

DEFENCE | SECURITY | DEVELOPMENT

DEFENCE ACADEMY
OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
Intellectual Excellence in Defence

British Leaders and Irregular Warfare
By David Benest

THE DEFENCE ACADEMY JOURNAL

December 2007



The Defence Academy of the United Kingdom

The Defence Academy is the UK's Defence higher educational establishment. It is responsible for post-graduate education and the majority of command, staff, leadership, defence management, acquisition, and technology training for members of the UK Armed Forces and MOD Civilian Servants, and for establishing and maintaining itself as the MOD's primary link with UK universities and international military educational institutions.

Through exploitation of its intellectual capital, the Academy aims to act as a powerful force in developing thinking about defence and security, not only within MOD but across Government, and to influence wider debate about defence and security issues.

Defence Academy of the United Kingdom: <http://www.defenceacademy.mod.uk>

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this paper are entirely and solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect official thinking or policy either of Her Majesty's Government or of the Ministry of Defence.

The Defence Academy Journal

The Defence Academy's on-line Journal provides a forum for the discussion of the most topical issues of Defence, development, and security.

As with all the Defence Academy's publications, its functions are: to help keep the educational curricula of the Academy's colleges at the cutting edge; to reinforce operational capability; and, to provide material to assist policymakers and decision takers working in the various fields pertaining to national security. Emphasis will be placed on rapid response and early publication of papers submitted.

A Note for Potential Authors

If you have a topic which you think it would be useful to discuss in print, either in the Journal or as a Shrivenham Paper, do please call or email Emma McCarthy (Tel: 01793 788 861, E-mail: emccarthy.hq@da.mod.uk) the Publications Manager. She will be happy either to discuss the scope and direction of your paper and help you frame it for us to publish, or she will put you in contact with one of our team qualified in your topic for an expert discussion of the issue and how to develop it best into a paper. In this way we hope to be able to ensure the high quality and above all the relevance of the items before they go before our editorial board to evaluate for publication.

Contents

British Leaders and Irregular Warfare.....	4
Leaders in irregular warfare face acute ethical and legal dilemmas.....	6
Leaders make the real difference: theory and doctrine merely provide a basis for action.	8
Strong leaders are required in the political, military and civil dimensions – the three legged stool.....	10
Bad leaders must go.	11
The selection, training and education of leaders for irregular warfare is critical.....	13
Quo vadis?	14
Notes.....	15

British Leaders and Irregular Warfare

By David Benest

In his recent book,ⁱ General Sir Rupert Smith claims that 'industrial warfare', as experienced in both world wars and subsequently in many regional conflicts, is over. It has been replaced by a new paradigm in warfare - 'war among the people.' This is not necessarily asymmetric warfare, though it might be, but it represents his own experience in former Yugoslavia as commander of UNPROFOR and as General Officer Commanding (GOC) Northern Ireland. The Senior Fellow at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom similarly claims that we are facing a revolution in the nature of conflict.ⁱⁱ

Both of these assertions are open to question. 'Industrial war' (or regular war) has not disappeared and nor will it, in Colin Gray's viewⁱⁱⁱ. And to see 'war among the people', or irregular war, as a new phenomenon simply ignores a swathe of conflicts 'among people' that have occurred throughout the twentieth century. In both respects, Colin Gray is surely closer to the truth: regular warfare has been part of the human condition for a very long time and there is no reason to believe that it has ceased to exist. Yet whatever the rights and wrongs of these conflicting views, both authors are equally of the opinion that irregular war **is** here to stay.

Accepting the premise that irregular warfare is not a new phenomenon and is as likely to be enduring, this chapter explores the British experience of leadership in irregular warfare throughout the past century. In doing so, it draws on an unparalleled and vast experience of irregular war, including South Africa^{iv}, Ireland^v, the mandates of Mesopotamia and Palestine^{vi}, India, Egypt, the colonies of Malaya^{vii}, Kenya, Cyprus^{viii} and Aden^{ix}, Borneo, Dhofar^x, Northern Ireland^{xi}, and now Iraq^{xii} and Afghanistan.

