specialness’<sup>6</sup>, or the breadth and depth of individual areas<sup>7</sup>. Thus, a full panoply of opinions exists, from the AASR-sceptic to the AASR-evangelist, with most shades between represented. What is incontestable is that debate surrounding the relationship is as fierce today as it has been since Churchill’s defining words at Fulton in 1946.

Historical context is a crucial aspect of the AASR. Formerly a British colony, America as a nation was born out of the 1776 rebellion, leaving a cultural, religious, linguistic and democratic inheritance that endures today. Tension persisted throughout the Nineteenth century, with the two countries at war in 1812, the British famously burning down the President’s residence. Fifty years later, the US Civil War raised new tensions, with Britain failing to provide either the Union or

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<sup>1</sup> Churchill, 1946, Fulton, Missouri.

<sup>2</sup> Reynolds, 1985-6, p.1.

<sup>3</sup> Danchev, 1998, p.160.

<sup>4</sup> Interview with Lord Callaghan Feb 1987 - Dobson, 1995, p.72.

<sup>5</sup> Kennedy, 1982, p.9.

<sup>6</sup> Kimball (2005); Danchev (1998).

<sup>7</sup> Dumbrell (2001 & 2006). The most recent endorsement of the existence and significance of the AASR was provided by Queen Elizabeth II, speaking at a White House banquet, 7 May 2007.

Confederate governments with overwhelming support, until the outcome of the conflict conclusively revealed itself. Yet by the Twentieth centuries, both nations based foreign and military policy upon the assumption that there would be no hostile action between the sides, foundations cemented by shared experience fighting two world wars during the first half of the century. Thus while Churchill's 1946 speech cemented the AASR within the common lexicon, the historical experience of relations between the nations must be recognized.

Within the remainder of this chapter, we will consider what is understood by the term 'AASR', analyzing what can be inferred from the word 'special' and determining the foundations upon which US-UK relations have developed since WW2. Chapter Two will then examine the historiography of the relationship throughout the Twentieth Century. Space precludes pursuing an in-depth, year-by-year account of every event; instead, key episodes that have shaped the texture of the relationship will be briefly considered, to derive an overall understanding of the historical context of the debate. Within Chapter Three, several different perspectives and dimensions of the AASR will be explored. Once again, the intent of this analysis is not to exhaustively discuss every conceivable facet of US-UK relations, rather to highlight both the major pillars upon which the relationship rests, as well as some other areas that act as 'glue' further binding the two countries together. Chapter Four will examine the relationship as it stands today, focussing upon Twenty-First century events of the Bush-Blair era. Finally, Chapter Five will seek to draw together a number of conclusions, both about the relationship itself and the reasons for widely differing views on the utility and existence of the AASR. Without 'crystal ball gazing', it will attempt to extrapolate some of the key themes previously identified, to provide a general insight into US-UK relations for the future.

### What Do We Mean By 'Special' And 'Relationship'?

Initial research relating to the 'special relationship' reveals the extent to which the phrase is inherently associated with US-UK relations. Only a handful of articles or books that emerge from any keyword search do not relate to the relationship between America and Britain. The phrase represents common currency in academic, political and cultural circles; it is implicit that Anglo-American relations are being debated with authors generally feeling little need for further qualification. Yet an understanding of exactly what is meant by the term often varies wildly between authors. Danchev provides useful context for what is an intangible concept, with a discussion regarding Aristotelian types of friendship. Aristotle identifies three kinds of friendship: based on utility, pleasure and goodness<sup>8</sup>. While Aristotle believed that only the latter, a friendship based on goodness, was perfect, the *realpolitik* of international relations suggests that only the first, a friendship based on utility, is likely to endure in the AASR context. Whilst some have cited the presence of an AASR with reverence, seeing the relationship in almost evangelical terms, this

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<sup>8</sup> Danchev, 1998, p.153.

explanation is less plausible than the idea that the two countries perceive the idea pragmatically, with clear profit and loss calculations driving decision-making. This essay will argue that the relationship between the two countries represents a complex cost-benefit analysis, an evaluation of interests versus values, with multiple layers and personal relationships that make assessments multi-dimensional rather than linear.

The 'special' relationship does not preclude disagreements. It is precisely because the two countries can disagree, frequently over significant issues and yet continue to operate together, that reinforces the strength of the relationship. Many authors have drawn an analogy between US-UK relations and those found in a family, particularly over the issue of disagreement. As Vivekanandan says, "they are family quarrels. Two relatives sometimes frustrate, surprise and even aggravate the other; they also interest, amuse and inspire. Each is more confident in a moral venture if it has the other's tacit support"<sup>9</sup>. Kimball points out that the phrase is now often used as a proper noun, with either initial capitals or quotation marks used to denote something special, but questions who decides what the words mean – "politicians?, pundits? historians?"<sup>10</sup>. Elie also provides an interesting perspective on the term and its usage, saying that special was to be a synonym for "'exceptional', 'extraordinary' or 'exclusive'.. the alternative French translation for the phrase was 'the privileged bond'"<sup>11</sup>.

This brief analysis of the term 'AASR' identifies that despite a widespread and common agreement of the relationship being inferred, its exact nature remains extensively debated and open to widely-differing interpretations. Used by a multiplicity of observers and cited in a variety of different contexts, this mixture of widespread agreement, but linguistic ambiguity, is a pervasive theme.

### History And Practical Foundations.

Facing shared enemies in perceived wars of national survival has been a common strand throughout the relationship's history. Initially, Nazi Germany represented an ominous challenge to Western ideals, a spectre replaced in the Cold War period by the threat from communism. More recently, the Global War on Terror (GWOT – further discussed in Chapter Four) has emerged as a threat to Western society, once again providing a focus around which the US-UK can unite. The memory of Churchill remains central to the ideals of the special relationship, not only in the UK, but also in the US' psyche - "that a foreign national...should occupy such a place [in American memory] is remarkable"<sup>12</sup>. Evoking the memory of Churchill is most prevalent by politicians on both sides of the Atlantic during periods of crisis. Following the terrorist attacks on the US in

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<sup>9</sup> Vivekanandan, 1990, p.370.

<sup>10</sup> Kimball, 2005, p.1.

<sup>11</sup> Elie, 2005, p.66.

<sup>12</sup> Dumbrell, 2005, p.39.

September 2001, New York Mayor Giuliani “called forth the Churchillian spirit of the London Blitz”<sup>13</sup>. ‘9/11’ was portrayed as proof that appeasement in the Twenty-First Century was not an option, much as Saddam Hussein had been compared to Hitler prior to the 1991 Gulf War<sup>14</sup>.

Yet the historical context of the AASR should not be overplayed<sup>15</sup>. Politicians calling forth the memory of Churchill are not a basis in itself for a special relationship existing, although within the complex web of mutual interdependence, the Churchillian legacy is an important factor. Britain’s decision to resist Nazi Germany represented a pivotal moment on many levels, not least the financial impact of waging war for two years without significant US assistance. This commitment arguably signalled the end of Britain as a ‘superpower’, resulting in UK dependence on US financial aid in the post-war period. Indeed, Charmley and Clark typify those who have argued that Britain would have been better advised accepting Hitler’s terms in 1940, allowing its empire to remain intact and preventing any subsequent reliance on America<sup>16</sup>. Thus the experiences of both countries in WW2 and its aftermath are one prism through which the AASR should be observed.

Three key factors must be considered when assessing the relationship: utility for both countries; relevance for both sides; and breadth of areas of cooperation. Aristotle’s ideas of friendship discussed above highlighted the importance of utility, which have been helped in the US-UK experience by a convergence of interests. A former US Ambassador to London noted, “what is remarkable about the Anglo-American relationship is the degree to which our respective interests have historically run in parallel. The coincidence of our interests is the basic element of the relationship”<sup>17</sup>. Where interests have not coincided, examples of which are discussed in the next chapter, relations have been strained, but there has always remained sufficient overlap between the two countries to ensure continued utility. Post-WW2, Britain represented a key world player and in the institutions created during this era, retained significant influence. This included the establishment of UN and its permanent membership of the Security Council and the formalization of international economic policy at Bretton Woods. Whilst there was an undoubted imbalance between the respective power wielded by both sides, from the formative post-war years extremely close US-UK interaction became the norm. Indeed, Kissinger believed the AASR involved “a pattern of consultation so matter-of-factly intimate that it became psychologically impossible to ignore British views”<sup>18</sup>. Robert Keohane has coined the term ‘empathetic interdependence’ to describe a situation where international actors are “interested in the welfare of others for their own sake”<sup>19</sup>; in this guise, the US could be seen as a powerful UK sponsor, with practical

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<sup>13</sup> Dumbrell, 2005, p.32.

<sup>14</sup> Danchev, 1998.

<sup>15</sup> Coker, 2001, asserts the UK considered the relationship in more historical terms, while the US showed greater pragmatism.

<sup>16</sup> In Howard, 1995. p.706.

<sup>17</sup> Seitz, 1994, p.9.

<sup>18</sup> Kissinger, 1979, p.90.

<sup>19</sup> Dumbrell, 2001, p.222.

manifestations in areas such as nuclear assistance with Polaris and Trident. Thus the utility and relevance of the relationship is a key consideration, one where the US-UK have proven intricately interrelated. Interdependence is across a wide variety of issues and areas, comprising multiple relationships and many different levels. This multi-faceted nature is discussed in more depth with examples in Chapter Three, but it has relevance here. If one considers the AASR as demonstrating the realist conceptions of utility and relevance, the anchors by which the relationship is held, then the final consideration of breadth is important: it provides multiple anchor points, ranging across extremely diverse areas. Considered together, they represent a solid foundation deeply rooted in shared history, for the relationship to be built upon.

### Other Special Relationships?

Time precludes detailed analysis of the two countries' arrangements with other nations, but a few general points underscore the differences between the AASR and other relationships where one or other is a partner<sup>20</sup>. In a uni-polar world<sup>21</sup>, or at the very least one that is multi-polar with only one superpower, it is unsurprising that many countries claim a 'special' relationship with the US to a greater or lesser degree. "The *reduction ad absurdum* of such a proposition is that *everyone* has a special relationship with the United States, because of the overwhelming power or overweening influence of the latter"<sup>22</sup>. Yet use of the term 'special' overstates the extent of these relations, misunderstanding the depth and breadth of arrangements between the US and other nations. "The use of the term 'special' to describe relationships the US maintains with others distorts our understanding of the peculiarly special Anglo-US bond"<sup>23</sup>. Arguably every country currently defines its strategy in relation to America<sup>24</sup>. Countries frequently quoted as US partners include Israel, Canada or Mexico. Each has strong ties in key areas, whether cultural, linguistic, financial or security-based; but none can lay claim to the scope of relations enjoyed by the US-UK, nor with the same levels of complex interdependence.

The UK also retains both bilateral and collective relationships with many countries, whether European partners through economic links such as the EU; linguistic and intelligence ties with countries such as Canada or Australia; or with the 53 Commonwealth countries through previous colonial associations. Indeed, former colonies' desire to retain strong links with UK was a source of mystery to the US: as the UK Ambassador to Washington in 1962, Ormsby-Gore's annual report to London stated it was "a source of mystification to Americans that former colonies should be

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<sup>20</sup> See Enclosure One. Danchev (1998) set ten criteria to measure the 'specialness' of a relationship. Arguably this test highlights the greater degree of closeness present in the AASR compared with other US or UK relationships.

<sup>21</sup> Jentleson (2007) argues a uni-polar world does not exist today, rather that a 'uni-polar moment' existed at the end of the Cold War.

<sup>22</sup> Danchev, 1998, p.8.

<sup>23</sup> Jakub, 1995, p.319.

<sup>24</sup> Cooper, 2004, p.45.

willing to maintain a special and close relationship with Britain”<sup>25</sup>. These relationships inform governmental decisions to a greater or lesser degree, but none has the AASR’s pervasive influence.

There are also significant numbers of organizations that count both countries as members, most notably institutions such as the UN and NATO. US-UK behaviour as part of these bodies again reflects the relationship’s unique nature, almost invariably mutually supportive, potentially to the extent that it raises other nations’ suspicions. From the Cold War’s outset, the US recognized the potential to mobilize UK colonies against the global influence of communism. Throughout the Twentieth century, and more recently with the GWOT, the ability to influence the international arena for mutual benefit has frequently been the objective of both governments. How balanced this influence and support has been is discussed in subsequent chapters.

### Measuring How Special?

The intangible nature of the relationship has already been highlighted and characterizes virtually every aspect of the AASR. This ambiguity produces difficulties in defining or measuring degrees and extent of ‘specialness’, requiring both agreed criteria for assessment and scales of ‘effect’ within each area. Discussed previously, Danchev proposes criteria to measure against, supported by amplifying information regarding why they are appropriate. While personally sceptical about the extent and utility of the AASR from the UK’s perspective, Danchev’s criteria arguably support the notion of the relationship being unique.

Any attempt to measure the extent to which the relationship is special, confirms what most observers intuitively recognise, concisely captured by Dumbrell who believes that “radical asymmetry of power... lies at the heart of the relationship”<sup>26</sup>. A strong advocate of the AASR, Kimball acknowledges its limitations saying that special never meant equal, seeing the relationship as characterized by competitive competition<sup>27</sup>.

Difficulties of measurement and the ambiguities of definition can leave the AASR open to ‘attack’, even to claims of it being a myth. It can generate unrealistic expectations for the parties involved, potentially leaving both unsatisfied with the returns they receive. “At any given moment [the AASR] is not as pliant or as potent – not as *special* – as one partner would wish”<sup>28</sup>. Viewed more positively, this uncertainty could be perceived as a fundamental strength of the relationship, permitting creative ambiguity that enables innovative interpretations by both parties. Attempts

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<sup>25</sup> Dumbrell, 2001, p.179.