The focus throughout is on the role of leaders, both political, military and police leaders. Regarding definitions, much time and effort has been spent in attempting to distinguish between insurgency, terrorism, disorder, rebellion and wars of national liberation. This paper will simply emulate Colin Gray and stick to 'irregular war' as opposed to 'regular war' in reference to the above conflicts. They are typified by the characteristics Rupert Smith alludes to: they are generally of long duration; they involve the use of technology never designed for the situation; the media is ever present; the political aim is often obscure, or changing; sometimes there is no political 'solution' or exit strategy; regular forces are pitched against irregular; and the question as in all wars, is of whether the irregular's vision of the political future or that of the existing polity is to prevail.

The paper deliberately focuses on the 'British Way' in countering irregular war on grounds that it is unique, reflecting upon British culture, educational system, religion, rule of law tradition and liberal democracy, open to scrutiny by a free press. Hence, the personality, character and behaviour of, say, Gerard Templer in Malaya in 1952 or Rupert Smith in Northern Ireland in 1996 can be compared and contrasted but they have more in common than that which sets them apart. The leaders considered have all passed through a process of selection, education and training that has changed little over time, typified by the British public school ethos, our officer training establishments, especially the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, the Staff Colleges, regimental system and a selection process for senior command that has remained more or less constant.^{xiii}

This paper suggests that a study of our past, and in particular the actions or inactions of past leaders, can illuminate the present. Five key themes are identified:

- The moral and legal dilemmas for leaders in regular war have always been acute, but leaders countering irregular war face particularly demanding challenges, requiring a strong ethical and moral 'compass' as a guide to policies and action.
- A strategy is required to win irregular wars but theories and doctrine for this challenge pale into insignificance when compared to the influence of leaders.
- Strong leaders are required in the trinitarian spheres of the political, military and civic power, primarily the police – the three legged stool.
- British leaders have often been of the highest quality but not always. Yet there appears to have been a reluctance to remove bad leaders.
- Whilst the training and education of leaders for countering irregular warfare is critical, prior selection is paramount.

Leaders in irregular warfare face acute ethical and legal dilemmas.

The 'British way' in irregular warfare has always been upheld by the principle of minimum force to achieve the stated aim. This is itself a reflection of the common law status under which soldiers are required to operate – the armed citizen in uniform - whose every action is accountable in law, who must decide for himself the level of force required to resolve a violent situation. For the most part, the soldier has managed to live, uncomfortably maybe, on this tightrope above the legal precipice. Yet, excessive force has been applied by leaders from time to time in circumstances that have attracted abhorrence and condemnation from the media, from both houses of parliament and internationally. This was as much the case in the period of guerrilla warfare in South Africa between 1900-1902^{xiv} as it was at Amritsar in 1919, in Cyprus from 1955-59, in Aden 1967, in the early period in Northern Ireland and most recently in the context of the mistreatment of detainees at Camp Breadbasket in Iraq. The issue facing leaders, therefore, has been of how to prosecute a war among the people without actually effecting their destruction, loss of civil liberty, humiliation or starvation and without incurring public vilification; in some circumstances, an impossible dilemma.

The provocations faced by regular forces in irregular warfare have often been contrary to all standards of decency and civilised behaviour. Terrorism as a political act aims, after all, to terrorise. The conduct of security forces in the face of such challenges has required a degree of patience and restraint not usually associated with regular warfare. In most circumstances the 'moral compass' required of leaders has provided the necessary constraints on behaviour, in that most leaders are guided in their actions by an acute sense of what is right to do and of that which defines the limits of acceptability. Yet when, as has happened, the compass becomes unstable, the consequences of excessive behaviour on the part of the regular forces have usually been very serious and of long term consequence - indeed, still with us today in the context of Ireland, where the 'martyrs of 1916' are remembered as such.