<sup>26</sup> Dumbrell, 2006, p.19.

<sup>27</sup> Kimball, 2005, p.4.

<sup>28</sup> Danchev, 1998, p.154.

such as Danchev's allow a quantitative approach, but the strength of the AASR seems to derive more from the qualitative benefits, that whilst intuitively apparent remain tantalisingly difficult to positively identify.

### Characterizations of the Relationship.

There has been a consistent attempt by observers and those involved in the relationship to seek to characterize the 'roles' and 'nature' of the two countries; two are identified here. The earliest example, frequently quoted, was coined by Harold Macmillan speaking to Richard Crossman during their wartime service in Algiers in 1943. Macmillan likened the UK's role in the relationship to that of the Greeks, providing wisdom and guidance to the emerging international powerhouse, the US, which he likened to the Romans. This description has been widely derided, but arguably reveals much about conceited British perceptions of their role<sup>29</sup>. As other commentators have observed, it was not the UK but the US that was to be the driving force of military, economic, political, artistic and philosophical ideas<sup>30</sup>.

A second characterization is provided by Kagan, who identifies similarities between the two countries that draw them together within the international community. He postulates that the US-UK are more willing to use force than the European powers, a key factor in drawing them together. He describes the US-UK as being from Mars, following a more Hobbesian approach to international relations, while the Europeans are from Venus, adopting a more Kantian methodology<sup>31</sup>. In terms of both utility and relevance, this shared perspective on international relations is a key AASR factor.

### Conclusions.

Analysis within this chapter argues that the AASR exists and that cooperation is 'deeply ingrained'<sup>32</sup>, despite difficulties with definition and measurement. Historical context is crucial to understanding its nature, with a shared common enemy a pervading theme. The relationship is founded upon utility, relevance and breadth of contact areas; although both countries share close ties with many other nations, none possesses the depth or diversity of the AASR. Whilst the stereotyped characterizations suggested by some commentators appear unsupportable, common approaches to international relations have bound both countries closer together, producing a thriving and 'special' relationship.

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<sup>29</sup> Thorne, 1978, p.150.

<sup>30</sup> Howard, 1995, p.713.

<sup>31</sup> Kagan, 2003, p.3.

<sup>32</sup> Stephens, 2006, p.135.

## CHAPTER TWO – HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

Analysis of the AASR's nature within Chapter One identified the importance of shared utility, relevance and breadth of interests as central foundations. An examination of the historiography of the relationship across the last six decades of the Twentieth century suggests that three factors profoundly influenced its development. First, the impact of contemporary global events was crucial, with the ideological struggle of the Cold War the most pervasive theme. The mutual threat from communism bound the two countries together, with the US recognizing that "the United Kingdom must continue in existence as the principal power in Western Europe economically and militarily. The US should, therefore, explore its relationship with Great Britain and give all feasible political, economic, and if necessary, military support"<sup>33</sup>. Individual foreign policy issues throughout successive decades pressurized both nations, but for the vast majority of the period, close cooperation characterized the AASR. When conflicts of interest did arise, disagreements were typically quickly forgotten. Second, domestic political considerations fundamentally affected how the relationship was conducted. Both countries were generally sensitive to the other's need to satisfy a domestic electorate to retain political power. In most instances, this manifested itself as support for allies when sensitive domestic considerations arose. Third, individual personalities and their relationships, most importantly the President and Prime Minister, frequently set the relationship's tone<sup>34</sup>. Unlike many other bilateral partnerships, the AASR was characterized by key relationships across many areas and at varying levels. These factors are consistently evident throughout the Twentieth century and provide understanding of the relationship and its longevity<sup>35</sup>.

### 1940s.

The fall of France in 1940 was arguably the 'fulcrum of the twentieth century'; within the context of the AASR, it was particularly noteworthy signifying UK policy turning away from involvement with France in continental affairs and towards America<sup>36</sup>. Personalities were a key factor in the formulation of the relationship, with pre-war Prime Minister Chamberlain's interaction with the US "conspicuously neglectful, not to say disdainful"<sup>37</sup>. By contrast, Churchill has frequently been portrayed as the 'high priest'<sup>38</sup> of the AASR, recognising the need for US entry into WW2 to enable the Allies to defeat the Axis powers. "For survival, let alone victory, US assistance on an

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<sup>33</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1946, vol. 1, 1170

<sup>34</sup> Time prevents further examination, but initial investigation suggests that the relationship between the President/PM is influenced by timing of accession to office, with the individual *in situ* first able to exert greater influence, especially from a UK perspective: Macmillan/Kennedy; Thatcher/Reagan; Blair/Bush would all be worthy of further consideration within this context.

<sup>35</sup> Enclosures Two and Three provide (respectively) graphical representations of assessed high/low points of both the overall relationship and that between the President/PM from 1940 to modern day.

<sup>36</sup> Reynolds, 1990, p.325.

<sup>37</sup> Danchev, 1998, p.13.

<sup>38</sup> Danchev, 1998.

unprecedented scale was clearly vital<sup>39</sup>. Thus a unique combination of necessity, circumstances and personalities converged to solidify the relationship. Effective interaction was exemplified by the Roosevelt-Churchill partnership; at lower levels, working relations were equally strong, typified by the mutual respect between the British Head of the Joint Staff Mission in Washington, Field Marshall Dill and his US counterpart, General Marshall, a key figure in post-war European reconstruction<sup>40</sup>. During the wartime period, each side recognised the global influence of the other, typified by Roosevelt's suggestion to Churchill in early 1942 that the world should be considered in terms of spheres of interest, with either the US or UK assuming primary responsibility, the exception being the European and Atlantic Theatres, where they would assume joint responsibility<sup>41</sup>.

Post-1945 it became increasingly evident that the UK was economically shattered; by contrast, the US had thrived exacerbating the differences between the two countries. This disparity caused significant resentment within the UK placing an early strain on the AASR. Yet the 1940s remain arguably one of the highest points of the relationship. The Berlin Airlift military relief operation in 1948 exemplified close cooperation, making a clear statement of Western powers' intent to combat perceived communist expansion. Arguably the greatest AASR achievements of the period are in the establishment of international institutions, with the US-UK contribution at their heart. The UN, NATO and the Bretton Woods economic agreements that shaped the financial system for the next quarter century, provide enduring legacies upon which post-war reconstruction was based.

### 1950s.

In the post-WW2 period, relations between leaders were not as cordial as previously, with Truman and Attlee not getting on well<sup>42</sup>; similarly Churchill was seen as a largely spent force when he returned to government in 1951<sup>43</sup>. Yet two major events, not personalities, epitomise the extremes of the relationship. While cooperation and friction are evident, both support the contention that the AASR remained 'special'. The first was the Korean War. As part of the Truman Doctrine articulated in the 1940s, the US had signified its intention to combat threats as they arose, part of a policy of containment to prevent the global spread of communism through a 'Domino Effect', with the fall of one nation to communism perceived as likely to lead to others<sup>44</sup>. Two days after the North Korean's invasion of the South on 25 June 1950, the UN Security Council endorsed intervention, with America providing the bulk of international troops. Under a month later, the UK

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<sup>39</sup> Reynolds, 1990, p.331.

<sup>40</sup> The Marshall Plan, the economic part of US attempts to prevent the spread of Communism, provided \$13Bn of economic reconstruction assistance to Western Europe by 1953, <http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/57.htm>.

<sup>41</sup> Reynolds, 1990, p.331.

<sup>42</sup> Dobson, 1995, p.92.

<sup>43</sup> Bogdanor, 2006.

<sup>44</sup> Deibel & Gaddis, 1986, p.7.

had ratified the decision to send forces, the second largest military contingent<sup>45</sup> and “a valuable contribution to Anglo-American solidarity”<sup>46</sup>.

In sharp contrast to the close cooperation in Korea, arguably the greatest crisis in the AASR was precipitated in 1956 following Egyptian President Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal to raise domestic revenue, seen by the UK as a direct challenge to its global interests. A combined UK, French and Israeli intervention enjoyed limited military success, but suffered catastrophic diplomatic failure. US economic pressure on the UK, most notably with sales of sterling, resulted in a financial crisis, forcing Britain to accede to US’ demands for withdrawal<sup>47</sup>. The UK’s capitulation to US pressure demonstrated a relationship shift, clearly no longer one of equals, but of senior and subordinate<sup>48</sup>. The aftermath of the crisis proved to be a turning point in the AASR for two major reasons. Firstly, the UK experience suggested that it should not intervene without US support. Secondly, France’s deep-rooted mistrust of the US was exacerbated and it determined never to rely again on the UK as an international interlocutor. Yet despite the deep political divisions created by the Suez Crisis, the strength of the relationship was demonstrated by the remarkable speed with which reconciliation began<sup>49</sup>.

### 1960s.

Following the rift of Suez and the underlying lack of closeness between US-UK leaders in the 1950s, Macmillan was an ideal candidate to re-forge relations, like Churchill being half American and with a long-standing relationship with Eisenhower that went as far back as the Second World War<sup>50</sup>. When Eisenhower was replaced by Kennedy, the closeness of the relationship grew, characterized by some as the ‘Jack and Mac era’<sup>51</sup>. This closeness was heightened through the personal friendship that existed between the UK Ambassador to Washington, Ormsby-Gore and Kennedy, which allowed the former unprecedented access to the President. The clearest manifestation of this particularly close relationship came with the Polaris Nuclear Missiles deal agreed in Nassau in December 1962, discussed in more detail in Chapter Three.

A second key theme throughout the 1960s was the UK’s relationship with Europe, most notably France, personified by President de Gaulle. Britain’s attempts to gain entry into the European Community (EC) were twice blocked by de Gaulle’s veto, with Anglo-American cooperation, particularly on economic issues, the key factor<sup>52</sup>. De Gaulle believed that the UK had accepted a

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<sup>45</sup> US troop numbers - 302,483; UK - 14,198, <http://www.korean-war.com/unitednations.html>

<sup>46</sup> Danchev, 1998, p.126

<sup>47</sup> Dobson, 1995, p.118.

<sup>48</sup> Bogdanor, 2006.

<sup>49</sup> Dobson, 1995, p.102.

<sup>50</sup> Dobson, 1995, p.118.

<sup>51</sup> Dumbrell, 2006.

<sup>52</sup> Dumbrell, 2001.

degree of dependence upon the US that made it virtually a 'satellite' that was unacceptable within a pan-European model<sup>53</sup>.

The central AASR issue of the decade was the US' increasing involvement in Vietnam, without military support being provided by the UK. While the Wilson governments of the period were strongly pro-American, Wilson refused to commit UK forces. The US Administration under Johnson applied extreme pressure to obtain a UK commitment, for symbolic purposes rather than to satisfy any military imperative. US National Security Advisor Bundy observed that the commitment of a British Brigade (namely a token force) would be worth a "billion dollars at the moment of truth for sterling"<sup>54</sup>. The comment reflects the complexity of the relationship; in this context relating to economic, political and military concerns. The UK economy during this period remained extremely fragile and the US sought to exert economic pressure to force the UK to commit troops. Wilson's refusal to comply provided a marked contrast with the earlier Suez crisis. The Healey Defence Review of 1967 encapsulated all these themes, with financial pressures forcing a withdrawal of permanently-stationed UK forces from East of Suez<sup>55</sup>, further increasing the pressure on the US to prevent the global spread of communism, a vacuum the US felt unable or unready to fulfil<sup>56</sup>. By the end of the decade, both countries' policies appeared in disarray with the AASR "looking less special than at any time since the late 1920s"<sup>57</sup>.

### 1970s.

No single international event dominated the 1970s in the same way as previous decades, with domestic politics providing many key AASR issues. Both UK attempts to join the EC in the 1960s had failed largely due to French perceptions of their closeness to the US. Paradoxically, the damage caused to the AASR by currency devaluation (discussed further in Chapter Three) and the UK's unwillingness to commit troops to Vietnam actually enhanced the prospects for Britain's eventually successful entry bid<sup>58</sup>. Under Prime Minister Heath, the UK pursued a significantly more pro-European, anti-American agenda that secured EC membership in 1973. Heath had earlier assured French President Pompidou that there could be no special relationship between the UK and US because "one was barely a quarter the size of the other"<sup>59</sup>.

The 1973 Yom Kippur War brought a further dispute, with the UK (along with France) failing to support a UN-sponsored (US-backed) ceasefire resolution and refusing over-flight permissions for US supporting aircraft. It was not just the British who lamented the inter-changeability of ordinary

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<sup>53</sup> Elie, 2005, p.68.

<sup>54</sup> Bundy memo to Johnson 28 July 1965 quoted in Dobson, 1995, p.135.

<sup>55</sup> Heath sought unsuccessfully to reverse this policy finally admitting defeat in 1973.

<sup>56</sup> Coker, 2001, p.77.

<sup>57</sup> Dobson, 1995, p.137.

<sup>58</sup> Dumbrell, 2001, p.182.

<sup>59</sup> Dumbrell, 2001, p.184.

and special treatment; Nixon expressed similar sentiments regarding Heath in the early 1970s<sup>60</sup>. Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home sought to maintain relationships with the US during Heath's time in office, but the period represented an undoubted low in the AASR. Within the US, the Watergate scandal and withdrawal from Vietnam dominated the first half of the decade. The conflict in Cyprus in 1974 reflected differing US and UK perspectives: the former viewed the crisis from a NATO standpoint, while the latter viewed it in terms of a crisis within the Commonwealth<sup>61</sup>.

The second half of the decade saw a Labour Administration seeking to rebuild fences 'broken' under Heath<sup>62</sup>. Personal relationships between first Carter-Wilson and then Carter-Callaghan promised signs of recovery. 1979 was a pivotal year for the AASR and the wider international community. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan forced a strong response from Western powers, typically driving the US-UK closer together. The 1979 General Election was viewed with disappointment by Washington as Carter had been impressed by Callaghan<sup>63</sup>. This reinforced the idea that the US did not necessarily favour Tory political control. The election of Thatcher would have a significant impact on both UK policies across a broad spectrum of areas and specifically for the AASR.

### 1980s.

In the same way that Churchill became synonymous with the AASR, so the Reagan-Thatcher relationship in the 1980s symbolized US-UK cooperation at the highest level. A series of military crises lay at the heart of US-UK relations throughout the decade. Most significantly was the UK's dispute with Argentina in 1982 over sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. The conflict forced the US to make difficult international relations choices. US Ambassador to the UN Kirkpatrick, advocated support for the Argentinians, her decision largely motivated by a desire to prevent the spread of communism in South America. Others within Reagan's administration, notably Secretary of Defense Weinberger, took a firmly pro-UK view: this latter faction prevailed. US support for the UK was crucial; equally, so was the manner and speed in which assets were provided<sup>64</sup>. It reflected the UK's importance for the US in wider international issues and also partly to the personal relations between key individuals. Some commentators have suggested that US experience in Vietnam had bred a greater appreciation of the complexities of power<sup>65</sup>, making them more sympathetic to the UK position. Others have simply viewed the entire conflict as senseless, "like

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<sup>60</sup> Dobson, 1995, p.124.

<sup>61</sup> A similar theme, discussed later, arose regarding Grenada in 1983.

<sup>62</sup> Dobson, 1995, p.143.

<sup>63</sup> Dumbrell, 2001.

<sup>64</sup> Dobson, 1995, p.155.

<sup>65</sup> Richardson, 1996, p.203.

two bald men arguing over a comb!”<sup>66</sup>. What remains clear is the conflict’s significance to the US-UK relationship in the early part of the 1980s.

Two other comparatively small events on the international stage had a significant impact on the AASR. Firstly, the US invasion of Grenada on 25 October 1983, where against UK advice, Reagan authorised the assault leaving Thatcher “dismayed and let down”<sup>67</sup>. It left her the unenviable task of explaining to the House of Commons how a Commonwealth country had been invaded by the UK’s closest ally. The subsequent debate widened into a discussion of the AASR, with accusations that the UK was bereft of influence over Washington. We will return to the issue again in Chapter Four regarding the UK’s influence over the US regarding Iraq. The second incident was the US bombing of Libya in April 1986 in response to terrorist attacks on US personnel in Berlin, with aircraft being launched from UK bases. The issue separated Europe (with Spain and France rejecting applications to over-fly their airspace), once again drawing parallels with the Twenty-First century. Many in the UK questioned the legality of US actions; some expressed the view that the relationship had become “one-sided to the point of embarrassment”<sup>68</sup>. Yet despite occasional disagreements, the 1980s represented a rejuvenated AASR, with the Reagan-Thatcher partnership another relationship high-point.

### 1990s.

The final decade of the Twentieth century witnessed several significant incidents that impacted upon the AASR. Some argued that the Cold War’s end removed much of the rationale for intimate and ‘special’ US-UK cooperation<sup>69</sup>. As will be explored in Chapter Five, many of these perceptions were shaped by contemporary events at the time when authors were writing. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of communism undoubtedly affected the AASR ‘s development; the first brought a re-united Germany as a competitor for the US’ affections, while the latter removed the shared threat that had bound the two countries together since the end of WW2.

Changes in key figures were also crucial. The Bush-Thatcher relationship was not as close as that of Reagan-Thatcher; indeed, Thatcher believed that Bush turned his back fairly publicly on the special position she had enjoyed with the Reagan Administration<sup>70</sup>. She exerted a degree of influence over Bush regarding the Gulf War, famously telling him it ‘was no time to go wobbly’<sup>71</sup>, but its extent was limited. The subsequent relationship between Clinton-Major has been described

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<sup>66</sup> Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa quoted in Freedman, 2006, p.64.

<sup>67</sup> Baylis, 1997, p.208.

<sup>68</sup> Urban, 1996, p.95.

<sup>69</sup> Dumbrell, 2006, p.5.

<sup>70</sup> Thatcher, 1993, p.783.

<sup>71</sup> Thatcher, 1993, p.824.

both as warm and cordial, but never anything more<sup>72</sup> and by contrast, some have suggested that Clinton had little time for Major<sup>73</sup>. Not until the arrival of Blair in 1997, who placed personal relations at the heart of his approach<sup>74</sup>, did top-level relations significantly improve, with shared ideals such as the 'Third Way'<sup>75</sup> and humanitarian intervention as a 'force for good' characterizing the Clinton-Blair relationship.

Throughout the decade, certain issues persisted, causing tension between the two countries. Intervention and policy in the Balkans continued to be a "running sore between London and Washington"<sup>76</sup>. Similarly, Clinton's desire to involve himself in the Northern Ireland Peace Process also created significant tension, with former US Secretary of State Baker claiming in 1996 that Clinton's Irish policy had produced the "worst relationship with our closest ally, Britain, since the Boston Tea Party"<sup>77</sup>. In terms of policies and issues, the 1990s created the conditions for the new millennium, with the AASR as multi-faceted and complex as ever.

### Conclusions.

Almost overwhelmingly 'high politics'<sup>78</sup> have been discussed throughout this Chapter, as it is upon these major issues and the personalities behind them that the AASR can be meaningfully, although as argued throughout not exclusively, traced and assessed. Diplomatic and intelligence/military cooperation have traditionally characterized the relationship; the latter combination, Naughtie describes as the 'marriage contract' that underpins the AASR<sup>79</sup>. When this has not occurred, it has frequently come as an unpleasant surprise. It is imperative to appreciate the historical context of the relationship, with many of the key players and commentators referring back to its Churchillian foundations. What analysis of AASR historiography reveals is that disagreements are a persistent facet. Equally apparent is that disputes, even major, are soon forgotten. Strong personal ties often define the relationship's closeness, with chemistry between leaders frequently reflected in the success or failure of the relationship<sup>80</sup>. Yet even if this chemistry is absent at the very highest levels, relations are sufficiently well-developed across the full spectrum for the AASR to continue to thrive. The final sixty years of the Twentieth century witnessed major international events: the end of a world war; the rise and fall of the Cold War; major international conflicts; economic and political turmoil across the globe. Throughout all these events, the AASR remained a key feature

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<sup>72</sup> Dobson, 1995, p.163-4.

<sup>73</sup> Zakheim, 1996, p.74.

<sup>74</sup> Riddell, 2004, p.2.

<sup>75</sup> The 'Third Way' was intended to bridge the "social concerns of the liberal Left and the power of individualism as championed on the Right"; Naughtie, 2005, p.14.

<sup>76</sup> Major, 1999, p.497.

<sup>77</sup> *The Times*, 16 August 1996.

<sup>78</sup> Holm defines high politics as "issues that pertain directly to the political and economic integrity of the state and its legitimate use of power"; Holm, 2000, p.1.

<sup>79</sup> Naughtie, 2005, p.84.

<sup>80</sup> Gilbert, 2006, p.77.

of international stability, albeit increasingly with the US as senior partner, with mutual dependence based upon utility, relevance and breadth the enduring themes.

### **CHAPTER THREE – DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS AND MANIFESTATIONS OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP**

Chapter One emphasized the central importance of utility, relevance and breadth to the enduring nature of the AASR. Throughout the examination of the historiography of the Twentieth century's final six decades within Chapter Two, utility and relevance are self-evident in all the major areas of cooperation. This essay will again focus closely on these themes in Chapters Four and Five when examining contemporary events and assessing prospects for the future. Breadth was the third key factor identified as lying at the heart of the AASR and this concept will be explored within this chapter.

Eight major themes encapsulate the degree of interaction, some with greater significance than others, but all contributing to the relationship's overall texture<sup>81</sup>. None should be viewed in isolation, with areas overlapping to varying degrees. The first four can be considered to represent the 'hard' issues discussed between governments and ruling elites: political dialogue; intelligence sharing; military cooperation; and nuclear deterrence collaboration. These four areas are the relationship's 'building blocks', forming the basis of the high politics already examined in some instances within an historical context during Chapter Two. They are frequently the main issues cited, discussed by political elites<sup>82</sup>, when trying to determine what the AASR constitutes, forming the basis for inter-governmental cooperation. Issues five and six are more pervasive, providing the 'cement' between these 'building blocks': business & economic ties; and shared culture & language. Whilst the former can be reinforced using statistics to reflect levels of cooperation, it is also the personal connections and relationships that underpin these dealings which add strength to the two countries' relationship. The latter issues of culture and language can be more difficult to determine, but once again provide a myriad of connections which collectively draw the nations together. Finally, areas seven and eight reflect issues that have at different times defined the context of the relationship, frequently providing a source of friction: most significantly, relations with Europe; and the peace process in Ireland. The former has been a pervasive theme since the end of WW2, predominantly reflecting UK relations with Europe, although American interests have invariably been inextricably linked. Ireland has been a consistent source of friction, due largely to the US' significant Irish expatriate community. The Clinton Presidency witnessed the issue become a major source of tension between the US-UK.

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<sup>81</sup> Other themes, notably religion, could also have been explored that reflect both differences and similarities characteristic of the relationship.

<sup>82</sup> Dumbrell, 2006, p.20.

Time precludes a full investigation of each area. Thus key issues will be analyzed to expose both the depth and breadth of the relationship and how cooperation across the full spectrum can allow mutually supportive themes to develop. Enclosures Four-Eight support the points raised with amplifying information.

### Political.

Several Twentieth century political issues have already been discussed within Chapter Two; however, some generic points reflect the central importance of the political relationships at the heart of the AASR. Raymond<sup>83</sup> identifies key themes that he believes form the historical foundation of the modern day AASR. He argues that the relationship should be traced back to the American War of Independence, identifying the influence on early US policymakers such as Thomas Jefferson of British principles of law and philosophical thinking. The US political and legal systems today retain British roots. Common political ideals, described by Dobson as a “kernel of truths”, have bound the two countries together, what he describes as a common political morality<sup>84</sup>.

The previous chapter identified the importance of personal relationships; the political sphere has proven the most significant example of this. While utility and *realpolitik* remain prime considerations, periods of extreme closeness between the two countries frequently coincide when the Heads of State are notably close: Roosevelt-Churchill; Kennedy-Macmillan; Reagan-Thatcher. By contrast, a fractious relationship between these two key positions can lead to relations degrading: Nixon-Heath. Within this political dimension, relationships at several levels must be considered. One such key area is the exchange of Ambassadors between Washington and London, perceived by governments on both sides of the Atlantic as key appointments with the highest calibre individuals selected. Ormsby-Gore’s personal connections with Kennedy and the resultant preferential access have already been identified within Chapter Two. Career diplomats frequently enjoy extensive contact with key personnel from their counterpart nation, ensuring an intricate familiarity with the crucial issues and with an understanding of the relationship’s heritage, guaranteeing continuity. US Ambassador Seitz observed when speaking in 1994 that between the US-UK, “arguments had a long history and disagreements a distinguished lineage”<sup>85</sup>. His opposite number several years later, Sir Christopher Meyer, banned usage of the term ‘AASR’ due to “the unrealistic expectations it created”<sup>86</sup>. Yet both understood that the relationship was undoubtedly special, a point Meyer repeatedly stressed following his return to London<sup>87</sup>.

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<sup>83</sup> Raymond, 2006, p.7.

<sup>84</sup> Dobson, 1995, p.10.

<sup>85</sup> Seitz, 1994, p.2.

<sup>86</sup> Meyer, 2007.

<sup>87</sup> Meyer, 2007.

Analysis of the political dimension of the AASR reveals a shared heritage consistently reinforced by contemporary thinking, drawing the two sides closely together. There is a common sense of political morality based around concepts of democracy that endure despite the political affiliations of different administrations. No evidence suggests relationships are stronger between Democrat-Labour administrations, or their Republican-Conservative equivalents<sup>88</sup>. Common political ground between the two countries is sufficiently wide to allow individual freedom of manoeuvre for governments without upsetting the AASR balance. The relationship frequently appears strongest when Presidential-Prime Ministerial relations are strong, although if national interests are affected, personal relations alone will not influence above all other considerations. What does provide exceptional levels of continuity and understanding within the political environment result from the plethora of contacts between career US-UK civil servants<sup>89</sup>, who understand that disagreements are frequently short-term, while the long-term issues require cooperation and mutual trust. A similar situation exists in several other areas of the relationship, such as within intelligence, the military and national nuclear agencies. This collective multi-level cooperation is a quintessential aspect of the AASR; political cooperation lies at its very heart.

### Intelligence.

One AASR observer remarked that shared secrets make a powerful bond<sup>90</sup>. As a practical manifestation of the relationship between the US-UK, intelligence sharing clearly reflects unparalleled levels of access that each country allows the other. Intelligence cooperation dates back to WW2, where the UK's highly sophisticated intelligence-gathering, cryptographic analysis and wealth of experience served as a model for the embryonic US equivalent<sup>91</sup>. The 1943 BRUSA agreement allowed the sharing of UK ULTRA information with the US. In 1947 a further agreement apportioned the responsibility for signals intelligence between the USA on the one hand and Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand on the other, a 'Five Eyes' community that persists today<sup>92</sup>. From the outset tensions existed, exacerbated by US agencies typically making up about 90% of the total UKUSA budget<sup>93</sup>. Further tensions emerged following the high-profile defections of UK agents Burgess and Maclean in May 1951, followed by Philby over a decade later. Further worsened by the American anti-Communist excitement of the time, these events weakened but did not break the US-UK intelligence relationship,<sup>94</sup>.