This is not to say that British leaders have a poor reputation in this respect – quite the opposite, when compared to many other states. Yet there have been failures, and although these have tended to be immersed in the mire of forgotten history, they deserve our attention. The actions of Rex Dyer at Amritsar;^{xv} by junior commanders such as Major Percival in Ireland in 1920, "still remembered in Ireland as a vicious sadist, the man responsible for the 'Essex Battalion Torture Squad', the man who had personally 'taken a rifle with fixed bayonet from one of the troops and bayoneted one man ten times"^{xvi} (he was later to surrender to many more Japanese bayonets in Singapore); the Blair incident in Palestine^{xvii}, where a young captain was ordered to search a village and place a number of suspect Palestinians in the open under arrest - they subsequently died of heat exhaustion – and was held accountable rather than the brigadier who had given the order in the first place; the atrocities committed in the detention camps in Kenya,^{xviii} most notoriously at Hola when 10 Mau Mau were murdered, the event covered up; the beatings of pro-EOKA civilians following terrorist attacks in Cyprus^{xix} in the 1950s, as well as the courts martial of Captain G O'Driscoll of the Intelligence Corps and Lieutenant R A C Linze of the Gordon Highlanders over interrogation methods;^{xx} the 'Snowball pitchfork murders' in Northern Ireland; and excessive treatment of detainees in Iraq. Today's critics who claim that 'modern society' should be blamed for recent unethical behaviour in Iraq would do well to reflect on the enduring frequency of such incidents. In essence, the ethical standards expected of the armed forces of British society of 1906 differ little from those of 2006. The media was as 'intrusive' then^{xxi} as now, and rightly so.

It cannot be emphasised enough that these episodes of ill-discipline were exceptions to the rule. And the propensity to ignore or disclaim such behaviour may have been understandable in the context of a crisis where loss of life was all too frequent and loyalty to the greater cause seemed to preclude outright condemnation and disciplinary action. Equally, the effect can and usually is felt at the strategic level.

Leaders make the real difference: theory and doctrine merely provide a basis for action.

The British experience of irregular warfare has been tainted by the experience of one particular (and successful) counter-insurgency. Malaya is often quoted as 'how to do' counter-insurgency for a number of reasons. First, geography favoured the counter-insurgent forces: there was no secure border from behind which the Malay Peoples Liberation Army (MPLA) could operate (though Chin Pen did use the border for purely sanctuary purposes in the latter stage of the conflict) and the peninsula of Malaya could be patrolled by the Royal Navy to interdict arms and supplies. Instead, it was confined to the jungle fringes and, after the relocation of squatters, to the jungle itself – a hostile environment for all involved. Secondly, the offer of independence upon cessation of the insurrection removed the main impetus to fight. Thirdly, the ethnic composition of the insurgent was itself a defining issue, with little support from the majority indigenous Malay people. Fourthly, there was no external support from the communist bloc, as was to be the case in Korea and Vietnam. Fifthly, it was possible to bribe the leaders to come out, and many did.^{xxii}

Indeed, it was the experience of Malaya that led to the 'Thompson principles' which have served as a doctrinal construct ever since: "the government must have a clear political aim; the government must function in accordance with law; the government must have an overall plan; the government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrillas; and in the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first."^{xxiii} Yet from 1948 to 1951 these principles alone were insufficient to bring about success.

It was the then Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, who, following his visit to Malaya in 1951, put his finger on the missing ingredient for success in his famous note to the Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttleton:

Dear Lyttleton,

MALAYA

We must have a plan.

Secondly, we must have a man.

When we have a plan and a man, we shall succeed: not otherwise.

Yours Sincerely,

Montgomery (F.M.)^{xxiv}

He was of course referring to the previous failures of leadership in the shape of the Governor Sir Edward Gent, and the demise of the head of police, Colonel W Nichol Gray. General Briggs had supplied the plan, itself the key to success, not the 'Thompson principles', which were in any case an exercise in post event rationalisation rather than the basis for policy at the time. But it was Templer who was that man – the missing ingredient. Templer refused to make any plan of action until he had actually arrived in Malaya to see for himself what was required to be done, nor was he in any sense driven by doctrine. Yet he had a strength of character of immense proportions, a determination to succeed against all odds, the will to remove any obstruction to progress and yet a sense of humanity that was apparent to all. In the words of Sir Robert Thompson, 'To achieve great things it is often necessary, as it was in Malaya, to be fairly ruthless and to take tough decisions. It is the measure of Templer's greatness that he was able to retain the devotion and respect of everyone.'^{xxv} Templer's record in leadership remains an outstanding one. His reform of the police, the introduction of the district committee structure, his equal opportunities policies over race, his technical innovations such as the introduction of helicopters and the cessation of jungle bombing, all played their part. But above all it was his personal qualities that deserve attention.^{xxvi}

Strong leaders are required in the political, military and civil dimensions - the three legged stool.