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<sup>88</sup> The Carter Administration regarded the 1979 Conservative UK election victory 'with disappointment', one example that illustrates this point; Dumbrell, 2006, p.102.

<sup>89</sup> Roy/Faucher/Williams, NDU, Washington DC, 27 Feb 07.

<sup>90</sup> Danchev, 1998, p.98.

<sup>91</sup> Dobson, 1995, p.74.

<sup>92</sup> Dobson, 1995, p.95 – the Four Eyes Community, with New Zealand removed, is more common today.

<sup>93</sup> Dumbrell, 2001, p.133.

<sup>94</sup> Danchev, 1998, p.104.

One reason for consistently close intelligence linkages is the intricate military, and particularly nuclear relationship, between the two countries. Military operations have demonstrated the willingness to exchange information, with the Falklands and recent wars in Iraq clear examples; arguably shared intelligence has driven operations to an unprecedented degree in recent years<sup>95</sup>. Close US-UK intelligence cooperation has frequently had a negative impact on UK-European relations, with one French MEP claiming an ‘Anglo-Saxon Protestant conspiracy’, which he believed showed UK commitment towards the US not Europe<sup>96</sup>. The relationship should not be considered as one-way. UK capabilities, such as those in Cyprus, are occasionally in areas where US resources may be lacking and while the UK’s quantity of intelligence may be lower, America’s policymaking community consider the quality to be higher<sup>97</sup>.

Intelligence sharing remains an AASR lynchpin, the ‘jewel in the crown of the AASR’<sup>98</sup>, and reinforces the close linkages within political, military and nuclear deterrence realms. Levels of access are unparalleled, with liaison stretching across multiple levels. Many projects where intelligence is shared are long-term, suggesting that existing high levels of cooperation are set to continue. “Although no one is a complete friend in the intelligence world, with Britain and America, it’s as close as it gets”<sup>99</sup>.

### Military.

Many key military events, whether sources of close cooperation or friction, were assessed within Chapter Two. Rather than examine battles or campaigns from Twentieth century experience, it is apposite to examine three important themes that characterize the military component of the AASR. The first is the degree of shared experience between the two countries’ military personnel and civilian policymakers. From the latter stages of the WW1, the US-UK have a history of fighting as allies. The importance of Dill’s role in Washington was outlined in the previous chapter, with close cooperation across the senior ranks particularly crucial<sup>100</sup>. Danchev suggests that perhaps the greatest legacy of WW2 was the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization<sup>101</sup>. With the exception of Vietnam and smaller wars of purely national interest, the UK was consistently the US’ (junior) partner post-WW2<sup>102</sup>.

The second theme arises from the first, namely the personal relationships that have formed resultant from this shared experience. The UK’s significant contributions to international coalitions

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<sup>95</sup> Becker, 2006, p.66.

<sup>96</sup> Jean-Claude Maritnez, French MEP talking about electronic surveillance, quoted in Rachman, 2001, p.7.

<sup>97</sup> Jakub, 1995, p.320.

<sup>98</sup> Childs, 2006, p.128.

<sup>99</sup> Former CIA Director Woolsey, quoted in Rachman, 2001, p.8.

<sup>100</sup> Spaatz and Tedder provide an excellent example in the WW2 air environment; Danchev, 1998, p.101.

<sup>101</sup> Danchev, 1998, p.95.

<sup>102</sup> Twenty-First Century experiences will be addressed in Chapter Four.

have provided opportunities to exert limited influence over predominantly US military leaders. A former UK Ambassador to Washington, Lord Renwick, highlighted that “the price of consultation is presence and participation”<sup>103</sup>. The 1991 Gulf War provides an excellent example, with UK military commanders recognising the need for frank and open relationships with their US counterparts<sup>104</sup>.

Relationships develop across all rank levels, increasingly through the third major theme: shared training and interoperable equipment. US-UK armed forces exercise and increasingly operate alongside one another. Common military standards and shared doctrine, whether NATO or bilateral in nature, combined with generally interoperable systems, allow personnel to fully integrate. US basing in the UK and the UK’s extensive use of North American military training and evaluation areas<sup>105</sup> further enhances alliance operational cohesion. Military cooperation remains a high-profile AASR example, with UK-US interoperability enshrined in recent UK doctrine<sup>106</sup>; as Chapter Four will discuss, this has become increasingly evident throughout the Twenty-First century.

### Nuclear Deterrent.

The history of US-UK information sharing regarding the nuclear deterrent has been typified by constant tensions, yet unparalleled levels of cooperation. Despite US offers to the UK during WW2 to pursue a shared development programme, Churchill’s advisors pushed for an independent capability, although the two sides formally pledged not to use atomic weapons against each other with the Quebec Agreement<sup>107</sup>. By the end of 1945 atomic cooperation had begun to falter<sup>108</sup>, with the “main arteries of atomic information exchange” formally severed by the 1946 McMahon Act<sup>109</sup>. The Act was repealed in 1958, once again allowing the UK privileged access<sup>110</sup>.

The collaborative but ill-fated Skybolt project collapsed in the early 1960s, leading to the UK seeking to acquire Polaris missiles from the US, an arrangement Macmillan secured at Nassau in December 1962. Kennedy’s advisers recommended against the deal, but assurances over French acceptance and US concerns over Macmillan’s domestic position swayed the US President<sup>111</sup>. This deal enhanced the AASR, with follow-on connections in areas such as Navy cooperation due to missiles being delivered from submarines. A similar success was secured by Thatcher with the

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<sup>103</sup> Raymond, 2006, p.3. This has also been referred to as ‘pay and play’, Danchev, 1998, p.126.

<sup>104</sup> De la Billiere, 1993, p.39.

<sup>105</sup> Examples include the annual flying Exercise ‘Red Flag’ in the mainland US, or submarine use of the American Underwater Test and Evaluation Centre in the Bahamas.

<sup>106</sup> Defence Strategic Guidance 2005.

<sup>107</sup> 19 August 1943.

<sup>108</sup> Dobson, 1995, p.91.

<sup>109</sup> Danchev, 1998, p.103.

<sup>110</sup> Dumbrell, 2001, p.124.

<sup>111</sup> Dobson, 1995, p.129.

sale of Trident agreed in 1982, “a remarkable deal”<sup>112</sup>. Both acquisitions secured Britain a nuclear deterrent for a remarkably low price; it also guaranteed greater intelligence, political and military cooperation between the two nations. Although Kennedy offered the same 1962 deal to France<sup>113</sup>, de Gaulle declined.

The independence of the nuclear deterrent was a key consideration in de Gaulle’s decision to decline. For him, Macmillan’s acceptance confirmed the UK’s allegiance lay with America, that they represented a ‘Trojan horse’ in Europe<sup>114</sup>. Reliance on the US raised significant questions regarding the degree of independence. Talking about Trident in 1987, former Labour minister Healey questioned the logic of ownership: it would only be used if Britain could not rely on the US in a crisis, but if this was the case, could we rely on them to provide Trident?<sup>115</sup>. Despite concerns over independence and contemporary utility, provision continues to be provided on extremely favourable financial terms to the UK. The nuclear deterrent remains typical of the close cooperation synonymous with the AASR, binding the two countries together across another strand of government and interest.

### Business and Economic.

US-UK relations in the areas of business and economics could be characterized as a competitive alliance throughout the course of the AASR. Respective economic strength and business interaction has been a central feature, albeit with relative positions radically shifting throughout the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries. Three key themes are worthy of specific assessment: sterling’s weakness along with associated currency crises and devaluations that have ensued; differing perspectives on international trade; and levels of investment that have flowed both ways across the Atlantic. In addition, specific historical events and decisions stand out as defining moments, frequently not only for the AASR but the wider international system.

British financial weakness has contributed on several occasions to tensions within the relationship. American financial assistance, notably Lend-Lease payments during WW2 or from the Marshall Plan in the post-war era ensured UK economic solvency, but also produced a degree of dependence previously unforeseen<sup>116</sup>. US disapproval of UK-French intervention in the Suez Crisis of 1956 was tangibly reinforced through economic and financial pressure upon the UK. Britain was forced to accept US demands to withdraw from Egypt as it could not withstand the economic pressure being exerted by Washington<sup>117</sup>. It reinforced Eden’s observation when

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<sup>112</sup> Dobson, 1995, p.152.

<sup>113</sup> Schwabe, 2005, p.22.

<sup>114</sup> Schwabe, 2005, p.22

<sup>115</sup> Dumbrell, 2001, p.146.

<sup>116</sup> Dobson, 1995, p.84.

<sup>117</sup> Dumbrell, 2001, p.47.

Foreign Secretary in 1952, that until UK financial and economic independence was restored, US influence was unavoidable<sup>118</sup>. Yet the US recognised that although the 1944 Bretton Woods Congress had the dollar as the guarantor of the world's financial system, sterling's importance as the convertible international reserve, remained integral<sup>119</sup>. Sterling crises in 1967 and 1976 created tensions in the US-UK relationship over political not purely financial issues.

Trade relations have also caused friction across a range of areas. The UK's willingness to trade (albeit in extremely limited terms) with the North during the Vietnam War soured relations, reminiscent of the UK's 1861-65 deals with the Confederacy. Although involving private companies, disagreements over the Siberian pipeline in 1980 and the 'Westland Affair' late in 1985 also produced tensions. With the former, Thatcher's free trade ideas were at odds with her pro-Americanism. The Westland incident exposed divisions within the Thatcher administration over relations with Europe but ultimately showed the UK favouring the US over Europe.

Despite these tensions, the data within the Enclosures shows the interpenetration of the two economies, heightened by the increasing globalization of the world economic system. Flows of trade, goods but especially services, inextricably bind the countries' major organizations, and by extension governments due to the economic prosperity they generate. Competitiveness and disagreements inevitably arise, but these relationships are a major source of AASR strength.

### Culture and Language.

On both sides of the Atlantic, stereotypes of the other country abound. Coker says that for many Americans, England is a Ralph Lauren creation<sup>120</sup>. Several commentators have noted how often villains in Disney films have English accents<sup>121</sup>. Insightful contemporary analysis of US attitudes to others comes via *The Simpsons*, with few countries safe from the acerbic writers, the UK arguably alone in being praised (except for its poor oral hygiene!). Relationship frustrations are expressed, art possibly mirroring life, in the 2004 UK film, *Love, Actually*. US-UK relationships exist at many levels throughout the film, but Hugh Grant's PM's reflection that relationships based on one side taking but not giving were unsatisfactory, captured the opinion held in many areas of the UK that the AASR was one-sided favouring the US. Thus culture provides an extremely interesting insight into public opinion and provides a barometer, albeit not calibrated, into contemporary perceptions. In subsequent chapters, US expressions of power in terms of the relationship will be discussed, but

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<sup>118</sup> Horne, 1988, p.347.

<sup>119</sup> Dumbrell, 2001, p.59.

<sup>120</sup> Coker, 1992, p.421.

<sup>121</sup> Freedland, 1998, p.73.

the value of US/UK culture as a projection of 'soft' is arguably more appealing than traditional 'hard' power methods<sup>122</sup>.

Language plays an integral role in the close cooperation and trust between the two countries. Bismarck suggested that the single most important factor for the Twentieth century would be that the British and the Americans spoke the same language<sup>123</sup>, recognising the strength of linguistic ties. Anthropologists use the term 'culture area' focusing on shared characteristics such as language, behaviour and values<sup>124</sup>. The US-UK share many common concepts which in turn mutually validate the other's perspective. In the key area of ruling elites, historically 'alliances' have been cemented by marriage<sup>125</sup>, while academic, musical, theatrical and other cultural relationships have thrived for decades.

Changing US demographics have attracted significant comment, with immigrant populations, notably from Latin America, ensuring that key areas such as the American Foreign Service "had a distinctly less WASPish tinge" from the 1970s onward<sup>126</sup>. Yet even in these key areas the ideals that have underpinned the AASR remain, frequently transmitted via academic institutions traditionally attended by ruling elites. Rather than two countries divided by a common language, cultural and linguistic affiliations represent a crucial component of the AASR.

## Europe.

Britain's arguably schizophrenic relationship with Europe has proven to be a complicating factor within the context of the AASR. Churchill's concept of Britain's world role was at the heart of three overlapping circles: America, Europe and the Commonwealth. Post-1945, the influence of the Commonwealth declined, but the balance of relations between the other two was crucial. The idea of Britain as a 'bridge' between the two entities is a recurring theme from Churchill's time, with Blair identifying early in his first term of office that he and President Clinton had agreed that the UK did not need to make a choice to side with Europe or America<sup>127</sup>. Blair has strong US and European credentials, the latter arguably greater than any PM for over twenty years<sup>128</sup>, believing it to be vital not to be forced into making a decision between the two<sup>129</sup>. De Gaulle envisaged a subtly different model, with France at the centre of a French-led strong Europe and a post-WW2 'Big Three'-led

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<sup>122</sup> Nye, 2004, p.18.

<sup>123</sup> Harris, 2002, p.39.

<sup>124</sup> Dumbrell, 2001, p.11.

<sup>125</sup> Between 1895 and 1903 the daughters of more than 70 American millionaires married British aristocrats, many in key government positions; Raymond, 2006, p.12.

<sup>126</sup> Zakheim, 1996, p.76.

<sup>127</sup> Dumbrell, 2006, p.144.

<sup>128</sup> Marsh, 2003, p.68.

<sup>129</sup> Harris, 2002, p.42.

Atlantic circle<sup>130</sup>. These competing notions of who should play this vital bridging role contributed greatly to the UK-French animosity in the post-WW2 years.

From a US perspective, successive presidents emphasised their desire for strong UK influence at the heart of an integrated Europe, potentially able to provide pro-US influence. Many UK PMs recognised this, understood and tried to fulfil the Atlantic intermediary role, sensing the US did not want a 'fifty-first state'; "rather a strong ally in Europe"<sup>131</sup>. Commentators' perspectives on the desirable level of UK integration in Europe provide a major influence upon their perceptions of the AASR and subsequent analysis of it, discussed in more detail in Chapter Five. One European-specific example comes from Danchev, who said "London has been prosecuting a cold war of its own with Brussels, a posture as myopic as it is futile"<sup>132</sup>, a clear nailing of his colours to a pro-European mast. Analysis of both countries relations with Europe are central to understanding the AASR and the policies that respective governments have followed; they are also a major influence upon many commentators' perception of the validity of the AASR as a concept.

### Ireland.

Ireland, specifically the Peace Process within the 1990s, warrants brief but specific mention as a key source of tension in the post-Cold War period. American support for Republican terrorists within Northern Ireland was a continual but relatively minor irritation throughout the 1980s. During the Clinton Presidency, a visa was granted for Gerry Adams, the head of Sinn Fein to visit the US, provoking outrage within the British government. Many in the UK opposed foreign diplomatic intervention, especially from the US President, into what they perceived as UK domestic politics. The media described the episode as the worst rift between the two countries since Suez<sup>133</sup>, while other observers claimed it showed a departure in US foreign policy, reflecting Clinton's dismissal of Major's views<sup>134</sup>.

While the episode provided a major source of trans-Atlantic tension, it also demonstrated the resilience and rapid healing properties of the AASR. Soderberg<sup>135</sup> claimed that the relationship was special precisely because such a major rift could occur and yet the relationship remained solid, akin to the family-related arguments mentioned within Chapter One. Although the 'Adams' visa' saga caused a protracted debate and a conspicuous source of tension, Dumbrell argues this was transformed by Blair's 1997 election into conspicuous cooperation<sup>136</sup>. Irish terrorism represented a consistently sensitive issue for UK administrations, yet even with perceived

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<sup>130</sup> Schwabe, 2005, p.11.

<sup>131</sup> Major, 1999, p.578.

<sup>132</sup> Danchev, 1997, p.753.

<sup>133</sup> *Daily Telegraph*, 2 February 1994.

<sup>134</sup> Dumbrell, 2001, p.210.

<sup>135</sup> *Sunday Times*, 2 April 1995.

<sup>136</sup> Dumbrell, 2001, p.196.

interference into what many in Britain believed was a domestic affair, tensions abated and even transformed into a positive source of cooperation.

### Conclusion.

The AASR is deeply anchored by four key issues namely: political, intelligence, military and nuclear deterrence ties. It is provided with considerable additional breadth through the economic, business, cultural and linguistic cooperation that exists. This combination of factors tightly binds the relationship, so that when difficulties are experienced within one area, the AASR overall remains strong. Europe has consistently provided a relationship-focus for both parties, but the UK's association and integration within the European Community has proven of considerable interest to the US as well as the UK. Britain's role as the interlocutor between the two parties has been considered by successive UK administrations as vital. The Peace Process within Ireland is one relatively recent, extremely sensitive and high profile example of top-level political disagreement. Yet its resolution epitomises the robust qualities and enduring nature of the partnership, exemplifying the extent of close cooperation.

## **CHAPTER FOUR – THE US AND UK UNDER BUSH AND BLAIR – A BALANCED RELATIONSHIP?**

Previous chapters have addressed the AASR's nature, then analysed the historiography and breadth of factors that collectively make the relationship unique. This chapter will analyze the AASR in a Twenty-First century context focusing on three crucial areas: the impact of 9/11; intervention and the subsequent aftermath in both Afghanistan and Iraq as a physical manifestation of the GWOT; finally, the generic context and public perceptions of the AASR in the new millennium. An assessment of the current relevance of the relationship will determine its contemporary importance to both nations. All three issues are inextricably tied to political and military concepts of security and whilst the US-UK relationship remains extremely broad, these particular areas have defined the AASR in the new millennium. The international order has been irrevocably altered during the first decade of the Twenty-First century by these seismic events; the AASR provides one prism through which transformation can be examined.

### The Impact of 9/11 on the AASR.

Previously identified in Chapter Two, the top level US-UK political relationship during the Clinton-Major years was frequently strained, never developing the intimacy of Kennedy-Macmillan or Reagan-Thatcher eras. Issues such as the aforementioned US involvement in the Northern Ireland Peace Process placed a diplomatic strain across many levels of government. While many

enduring linkages remained in place, several commentators writing around the mid-1990s perceived a relationship in decline<sup>137</sup>. Yet signs of increasing closeness emerged following the overwhelming Labour victory in 1997, providing Blair with a powerful majority and thus the ability for significant freedom of action. Ideological similarities between Clinton and Blair with a common belief in 'Third Way' politics and a shared generational identity created an impression of the two leaders as 'kindred spirits'<sup>138</sup>. The election of George W Bush to office in one of the closest elections in US Presidential history<sup>139</sup>, significantly altered the diplomatic dynamic. The first nine months of the Bush Presidency has been described as being distinguished by trans-Atlantic bad temper<sup>140</sup>. Rather than reinforcing the AASR's perceived significance, Bush's first visit to Europe was not to the UK. Instead, he visited Spain, emphasizing an evolving cultural dimension within the US and raising the possibility of a new interlocutor, namely Spain as a Latin American bridge<sup>141</sup>.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 against targets in New York and Washington brought about a paradigm shift in the international order. One second order effect was to reinvigorate the AASR, albeit perceived as only temporary by some observers<sup>142</sup>; still others claimed the impact on the relationship was relatively meagre<sup>143</sup>. Alternatively, several commentators have argued that far from a transient impact, the events of 9/11 fundamentally rejuvenated the AASR, increasing its relevance in a global context<sup>144</sup>. This renaissance owed much to the approach and policies followed by Blair immediately post-9/11. Once again in time of crisis, the memory of Churchill was resurrected, with Blair's language ringing 'Churchillian bells'<sup>145</sup>. In a wider sense, Britain as a nation demonstrated a stronger sense of sympathy and support than other countries, a factor reinforced in a Newsweek poll regarding immediate post-9/11 actions<sup>146</sup>. This opportunity provided Blair with the chance to reaffirm the UK's position within the US' inner circle, describing the events as an attack on Western ideals<sup>147</sup>. In physical terms, the number of UK citizens that died in the attack on the World Trade Centre was 53, second only in casualty terms to the US itself<sup>148</sup>.

The UK's public and diplomatic support for the US in response to the attacks of 9/11 provides the defining moment for the AASR in recent decades. A relationship that remained intimate and broad in many ways was arguably beginning to show signs of losing some of its 'specialness'. Post-9/11,

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<sup>137</sup> See Dobson, 1995; Danchev, 1998.

<sup>138</sup> Kampfner, 2003, p.12.

<sup>139</sup> Bush won the vote in the Electoral College, but received fewer public votes than Democrat candidate Gore.

<sup>140</sup> Dumbrell, 2006, p.148.

<sup>141</sup> Dumbrell, 2006, p.149.

<sup>142</sup> Marsh, 2003, p.56.

<sup>143</sup> Harris, 2002, p.30.

<sup>144</sup> Dumbrell, 2007.

<sup>145</sup> Garton-Ash, 2005, p.49.

<sup>146</sup> Harris, 2002, p.30.

<sup>147</sup> Marsh, 2003, p.66.

<sup>148</sup> [http://www.nytimes.com/library/national/index\\_VICTIMS.html](http://www.nytimes.com/library/national/index_VICTIMS.html).

the Bush-Blair AASR blossomed. On initial impressions, it appeared an unlikely partnership<sup>149</sup>, with ideological, political and personal differences apparent. Yet a common sense of purpose and focused determination on a shared 'crusade' against terrorism substituted for the ideological bond of the Clinton-Blair years<sup>150</sup>, based largely on similar moral and religious convictions which formed the basis of the new relationship. At the highest level of government, a new, intimate bond had been forged in the crucible of the 'global war on terror (GWOT)'.

### Intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq: the GWOT.

The US received a wave of international sympathy in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. All the world's major powers, significantly including both Russia and China, denounced the attack and for the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5: an attack on one is an attack on all<sup>151</sup>. The creation of this permissive environment enabled the US to prepare to use force against those accused of planning and authorizing the terrorist acts. Political manoeuvring and subsequent military action in both Afghanistan and Iraq resulted, interventions that represent defining features of the new century. The American public were assured that pre-emptive action was required for their protection and to prevent further terrorist attacks<sup>152</sup>. Despite apparent legitimacy, the manner in which the US pursued the subsequent campaigns enraged many within the international community, forcing the UK to make exceptionally difficult choices that continue to shape the high politics context of the AASR in 2007. The two interventions are extremely different in character; both are briefly considered below.

Afghanistan was identified as the key enabler for Al Qaeda but the Taliban government refused to accede to US requests to 'give up' Osama bin Laden. The repressive nature of the regime helped to further justify the US-led intervention in October 2001<sup>153</sup>. Britain offered 6000 troops to support the effort; this was largely rejected, although the search for Al Qaeda operatives in the demanding, mountainous terrain of the Tora Bora region saw US-UK Special Forces conduct extremely successful joint operations. Several key points are noteworthy within the context of the subsequent intervention in Iraq. Firstly, US actions were perceived as justified in response to the 9/11 attacks as part of the international attempt to fight terrorism. Secondly, world powers traditionally opposed to US military activity, notably Russia and China, provided no direct opposition to intervention in Afghanistan, even though it was within an area considered to be part of Russia's natural sphere of influence. Finally, it had international endorsement, under UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386<sup>154</sup> and acting within Article 51. Today, the international

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<sup>149</sup> Naughtie, 2005, p.xiv.

<sup>150</sup> Marsh, 2003, p.66.

<sup>151</sup> Joffe, 2006, p.45.

<sup>152</sup> Jackson & Towle, 2006, p.180.

<sup>153</sup> US bombing commenced 7 October 2001.

<sup>154</sup> UNSCR 1386 augmented previous UNSCRs 1368/1373/1378/1383.

20,000-strong stabilization force within Afghanistan represents 37 NATO and non-NATO countries<sup>155</sup>. Although the initial intervention force was overwhelmingly American in composition, perceived international legitimacy was crucial. Legitimacy was crucial within the AASR context making UK support for the US significantly less controversial, both internationally and domestically. Following on from the messages of support immediately post-9/11, the UK military contribution demonstrated clear intent regarding the closeness and strength of the contemporary AASR.

Iraq provides a starkly different experience. Causality for going to war and the subsequent validity of information supporting the US-UK's decisions remains highly contentious; its bearing on pre- and post-conflict activity and for the AASR in its widest context was significant. Discrepancies over the reasons for military engagement with Iraq undermined the credibility of the partnership: was the search for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) the primary issue as stressed by the UK, or rather regime change and the removal of Saddam, the US perspective<sup>156</sup>? Despite UNSCR 1441, international opinion fractured over the legality of the proposed action, leading to Blair attempting to persuade the US to pursue a second UNSCR, more explicitly authorizing forceful measures. The absence of this second Resolution undoubtedly undermined the perceived legitimacy for many. These fundamental differences, along with a number of more minor factors, placed significant strain upon the AASR. From a UK perspective, the veracity of the relationship was questioned by some, especially regarding UK levels of influence over the US. Despite extreme domestic pressure, Blair remained resolutely supportive of the US action, consistently re-assuring Bush of his fidelity<sup>157</sup>. Within the UK, negative perceptions of the US were apparent immediately prior to the conflict commencing, with a *Sunday Times* poll showing equal numbers of respondents citing both the US and Iraqi leaders as 'the greatest threat to world peace'<sup>158</sup>. Bush personified anti-American feeling globally, including within the UK<sup>159</sup>. While militarily the UK contribution to the 'coalition of the willing'<sup>160</sup> was the second largest<sup>161</sup>, arguably the greatest impact was the legitimacy it bestowed, providing encouragement for other countries to participate<sup>162</sup>. International opposition was widespread, with both Russia's and China's stances fundamentally different from the Afghanistan intervention of 2001. Equally importantly, a well-publicised US-European disagreement resulted, arguably the biggest rift in modern times between the two parties<sup>163</sup>. Thus the UK's decision to support US action had implications for its international position, not least its

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<sup>155</sup> [http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/061004\\_update.pdf](http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/061004_update.pdf) accessed 23 April 2007. 5,200 UK and 11,250 US troops.

<sup>156</sup> Riddell, 2004.

<sup>157</sup> Gardner, 2005, p.43.

<sup>158</sup> Poll conducted 16 February 2003.

<sup>159</sup> Joffe, 2006, p.71.

<sup>160</sup> This phrase is increasingly absent from the US Government's lexicon due to negative connotations, associated with *ad hoc* military coalitions that lack international legitimacy of those supported by UNSCR/NATO mandates; US State Department presentations 27 February 2007.

<sup>161</sup> 46,000 UK troops during major combat operations -

<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/FactSheets/OperationsFactsheets/OperationsInIraqKeyFactsFigures.htm> accessed 23 April 2007.

<sup>162</sup> Dumbrell, 2006, p.212; Ferguson, 2005, p.161..

<sup>163</sup> Dumbrell, 2007.

perennially fragile relationship with Europe. It is important to understand the possibility of a lasting generational dimension to the events of 2003-4<sup>164</sup>. Despite the 2005 Labour election success, the Iraqi invasion may be perceived by future British leaders as a warning against excessive loyalty to US military agendas<sup>165</sup>.