"When I first arrived in August 1948, the police and the military forces in Malaya at that time...were facing an armed insurrection...However, as always in these situations – it happened in Palestine, it happened in Malaya, it happened in Kenya, it happened in Cyprus – there was a lot of reorganization, training and retraining to be done, new equipment to be acquired, new brains to be acquired, new systems to be worked out and applied and of course the basic method of correlating the activities of the administration, army and police so that there was a maximum push against the adversary. The three-legged stool system, it's called by so many so often. All these things had to be learnt the hard way."^{xxvii}

The elements of the three – legged stool that Catling is referring to with respect to war, are the people, the commander and his army, and the government. This exemplifies the essentially trinitarian and Clausewitzian^{xxviii} nature of the relationship between leaders in countering irregular warfare. As with all warfare, it is impossible to divorce the military from the political and civil. Crucially, the interrelationship between the respective leaders creates the conditions for success and for failure.

Such a successful trinity arose in the context of Northern Ireland around 1996-7. It was at a time of 'coercive diplomacy' between the Provisional IRA and the government and security forces of the United Kingdom, with the IRA's South Armagh sniper team fully active in what is known as 'Bandit Country' on the border with the Republic of Ireland.^{xxix} The quality of leadership in place at the highest level was most impressive: General Rupert Smith as GOC, Ronnie Flannigan as Chief Constable and Sir Patrick Mayhew as Secretary of State. Policemen and soldiers of all ranks were made to feel that each was known to these individuals personally and that much was expected of them. It was a relationship of mutual respect. By way of example, the Commanding Officer of the Armagh Roulement Battalion received a call from the GOC stating his intention to fly around all bases in South Armagh on Xmas day to wish the soldiers well. The CO demurred, stating that he had already planned that there would be no helicopter activity that day within the TAOR – his own limited contribution to 'hearts and minds'. Rupert Smith immediately conceded the point. In truth, over a six-month period, these three gentlemen (they all fitted the term admirably) were almost the only visitors with whom that CO^{xxx} felt comfortable. They understood what he was trying to do and supported him when, as happened on 12 February 1997, Lance Bombardier Stephen Restorick was murdered by the South Armagh sniper team, the last(?) British soldier to fall victim to Irish Republican terrorism.

It is equally true that strong leadership is required at every level of command in Irregular War. The inappropriate action of even a lance corporal can have far reaching consequences. This in turn leaves open the question to which extent mission command can actually be applied in these circumstances. Mission command was certainly being applied in Northern Ireland in the early days but has long been superseded by standing instructions and rigid control measures that in effect, have rendered its application meaningless, whatever the doctrine might suggest to the contrary.

Bad leaders must go.

The record of success of British leaders in bringing irregular wars to an overall conclusion to advantage cannot be doubted. Yet on occasions, they have failed. The reasons may be diverse:

- a lack of decisiveness or integrity.
- an inability to communicate.
- lack of professional knowledge.
- little humility.
- no capacity for innovation or the will to experiment.
- a lack of vision or aspiration.
- or inability to develop and lead a team.

The qualities cited here are not arbitrary. Rather, they were derived from a survey of all officers of the rank of brigadier or equivalent across the British Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force in 2004 and were deemed desirable by between 80% to 100% of those surveyed^{xxxix}.

Yet when leadership has so obviously failed, there has been a marked reluctance to lance the boil by removing the officer. Take Herbert Kitchener, who is on record as probably one of the most incompetent chiefs of staff the British Army has ever fielded. He interfered in the chain of command with disastrous consequences at the battle of Paardeberg in February 1900, when the British Army lost more men killed in a single day against the Boers than it was to lose in 35 years in Northern Ireland. He became known as 'Kitchener of Chaos' after the abortive attempts of Roberts and Kitchener to reform the Army's transport and logistics structure in 1901. As Commander in Chief he inflicted untold suffering upon thousands of Boer women and children through his 'sweep and scour' strategy and concentration camps. That he won the war against the Boers has not been in dispute. But the political price of doing so in the manner he chose was manifest.^{xxxix}

The behaviour of the political, civil and military leaders in Ireland during the war of independence^{xxxix} provides a similarly depressing tale. The combination of French as Governor, the lead in matters political, Neville McCreehy as CinC, the lead in matters military, and Henry Tudor as head of the Royal Irish Constabulary, was to provide perhaps the most infamous illustration available in our history of a three-legged stool that became literally legless. There is no doubt that this trio achieved the military defeat of the Irish Republican Army by late 1921, even if they did not realise that they had. Yet in so doing they created a political crevasse so deep and wide as to guarantee Irish independence and a 'war of liberation' of the north to last the remainder of the 20th century, only declared 'over' on 28 July 2005.