### The AASR in the New Millennium – Generic Context and Public Perceptions.

Chapter Three focussed on a variety of 'hard' and 'soft' issues that encapsulated the breadth of the AASR. The key political and military dimensions have been discussed above. Nuclear cooperation remains a continuous factor and while recent US doctrinal publications<sup>166</sup> have barely mentioned the role of US nuclear weapons, this is largely due to three key factors: a changed relationship with Russia; the increased focus on irregular threats; and the sensitivity of discussions and reliance on diplomatic tools when dealing with non-proliferation vis-à-vis North Korea and Iran. This does not mean that nuclear deterrence is no longer significant, nor importantly in this context, that the relevance of US-UK nuclear cooperation has diminished. Indeed, as the size of nuclear arsenals has reduced over the previous decade, the nuclear AASR has become increasingly meaningful<sup>167</sup>. Post-9/11 saw already well-established intelligence flows between the two countries intensify, significantly contributing to economic efforts to freeze terrorist assets. Intimate intelligence collaboration was perceived by both sides as a vital part of the GWOT, with information exchange enhanced by technological developments.

Twenty-first century business and economic experience refutes the 1988 Wilson Centre-Ditchley Foundation conclusions, which asserted that the UK's declining competitiveness and productivity would cause its strategic influence on the US to reduce, claiming then that it 'was almost at an end'<sup>168</sup>. In 2007, there can be little doubt that economic and commercial relations remain at the core of the AASR<sup>169</sup> and on current trends seem likely to strengthen rather than diminish. While Bush has arguably become 'the lightning rod' for anti-American feelings<sup>170</sup>, cultural and linguistic ties remain strong in areas such as pop music, film, literature and academia, along with a host of other areas. Recent polls reflect varying degrees of anti-Americanism, but much of this is focused against the Establishment and key individuals such as an unpopular President rather than America or Americans *per se*<sup>171</sup>. The anthropological concept of a 'culture area' remains crucial. Twenty-First century US-UK relations continue to support this concept, with a wide variety of cultural/linguistic areas and mutually validating perspectives.

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<sup>164</sup> Dumbrell, 2006, p.275.

<sup>165</sup> Dumbrell, 2006, p.215.

<sup>166</sup> The *National Defense Strategy* and *National Military Strategy* were developed in parallel, published 2005.

<sup>167</sup> Michel, 2006, p.159-161.

<sup>168</sup> Raymond, 2006, p.33.

<sup>169</sup> Peterson, 2006, p.44.

<sup>170</sup> Joffe, 2006, p.71.

<sup>171</sup> See <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?PageID=801> accessed 23 April 2007.

Progress in the Northern Ireland Peace Process has removed a 1990s source of tension, potentially transforming it into a major area of success. US/UK relations with Europe remain a pivotal issue, not least following the highly-publicised disputes between the US and 'old Europe' characterized by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in January 2003<sup>172</sup>. The UK continues to stress its similarity with the US, asserting that of all the European players it is most willing to take risks, a feature that distinguishes them from America's other allies in Europe<sup>173</sup>. Previously mentioned within Chapter One, Kagan supports this assertion, using his Mars and Venus analogy<sup>174</sup>. The Iraq War undoubtedly polarized European opinion, creating a 'highly toxic' environment<sup>175</sup>, yet the AASR continues to function. Britain's role as a trans-Atlantic bridge has traditionally depended heavily on US support for European integration; French and German opposition to the Iraq War has challenged this fundamental assumption<sup>176</sup>. In early 2003, Meyer believed the bridge was "sinking beneath the waves"<sup>177</sup>. Highs of European cooperation such as St Malo in 1998 seem distant, but despite the tensions created by intervention in Iraq, Britain's role as a trans-Atlantic bridge remains viable, if challenging, a theme that will be revisited within Chapter Five.

#### Contemporary Relevance and Importance.

In all respects, while emphasis shifts from decade to decade, the central features of the AASR to date remain pivotal to the Twenty-First century relationship. They provide varying degrees of depth, but cumulatively produce a breadth that underpins the AASR's success. Iraq clearly illustrates the costs both the US and UK have been willing to incur. For Washington, these were largely in the form of foreign policy adjustments, with "unilateralist instincts"<sup>178</sup> initially reined in to allow UN pressure time to take effect, albeit with unsuccessful conclusions. In London, 'costs' were incurred in terms of domestic public opinion and relations with key European allies, as well as recognition of the increased risk of the UK becoming a target for terrorist retaliation. The terrorist attacks of 7 July 2005 seemingly confirmed this<sup>179</sup>. While the 1991 Gulf War has been described as the apotheosis of the AASR<sup>180</sup>, cooperation in 2003 is arguably a more manifest example. While the 1997 the Labour Party manifesto made no mention of the AASR<sup>181</sup>, a new balance between UK relations with the US and with Europe "lay at the heart of Blair's grand strategy"<sup>182</sup>. Public support following 9/11 and intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq reflected a Twenty-First century manifestation of this. Blair firmly believed that to have influence in Washington, it was

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<sup>172</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2687403.stm> accessed 23 April 2007.

<sup>173</sup> Coker, 2001, p.88.

<sup>174</sup> Kagan, 2003, p.3.

<sup>175</sup> Childs, 2006, p.126.

<sup>176</sup> Stephens, 2006, p.140.

<sup>177</sup> Meyer, 2005, p.261.

<sup>178</sup> Stuart, 2006, p.205.

<sup>179</sup> The '7/7' attacks were at four separate locations in London, with 56 people killed and over 700 injured.

<sup>180</sup> Coker, 2001, p.78

<sup>181</sup> Dumbrell, 2001, p.220.

<sup>182</sup> Kramer, 2003, p.92.

necessary to “hug the Americans close”<sup>183</sup>: as he famously asserted, “the price of British influence is that we do not leave the US to face the tricky issues alone”<sup>184</sup>.

The future relevance of key AASR institutions has been challenged as a result of interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2005, former German Chancellor Schroeder suggested that NATO had outlived its usefulness and that a new organization was required to manage the trans-Atlantic security relationship<sup>185</sup>. Many observers have posited that NATO’s future could depend upon a successful outcome in Afghanistan<sup>186</sup>; yet such an assessment presents seemingly insoluble difficulties regarding definitions of what constitutes success and measuring whether it has been achieved. The US’ apparent dismissal of UN-relevance over proposed intervention in Iraq fundamentally weakened both parties, with a broader impact on international relations that is still being determined. One effect can be seen in Blair’s continued attempts to steer the US towards a multi-polar approach, utilising international institutions rather than simply relying on overwhelming military superiority. Afghanistan and particularly Iraq seemed to show that even a superpower should not “act without the benefits of a good counsel”<sup>187</sup>, a theme that will be explored further within Chapter Five.

While neither Afghanistan nor Iraq could yet be considered a success, collective US-UK experience has arguably strengthened the AASR. In 2007, the relationship retains the breadth upon which success has always been grounded; on key ‘hard’ security issues, while results have not always been favourable, cooperation has been overwhelming. Precisely because of the difficulties faced, the US increasingly recognises the importance of international legitimacy for its actions. Far from being Bush’s poodle<sup>188</sup>, Blair’s Britain represents a key actor in restoring the international community’s belief in US’ ability to act as a ‘benign hegemon’<sup>189</sup>. No single episode has ever reinvigorated the AASR to the extent witnessed following 9/11. Subsequent events, in both ‘soft’ and more importantly ‘hard’ areas provide fresh foundations on which to base the AASR for the next generation.

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<sup>183</sup> Riddell, 2004.

<sup>184</sup> Blair in Danchev, 2003, p.18.

<sup>185</sup> McCausland, 2006, p.197.

<sup>186</sup> Jentleson, 31 January 2007.

<sup>187</sup> Kramer, 2003, p.104.

<sup>188</sup> Riddell, 2004.

<sup>189</sup> Dick, 2006, p.185.

## CHAPTER FIVE – A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?

Analysis of the AASR within Chapter One determined that despite difficulties over precise definition and quantitative measurement, the relationship did exist and was special. In Chapter Two, an examination of the historiography from the end of WW2 to the close of the Twentieth century identified both relationship highs and lows, but demonstrated consistent themes commensurate with the closeness unique to the AASR. This examination focussed primarily on high politics and 'hard' issues; it was argued these provide the relationship's depth. Chapter Three examined some of these 'hard' issues but also introduced some 'softer' and more diverse areas of interaction between the two nations. Cumulatively, it was suggested these areas provided the breadth of the relationship, ensuring AASR stability is maintained even when political differences exist. Within Chapter Four the defining issues of the first decade of the Twenty-First century were examined, notably the impact of 9/11 and subsequent intervention in Afghanistan and more contentiously, Iraq. It argued that the depth of the relationship had grown. A brief examination of the wider dimension of the AASR confirmed that the breadth also remained and was more extensive than at any time during the previous century.

In this concluding chapter, three key areas will be explored. Firstly, the differing perspectives on the existence and extent of the AASR will be considered, an attempt to explain why significant discrepancies in commentators' opinions exist and why the relationship remains a perennial topic of both interest and contention. Second, the current international context and American global supremacy will be examined, allowing the implications for the AASR to be assessed. Finally, the utility, relevance and breadth of the AASR, the key factors identified within the first chapter as underlying the relationship, will be gauged and conclusions drawn regarding future relations between the two countries.

### Schools of Thought.

An extensive examination of the literature reveals a wide-ranging spectrum of opinions on the nature of the AASR. At one extreme, commentators such as Massie perceive the imbalance in the relationship to be so great that it cannot be considered special or mutually beneficial, with the UK portrayed as entirely subservient. He describes Blair as "the American President's whipped cur"<sup>190</sup> and argues that UK interests would be best served by abandoning any hope of a meaningful and balanced relationship with the US. Occupying the middle ground, many academics accept the existence of the relationship<sup>191</sup>, but dispute the extent of 'specialness'<sup>192</sup>. Danchev has argued that a truly 'special relationship' can never exist, as at any given moment there will be imbalance with

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<sup>190</sup> Massie, 2006, p.18.

<sup>191</sup> Danchev & Kimball: articles in *BJPIR*, 2005.

<sup>192</sup> Danchev's term coined in 1998 book.

relations not as pliant or potent as one partner would wish<sup>193</sup>. Kimball argues that semantics are being discussed, contending that the disagreement over how special the AASR is represents not a scholarly debate, more a debate between scholars<sup>194</sup>. Many observers have accepted that an imbalance exists in the relative power of the two countries, but assert that this does not preclude the AASR's existence. The term 'asymmetric interdependence'<sup>195</sup> characterizes this view, namely that whilst there are different benefits for each side, the relationship is mutually beneficial and complementary. Others identify unparalleled levels of trust that have "no exact equivalent in their relationships with any other country"<sup>196</sup>. A shared history of cooperation is seen by many as reinforcing the relationship, while both countries' disagreements with third parties bind them closer together. Even before the Iraq War in 2003, one French observer believed that for the US, the UK had become the only credible European partner<sup>197</sup>. The AASR has consistently generated academic and political debate throughout the past sixty years, as well as providing a rich vein of material for political cartoonists, as the examples at Enclosure Nine show. The rationale for this range of views is considered below.

### Why Such Significant Discrepancies?

Interest in the AASR is frequently greatest during periods of tension, with commentators' perceptions shaped by prevailing international circumstances. Many factors contribute towards observers' views of the AASR, but three will be briefly examined here: contemporary international circumstances; wider political motivation; and cultural perspectives.

Some academics, notably Danchev, have consistently opined that the AASR is not special, views he has expressed against shifting international backdrops throughout the last decade<sup>198</sup>. Despite an evolving world position, his position vis-à-vis the AASR remains unwavering. By contrast, another key AASR-commentator Dumbrell has reassessed his views on the relationship's nature as events have unfolded. His definitive assessment in 2001 was written within the context of the post-Cold War decade. A combination of factors, including the removal of the common threat posed by the Soviet Union, led to predictions of a declining importance for the AASR. The Second Edition of this book, released in 2006, witnessed many arguments reconsidered, leading Dumbrell to reassess his position on the future of the AASR in the light of Twenty-First century events. During the Suez Crisis, UK views of the AASR were inevitably negatively influenced, while during periods such as the Reagan-Thatcher era, pro-American sentiment was more in evidence. Therefore, historical context is undoubtedly crucial.

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<sup>193</sup> Danchev, 1997, p.748.

<sup>194</sup> Kimball, 2005, p.437.

<sup>195</sup> Keohane & Nye, 1989.

<sup>196</sup> Vivekanandan, 1990, p.384.

<sup>197</sup> Arnaud de la Grange writing in *Le Figaro*; Harris, 2002, p.38.

<sup>198</sup> Opinion's expressed in Danchev's *On Specialness* are extremely similar to articles in 1997, 2003 & 2005.

Attitudes towards UK relations with Europe provide one clear example of the impact of wider political motivations on perceptions of the AASR. Pro-European writers such as Danchev or Braithwaite have sought to devalue the AASR as part of attempts to stress the importance of UK relations with Europe. In contrast, strong supporters of the AASR such as Kimball, who claimed to have grave doubts that Britons are culturally, politically or socially Europeans<sup>199</sup>, playing down UK ties with Europe and emphasising US-UK cultural similarities. The 2003 Iraq War provides a further example of the AASR being cited to support wider political claims. Danchev's views again provide a useful example; he claims that events in Iraq show acquiescence rather than any meaningful influence<sup>200</sup>, supporting his contention that the UK lacks authority within the AASR. Thus positions taken regarding the AASR can become self-supporting of other views and assessments of the AASR should be considered in this context.