The same could be said of Kenya during the Mau Mau rising of 1952. The leader of the British regular forces garrisoning the colony, Major General 'Looney' Hinde, had himself been removed from brigade command in Normandy in 1944. As a general he had 'gone native' in his collusion with the white highlanders, themselves the root cause of the Kikuyu rising. The police were utterly corrupt, and largely remained so, despite the arrival of Arthur Young, former Commissioner of the London City Police and exemplar of police reform in Malaya under Templer. The toleration of levels of corruption within the Kenya Police Reserve were such that he resigned his post, though his reasons for doing so were themselves deemed too sensitive for public consumption.^{xxxiv}

Something similar occurred in Aden^{xxxv} in the summer of 1967 when Lieutenant Colonel Collin Mitchell arrived on the scene. It was not that Mitchell was a weak leader. He had served as a platoon and company commander in several counter-insurgency campaigns and was thus experienced and highly respected by his 'jocks'.^{xxxvi} nor that he was unsuccessful in the reoccupation of Crater in early July 1967. His insubordination was another matter. He was a self-publicist who harnessed the media to his own ends as opposed to those of policy, which was one of 'low profile' in the conduct of operations in Aden's Crater district. He encouraged 'Argyll law' in Crater at a time when secret negotiations with the various terrorist groups over achieving a peaceful withdrawal from Aden were ongoing, placing the strategy in grave danger of compromise as a consequence of the behaviour of his soldiers. In mitigation, he was not made aware of the secret talks but nevertheless, he was blatantly disobedient to his GOC, Major General Philip Tower, and was interviewed 'without coffee' with his CinC. Yet it was deemed inexpedient to remove him from office, as might have been expected. Following his resignation he wrote articles in the Sunday Express excoriating the Middle East chain of command for its alleged weaknesses,^{xxxvii} thus gaining fame and even martyrdom where neither was applicable. But he was regarded as a national hero, whose eventual resignation was to be notified to the House of Commons, a government spokesman remarking, "The Army needs 'Mad Mitches', but too many of them would be an embarrassment."^{xxxviii}

The selection, training and education of leaders for irregular warfare is critical.

The process of selection of leaders has been anachronistic and, one could say, typically British. Political leaders have been selected on the basis of party politics and by popular vote rather than any proven ability to lead in crisis. Those assigned as governors or high commissioners have usually followed a career path in the colonial office, or today, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, where political acumen rather than leadership are the desired qualities. Police leaders have been, until comparatively recently, schooled in the military. Training for senior command in the armed forces was only initiated in 1989 when the Higher Command and Staff Course was created, the selection of attendees based solely upon the annual reporting system.

Despite the fact that British forces have been involved in Irregular War for the past century, surprisingly little time is actually devoted to the study of Irregular War within the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. It is, of course, fair to say that the 'university of life' should not be dismissed lightly. Individuals such as Bernard Montgomery had experienced irregular warfare as a brigade major in Ireland^{xxxix} prior to command of one of the two divisions deployed in Palestine by the late 1930s^{xl} and was thus able to grasp the issues associated with the Malaya emergency as CIGS in 1951. Templer too had learnt much from his experience in Palestine. General Sir Rupert Smith had served in Northern Ireland as a patrol company commander in South Armagh, and again with distinction as a company commander.

Quo vadis?

Whether one agrees with Rupert Smith that 'war among the people' is the new defining paradigm or with Colin Gray that we have been fighting these types of wars for years, it can safely be assumed that this form of warfare is not going to go away. There does therefore appear to be a reasonable case for a re-examination of how to select, educate and train future leaders for this type of conflict.