Finally, cultural perspectives, the most clear example being British anti-Americanism<sup>201</sup>, have historically shaped perceptions of the AASR and in many cases continue to do so today. Particularly in the post-WW2 era, this took the form of (generally) upper class affront at America's assumption of Britain's role as a world power. Another historical strand has been the views of the British political left, notably towards US foreign policy and the role of American intelligence agencies. A third strand crosses the UK political spectrum, with nationalist grievances over US success, namely a sense of injustice at America's success and concerns over what a relationship with the US would do to Britain's dignity and national sovereignty. Each of these themes is apparent in the historiography of the AASR, with contemporary examples still evident, reinforcing the importance of cultural perspectives on views of the relationship.

What these three key factors clearly show is the complexity of attitudes regarding the AASR. Commentators' views may be driven solely by attitudes towards the relationship itself, but in many cases, there are various layers to be peeled away before a full understanding of their opinions can be obtained. Thus the wide spectrum of positions vis-à-vis the AASR is partly due to differing interpretations of the relationship between the two countries, but also results from associated issues and authors' stances on them.

### A Special Relationship with the Global Hegemon?

Throughout the entire period under consideration, the US has been a global superpower. With the end of the Cold War and the Soviet Union's demise the US became pre-eminent, enjoying greater freedom of action with the Soviet bulwark removed. Following 9/11, this global power imbalance

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<sup>199</sup> Kimball, 2005, p.439.

<sup>200</sup> Danchev, 2003

<sup>201</sup> Dumbrell, 2001.

provided a temptation to act that was previously unthinkable<sup>202</sup>. US diplomatic and military actions provide significant implications for the AASR and its future. More than ever before, complexity characterizes the relationship, with fundamental questions arising, namely: the impact of globalization on international relations; the role of global institutions in maintaining world order, not least the challenge to the Westphalian notion of the integrity of nation state; managing Childs' aforementioned 'toxic' international environment<sup>203</sup> created by the US-led coalition intervention in Iraq; global insecurity and the challenges posed by terrorism (although this remains a technique rather than an enemy in itself)<sup>204</sup>; and trans-national crime. Strategic thinking on these 'hard' issues by both US-UK administrations lies at the heart of future AASR approaches.

The US-UK relationship within the context of the intervention in Iraq can be used to draw out many of the contemporary AASR headlines. Many politicians, academics and journalists within the UK have asserted that the UK's support of the US' intervention in Iraq has fundamentally weakened both the UK's world standing and the AASR itself. By extension, it has been claimed that UK interests are weakened through connection with the US and that the benefits to Britain of the AASR are "strangely intangible"<sup>205</sup>. Others assert that early Twenty-First century experiences have reduced the UK's position to that of a US 'satellite republic'<sup>206</sup>. The reputation of key individuals has also been negatively, irrevocably affected<sup>207</sup>, causing near political paralysis for both countries.

These views all perceive recent experience in Iraq as entirely negative, damaging to the AASR and the wider interests of both countries. Yet positive factors emerge from a potentially negative experience. Kagan suggested that US strength produced a propensity to use it, while Europe's relative weakness generated a world view stressing the primacy of international law and institutions<sup>208</sup>. Joffe believes US freedom to act has leapfrogged its ability to achieve<sup>209</sup>, while a former UK Ambassador to Washington identified that US experience in Iraq meant they would increasingly prefer to act in the world with allies than without<sup>210</sup>. Increasingly clear, is that results cannot be achieved through exercising raw power alone<sup>211</sup>. While the 1991 intervention in Iraq had international legitimacy, the 2003 experience was characterized by disagreements. This has provided a salutary lesson for the US of the crucial importance of international perceptions of legitimacy, an area where Britain's role within the AASR potentially has much to offer. Arguably from the 1960s onwards, Britain's relative position in terms of hard power compared with the US meant that London's ability to be both a reliable and an internationally credible ally and contributor

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<sup>202</sup> Jackson & Towle, 2006, p.ix..

<sup>203</sup> Childs, 2006, p.126.

<sup>204</sup> McCausland, 2006, p.193.

<sup>205</sup> Ferguson, 2005, p.162.

<sup>206</sup> Curtis, 2003, p.112.

<sup>207</sup> Freedman, 2006.

<sup>208</sup> Kagan, 2002, p.20.

<sup>209</sup> Joffe, 2006, p.207.

<sup>210</sup> Meyer, 2005, p.235.

<sup>211</sup> Calabrese, 2001, p.58.

towards American 'soft power' was fundamental<sup>212</sup>. Post-2003, this position has been resoundingly endorsed.

The concept of soft power, the ability to attract others by the legitimacy of policies and the values that underlies them, is crucial to understanding the future of the AASR. Some have argued that increasing anti-Americanism has undermined US ability in this area<sup>213</sup>. As a result, the UK's greatest utility for the Americans is arguably through 'soft' rather than 'hard' power<sup>214</sup>. In the language of the Nineteenth century, Britain can fulfil the role of an international honest broker. Thus the fundamental challenge for the UK in its AASR role is to demonstrate freedom of action, which has in some areas become increasingly restricted<sup>215</sup> whilst retaining credibility and independence in the eyes of the international community<sup>216</sup>.

### The AASR – Utility, Relevance and Breadth.

The strength of the AASR has undoubtedly ebbed and flowed throughout its history. Like an elderly married couple, the two nations have consistently bickered, but have become used to each others' idiosyncrasies. The ability to disagree, yet retain close cooperation across a broad range of issues and resolve differences remarkably quickly by the standards of international diplomacy, underscores the relationship's special nature. Despite the dynamic character of the AASR and the changing personalities of key figures, judged against the benchmarks of utility, relevance and breadth, it passes any test of 'specialness' with flying colours. AASR sceptics accuse some observers of sentimentality when assessing the relationship's value, particularly for the American superpower. This view fails to recognize the continued diplomatic, economic and cultural power of the UK, which while frequently inferior to the US remains significant in its own right. Danchev for one overstates his case when he asserts that, "Britain is Belgium although the British do not know it yet"<sup>217</sup>. While the international position in 2007 is markedly different to the post-WW2 era, the AASR remains relevant. The US remains the paramount global power; thus UK interests are undoubtedly served by a close relationship.

Yet experience post-9/11 has proven that the US cannot rely alone on 'hard' power. International legitimacy for US actions requires support of key institutions such as the UN and NATO, organizations where the UK retains significant influence. Negative experience in Iraq has in many ways strengthened the UK's position within the AASR; the US increasingly recognizes the need for

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<sup>212</sup> Dumbrell, 2006, p.74.

<sup>213</sup> Nye, 2004, p.16.

<sup>214</sup> Elie, 2005, p.64.

<sup>215</sup> Braithwaite, 2003.

<sup>216</sup> Dumbrell, 2006, p.273.

<sup>217</sup> Danchev, 1997, p.758.

allies. Regarding wider Middle East issues such as handling Iran, US policy requires revision<sup>218</sup>. Finally, the breadth of the relationship is arguably greater than it has ever been. In political, military, intelligence and nuclear fields, the two countries enjoy unparalleled mutual access. There is a remarkable interpenetration of the two economies<sup>219</sup>, with cultural ties tightly interwoven. Both countries' relations with Europe have been strained by intervention in Iraq, although arguably this has reinforced US-UK relations. The UK retains the desire to provide a trans-Atlantic bridge typified in the 2003 Iraq War, where its role was not as a mediator between Bush and Saddam but between the United States and anxious European allies<sup>220</sup>. The AASR remains an imprecise notion, with any assessment reliant more on subjective rather than objective factors. Yet considered against the concepts of utility, relevance and breadth, it is arguably stronger in 2007 than at any time in its history.

### The Future of the AASR.

After coming to power, Blair alluded to Dean Acheson's 1950s comments about Britain losing an empire but failing to find a role. The Prime Minister portrayed Britain as a 'pivotal power' at the 'crux of alliances and international politics' that shape the world<sup>221</sup>. It is clear this continues to be the role Britain pursues in the Twenty-First century. Emerging global powers such as China and India will continue to ensure that the US considers its interests worldwide. Yet economically, politically and culturally, Europe will remain of key importance for America. Churchill identified the role, followed by most subsequent British administrations, of the UK as a trans-Atlantic bridge, at the heart of European policy, but with the US as its key ally. Many commentators believe that this role as an interlocutor cannot last, with the UK forced to nail its colours to either a US or European mast. Some, such as Dick, suggest that both the US and Europe will demand Britain should choose between them<sup>222</sup>; Braithwaite agrees saying that Blair's actions over Iraq have made such a choice more difficult to avoid<sup>223</sup>. Frum and Perle agree a choice needs to be made by the UK, arguing that the US should force European Governments to choose between 'Washington and Paris', with a key element of this strategy being to prise London away from continental Europe<sup>224</sup>. Garton-Ash similarly argues that the UK abandon attempts as a trans-Atlantic bridge, but argues that the UK should align itself with the European powers<sup>225</sup>. Yet many observers, and crucially those in power within the UK, argue that the concept of the UK as a trans-Atlantic intermediary will best serve British interests and this policy seems that most likely to be pursued. US-UK decisions

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<sup>218</sup> Ansari, 2006.

<sup>219</sup> Raymond, 2006, p.34.

<sup>220</sup> Freedman, 2006, p.70.

<sup>221</sup> Blair, 22 November 1999.

<sup>222</sup> Dick, 2006, p.187.

<sup>223</sup> Braithwaite, 2003.

<sup>224</sup> Frum & Perle, 2003

<sup>225</sup> Garton-Ash, 2005.

over Britain's role vis-à-vis Europe, represents the single most important factor for the Twenty-First century AASR.

Since Churchill's coining of the phrase 'special relationship', observers have consistently predicted the AASR's terminal decline. As recently as December 2006, the US Ambassador to the UK reiterated the longevity of the relationship, asserting that it had, "weathered the storms of history"<sup>226</sup>. Whilst dynamic and responsive to changing international events, the AASR remains a "fixed and permanent factor in international politics"<sup>227</sup>. International conditions change, but the AASR has a proven pedigree for adapting to meet changing circumstances. Whether collectively addressing global security challenges, cooperating over sensitive intelligence or nuclear issues, adapting to an ever-changing international landscape or simply through overwhelming economic and cultural inter-penetration, the AASR seems certain to rest at the heart of both countries' strategic planning. Political affiliations or individual personalities will undoubtedly shape the relationship, but will not in themselves determine its existence. Mark Twain's observation accurately captures the current health and future prospects for the AASR: "the report of my death was an exaggeration".

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<sup>226</sup> Tuttle, *The Daily Telegraph*, 1 December 2006.

<sup>227</sup> Elie, 2005, p.73.

## ENCLOSURES

**One.** Danchev's Ten Criteria to Measure 'Specialness'.

**Two.** Highs and Lows of the Anglo-American Special Relationship.

**Three.** PM-President Relations Since 1940.

**Four.** International Defence Spending – 2005.

**Five.** AASR Significant Nuclear-Related Issues.

**Six.** US Inward and Outward Direct Financial Investment.

Six (Alpha) – Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Into United States.

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**Seven.** UK & US Trade Figures – Import and Export.

Seven (Alpha) – UK Exports by Country.

Seven (Bravo) – UK Imports by Country.

Seven (Charlie) – US Exports by Country.

Seven (Delta) – US Imports by Country.

**Eight.** UK Tourism Figures.

Eight (Alpha) – Visits to the UK by Country of Origin.

Eight (Bravo) – Visits from UK by Destination.

**Nine.** Anglo-American Special Relationship – Cartoons Since World War Two.

## **ENCLOSURE - OUTLINES**

Enclosure One. Danchev's 1998 book *On Specialness* provides ten suggested criteria against which countries' relations could arguably be measured. It is offered for consideration here as one example, that when applied reinforces the closeness of the AASR, even though Danchev himself remains sceptical about the existence and value of any 'special relationship'.

Enclosure Two. Each year since 1940 has been assessed and a 'subjective' score out of ten awarded for the strength of the AASR within that year. These are then plotted graphically and ten notable high and low points of the relationship identified. It provides subjective trends rather than objective measures.

Enclosure Three. For consideration with Enclosure Two, the relations between pairings of PM and President have been examined to determine the strength of their personal relations. Although the AASR is broader than simply relations between the respective national leaders, this provides a good indication of the overall health of the relationship.

Enclosure Four. A snapshot of Defence spending worldwide for 2005 is offered to show the significant expenditure committed by the US, but also the UK. It also reveals the overwhelming financial commitment of the US in relation to all other nations.

Enclosure Five. One of the key areas of the AASR, a brief outline of key nuclear-related events shows that with limited exceptions, this area has consistently lay at the heart of political and military cooperation between the two sides for over sixty years.

Enclosure Six. Financial interpenetration of each other's respective economies is a key tenet of the AASR. Both graphs reveal the extent of this penetration and the mutual dependence of the two countries. Source throughout: [http://www.bea.gov/international/ii\\_web/timeseries7-2.cfm](http://www.bea.gov/international/ii_web/timeseries7-2.cfm)

Enclosure Seven. Import and export figures are provided for both countries. While the degree of penetration is arguably less significant than in purely financial terms, all four graphs show the significant influence of trade in binding the two countries together. Source throughout: <http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/>

Enclosure Eight. Tourism is used to offer one example of a 'softer' area of cooperation. Other areas such as academia, the film and music industry, or literature could similarly have been used. Despite the significant geographical distance between the two countries, the levels of mutual

tourist dependence make a significant contribution to the AASR. Source throughout:  
[http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme\\_transport/](http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_transport/)

Enclosure Nine. Political cartoons provide an excellent barometer of media (and arguably public) perceptions of the AASR throughout the post-WW2 period. A sample is provided, with key personalities in each outlined below:

Note: Cartoons are explained starting from the top left of page one and them working from left to right, top to bottom:

1. First Published: *Evening Standard* (London) 26 October 2001. Character: Tony Blair. Context: US control of operations in Afghanistan, with Blair (and thus the UK) unable to influence operations. (Page E-9-1)
2. First Published: *New Statesman* 23 July 2001. Characters: George W Bush and Tony Blair. Context: The US (Bush) walking all over the UK (Blair). (Page E-9-1)
3. First Published: *The Times* 29 March 2003. Characters: George W Bush and Tony Blair (as the 'pooch'). Context: Media descriptions of Blair as 'Bush's poodle', following the US policy line as a dog would his master. (Page E-9-1)
4. First Published: *The Times* 28 March 2003. Characters: George W Bush and Tony Blair. Context: Media implication that Blair (and by extension the UK) lacked influence over US post-Iraq War reconstruction planning. (Page E-9-1)
5. First Published: *The Economist* 1 February 2007. Characters: Characters: George W Bush and Tony Blair. Context: The UK (Blair) falling off of the US 'machine' after a bumpy ride. (Page E-9-2)
6. First Published: *The Herald* (Glasgow) 12 June 1999. Characters: Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. Context: The US (Clinton) walking all over the UK (Blair) regarding involvement in Kosovo. (Page E-9-2)
7. First Published: *The Times* 19 February 1998. Characters: Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. Context: UK following the US line over potential action against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. (Page E-9-2)
8. First Published: *The Express on Sunday* 8 February 1998. Characters: Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. Context: Blair's support for Clinton in the wake of the Monica Lewinsky scandal. (Page E-9-3)
9. First Published: *The Herald* (Glasgow) 6 February 1998. Characters: Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. Context: Another reference to Blair as the US President's obedient dog. (Page E-9-3)
10. First Published: *The Times* 6 February 1998. Characters: Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. Context: Blair gives personal support to Clinton despite domestic scandals, notably the Monica Lewinsky affair, with personal relations key. (Page E-9-3)


11. First Published: *The Guardian* 24 February 1993. Characters: Bill Clinton, John Major and (Peter) Norman Fowler. Context: Conservative support for George H W Bush during the 1992 US Presidential elections led to bad feeling between the Major and Clinton Administrations. (Page E-9-4)
12. First Published: *The Daily Telegraph* 16 March 1995. Characters: Bill Clinton, (John Major as the UK (prone on ground)) and Gerry Adams. Context: Severe strain on the AASR as a result of the Clinton Administration granting a visa for Gerry Adams (spokesman of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA)). (Page E-9-4)
13. First Published: *Daily Mail* 13 June 1989. Characters: Ronald Reagan & Margaret Thatcher (with George H W Bush referred to). Context: Following the election of Bush Snr, the special relationship goes on despite a change of personalities. (Page E-9-4)
14. First Published: *New Standard* 22 January 1982. Characters: Ronald Reagan & Margaret Thatcher (with Denis Thatcher 'speaking'). Context: Highlighting the closeness of the AASR in the Reagan-Thatcher era, using a film billboard (playing on Reagan's background as an actor). (Page E-9-5)
15. First Published: *Daily Telegraph* 26 February 1981. Characters: Ronald Reagan & Margaret Thatcher (alluding to Charles, Prince of Wales and Lady Diana Spencer). Context: Reference to the closeness of the AASR using the recent Royal engagement as its basis. (Page E-9-5)
16. First Published: *The Guardian* 27 October 1983 Characters: Ronald Reagan & Margaret Thatcher and Geoffrey Howe. Context: US continuing to cite support for the UK during the Falklands War as a way of maintaining influence. (Page E-9-5)
17. First Published: *The Guardian* 7 June 1982 Characters: Ronald Reagan & Margaret Thatcher. Context: US support for the UK in the Falklands War, although US trying to satisfy both sides. (Page E-9-5)
18. First Published: *Daily Express* 20 December 1971 Characters: Richard Nixon, Edward Heath, George Pompidou (France) & Willy Brandt (Germany). Context: Heath's desire for closeness with Europe altering the balance of the special relationship. (Page E-9-6)
19. First Published: *Evening Standard* (London) 29 November 1961 Character: Edward Heath. Context: Heath's pro-European position. (Page E-9-6)
20. First Published: *Daily Express* 21 March 1966 Characters: Lyndon B Johnson, Harold Wilson, Edward Heath & Charles de Gaulle. Context: Wilson taking a more US-focussed line while opposition (Heath) favouring closer relations with Europe. (Page E-9-6)
21. First Published: *The Times* 1 July 1966 Characters: Lyndon B Johnson and Harold Wilson. Context: Wilson's refusal to send UK troops to fight in Vietnam. (Page E-9-7)
22. First Published: *Evening Standard* (London) 2 February 1966 Characters: Lyndon B Johnson and Harold Wilson Context: Vietnam War ongoing. (Page E-9-7)

23. First Published: *Daily Mail* 16 December 1965 Characters: Lyndon B Johnson and Harold Wilson Context: US-UK relations perceived positively at the outset of the Vietnam War, with the implication that Johnson is the father figure and Wilson the 'child' (secondary figure). (Page E-9-7)
24. First Published: *Daily Express* 11 January 1967 Characters: Lyndon B Johnson, Harold Wilson and James Callaghan. Context: Perceived imbalance in trade barriers favouring US industry over the UK. (Page E-9-7)
25. First Published: Unpublished 20 December 1963 Characters: Dr Ludwig Erhard, Charles de Gaulle, Alec Douglas-Home and Lyndon B Johnson. Context: UK trying to convince the US of the continued existence of the AASR in light of European overtures towards the US. (Page E-9-8)
26. First Published: *New Statesman* 3 July 1964 Characters: Lyndon B Johnson and Alec Douglas-Home. Context: Immigration ban in US for British secretaries. (Page E-9-8)
27. First Published: Unpublished 20 December 1963 Characters: Dr Ludwig Erhard, Charles de Gaulle, Alec Douglas-Home and Lyndon B Johnson. Context: UK trying to convince the US of the continued existence of the AASR in light of European overtures towards the US. (Page E-9-8)
28. First Published: *Daily Express* 1 November 1962 Characters: John F Kennedy, Harold Macmillan and Hugh Gaitskell (in UK pocket); Pierre Werner (Luxembourg), Baudouin (King of the Belgians), Jan Eduard de Quay (Netherlands), Antonio Segny (Italy), Konrad Adenauer (Germany) & Charles de Gaulle (France) ('The 6' pocket). Context: Implications of UK joining the European Six countries. (Page E-9-9)
29. First Published: *Evening Standard* (London) 13 Dec 1962 Characters: John F Kennedy (Prince Charming), Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle (Ugly Sisters) and Harold Macmillan (Cinderella). Context: Kennedy's support for Europe, perceived as possibly at the expense of the AASR. (Page E-9-9)
30. First Published: *Evening Standard* (London) 19 September 1945 Characters: Harry S Truman and John Maynard Keynes. Context: Post-WW2 economic negotiations. (Page E-9-10)
31. First Published: *Evening Standard* (London) 5 September 1940 Characters: Franklin D Roosevelt & Winston Churchill. Context: US assistance to the UK (in this case, specifically Navy), prior to US entry into WW2 after Pearl Harbour. (Page E-9-10)


**DANCHEV'S TEN CRITERIA TO MEASURE 'SPECIALNESS'**

1. Transparency.
2. Informality.
3. Generality.
4. Reciprocity.
5. Exclusivity.
6. Clandestinity.
7. Reliability.
8. Durability.
9. Potentiality.
10. Mythicizability.

### Highs and Lows of the Anglo-American Special Relationship



### PM-President Relations Since 1940



### INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE SPENDING – 2005

The 15 countries with the highest military expenditure in 2005 in market exchange rate terms and purchasing power parity terms

Spending figures are in US\$, at constant (2003) prices and exchange rates.

Military expenditure in MER dollar terms						Military expenditure in PPP dollar terms <sup>a</sup>		
Rank	Country	Spending (\$ b.)	Spending per capita (\$)	World share (%)		Rank	Country	Spending (\$ b.)
				Spending	Popul.			
1	USA	478.2	1 604	48	5	1	USA	478.2
2	UK	48.3	809	5	1	2	China	[188.4]
3	France	46.2	763	5	1	3	India	105.8
4	Japan	42.1	329	4	2	4	Russia	[64.4]
5	China	[41.0]	[31.2]	[4]	20	5	France	45.4
<b>Sub-total top 5</b>		<b>655.7</b>		<b>65</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>Sub-total top 5</b>		<b>882.3</b>
6	Germany	33.2	401	3	1	6	UK	42.3
7	Italy	27.2	468	3	1	7	Saudi Arabia <sup>b, c</sup>	35.0
8	Saudi Arabia <sup>b, c</sup>	25.2	1 025	3	0	8	Japan	34.9
9	Russia	[21.0]	[147]	[2]	2	9	Germany	32.7
10	India	20.4	18.5	2	17	10	Italy	30.1
<b>Sub-total top 10</b>		<b>782.7</b>		<b>78</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>Sub-total top 10</b>		<b>1 057.2</b>
11	Korea, South	16.4	344	2	1	11	Brazil	24.3
12	Canada <sup>c</sup>	10.6	327	1	0	12	Iran <sup>b</sup>	23.8
13	Australia <sup>c</sup>	10.5	522	1	0	13	South Korea	23.4
14	Spain	9.9	230	1	1	14	Turkey	17.8
15	Israel <sup>c</sup>	9.6	1 430	1	0	15	Taiwan	13.4
<b>Sub-total top 15</b>		<b>839.8</b>		<b>84</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>Sub-total top 15</b>		<b>1 159.8</b>
<b>World</b>		<b>1 001</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>World</b>		<b>..</b>

MER = Market exchange rate; PPP = Purchasing power parity; [ ] = Estimated figure.

<sup>a</sup> The figures in PPP dollar terms are converted at PPP rates (for 2003), calculated by the World Bank, based on comparisons of gross national product.

<sup>b</sup> Data for Iran and Saudi Arabia include expenditure for public order and safety and might be a slight overestimate.

<sup>c</sup> The populations of Australia, Canada, Israel and Saudi Arabia each constitute less than 0.5% of the total world population.


*Sources: Military expenditure:* Appendix 8A; *PPP rates:* World Bank, *World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for Everyone* (World Bank: Washington, DC, 2004), URL <<http://econ.worldbank.org/wdr/>>, table 1, 'Key indicators of development', pp. 256–57, and table 5, 'Key indicators for other economies', p. 264; **2005 Population:** United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), *State of the World Population 2005* (UNFPA: New York, N.Y., 2005), URL <<http://unfpa.org/swp/>>.

Source: SIPRI 2006 - [http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex\\_major\\_spenders.pdf](http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_major_spenders.pdf)  
(SIPRI – Stockholm International Peace Research Institute)


**AASR SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR-RELATED ISSUES**

- 1945 – 6 August, 'Little Boy' nuclear weapon dropped on Hiroshima.  
9 August 'Fat Man' nuclear weapon dropped on Nagasaki.
- 1949 – USSR Test their first nuclear weapon.  
Truman Administration applies pressure on UK to abandon attempts to develop national deterrent.
- 1952 – UK's first nuclear weapons test.
- 1954 – British Chiefs of Staff decide to support the development of an independent Hydrogen bomb.
- 1957 – UK 'Operation GRAPPLE' tests of nuclear device on the Christmas Island (fusion test).
- 1958 – UK Hydrogen bomb ready.  
US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement allows greater cooperation on nuclear security matters.
- 1962 – Polaris deal signed in the Bahamas by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan.
- 1963 – UK granted access to US underground nuclear testing sites in Nevada.
- 1964 – Effective abandonment by Washington of Multilateral Nuclear Force Proposals.
- 1968 – Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- 1969-1972 – Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT 1) between the US and USSR.
- 1972-1979 – SALT 2 (Later Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)) talks between the US and USSR.
- 1980-82 – Trident deal concluded.
- 1996 – Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signed.
- June 2006 – 'The Future of the UK's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: The Strategic Context' released.
- December 2006 – Blair tells MPs it would be 'unwise and dangerous for the UK to give up its nuclear weapons.'


### Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Into United States




### United States Direct Investment Overseas




### UK Exports by Country




### UK Imports by Country




### US Exports By Country




### US Imports by Country





### Visits to UK by Country of Origin



### Visits from UK by Destination




BUSH & BLAIR






The Economist, 1 February 2007

CLINTON & BLAIR




"That Special Relationship moment."  
12.6.00






CLINTON & MAJOR




THE IDES OF MARCH

BUSH, REAGAN & THATCHER



'It's true, Bonnie. I did say that President Bush and I had a special relationship — but honestly, not as special as ours!'


REAGAN & THATCHER



"Well I think your special relationship has gone too far!"





A special relationship





Special Relationship Pas de Deux

# HEATH'S EUROPEANISM



JOHNSON & WILSON




'Batman' the thrill-serial, which has been sweeping America, is starting its London run today.

Washington revival of 'Hello Dolly'



"... it's so nice to have you back where you belong ..."




"I've called you to America, gentlemen, to decorate you personally for your dedicated services in aid of American Industry"


JOHNSON & DOUGLAS-HOME




...BUT L.B.J. YOU KNOW, WE'VE ALWAYS HAD A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP!



'Gee, honey, this'll end our special relationship...'




KENNEDY & MACMILLAN



TRUMAN & JOHN MAYNARD  
KEYNES



ROOSEVELT & CHURCHILL



SOURCE: [HTTP://OPAL.KENT.AC.UK/CARTOONX-CGI/CCC.PY](http://opal.kent.ac.uk/cartoonx/cgi/ccc.py) UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED

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