Yet, as has been seen, the British selection process has proved to be deeply flawed in some circumstances. The Army recognised this as an issue in 1994 when the Officer Assessment Study (OAS) was initiated by the then Military Secretary, Major General Hayman-Joyce, following some notable failures in operational leaders. OAS set out to review the means of selection for strategic leaders at one star and above and examine alternatives, if the system in place was thought to be in need of improvement. Regrettably, the study was 'buried' and the only change to business has been the Officers Joint Appraisal Report (OJAR), applied across the three services.

In an age of simulation and IT, it should be relatively easy to devise a means of selection for those aspiring to cope with the conditions so often associated with irregular threats at the strategic level. Such a means of training, though not of selection, for civil leaders is under procurement under the aegis of the 'Gold Standard Trainer' to be situated at the Emergency Planning College, Easingwold from 2007 so as to improve upon civil contingencies crisis management. In a similar timeframe, the Defence Capability Centre (DCC) is being built within the Defence Academy to allow experimentation, education and training of officers in Network Enabled Warfare. These are well and good in their own right but leave unanswered the crucial question of whether the strategic leader will actually be capable of coping 'when the wheel falls off' to use a very experienced ex-police officer's^{xli} excellent analogy. Perhaps it is time that those seeking strategic leadership roles are actually assessed for their abilities in this vital area **prior** to appointment. How this might be achieved is itself open to question but surely deserves attention.

Notes

1. General Sir Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force – The Art of War in the Modern World*, London, Allen Lane Penguin, 2005.
2. Lecture to Cranfield University and Defence Academy 'Understanding Islam' Conference 29 Sep 05
3. Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century – Future Warfare*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005.
4. See for example, Thomas Pakenham, *The Boer War*, Abacus, Great Britain, 1979, pp 461-578; and Philip Warner, *Kitchener – The Man Behind the Legend*, London, Cassell, 2006, pp 108-139.
5. See, for example Charles Townshend, *Easter 1916 – The Irish Rebellion*, London, Allen Lane, 2005; and *The British Campaign in Ireland 1919-1921*, Oxford Historical Monographs, OUP, 1975.
6. On Palestine, see John Baynes, *The Forgotten Victor – General Sir Richard O'Connor*, London, Brassey's, 1989, pp 48-64; and Nigel Hamilton, *Monty – The Making of a General 1887-1942*, London, Hamlyn, 1982, pp 280-306.
7. On Malaya, see Richard Stubb *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960*, Eastern University Press, 2006.
8. For the less well known campaign of 1931 see Major General Sir Charles W Gwynn, *Imperial Policing*, MacMillan, London, 1934 pp 331-366; for an insurgent's view of British leaders in 1954-59 see Doros Alastos, *Cyprus Guerrilla – Grivas, Makarios and the British*, Heinemann, London, 1960.
9. On Aden, see Jonathan Walker, *Aden Insurgency – The Savage War in South Arabia 1962-67*, Staplehurst, Spellmount, 2005.
10. See Ian F W Beckett and John Pimlott (Eds), *Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency*, 1985, pp 16-46.
11. One of the best accounts is Richard English's *Armed Struggle – The History of the IRA*, London, Pan Books, 2003. See also my chapter on 'Aden to Northern Ireland' in Hew Stachan (Ed), *Big Wars and Small Wars – The British Army and the Lessons of War in the 20th Century*, London, Routledge, 2006, pp 115-144.
12. See Richard Holmes, *Dusty Warriors – Modern Soldiers at War*, Harper Press, 2006; and Tim Collins, *Rules of Engagement – A Life in Conflict*, Headline, 2005.
13. See Major St John's KCL Defence Fellowship Paper 2006 for a critical assessment of the efficacy of this process.
14. Pakenham, *op cit*.
15. Nigel Collett, *The Butcher of Amritsar – General Reginald Dyer*, Hambledon and London, 2005
16. Hamilton, *op cit*, p160-1.
17. Baynes, *op cit*, pp 48-64.

18. See both David Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged – Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005; and Caroline Elkins, *Britain's Gulag – The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya*, Pimlico, 2005.
19. Hugh Grant, *A Game of Soldiers – Diary of a National Serviceman 1957-1960*, Beaulieu Books, 2001.
20. Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1978, p 179.
21. See Warner, *op cit*, for Kitchener's criticism of the press campaign against him by the *Daily Mail*.
22. See Bryan Hunt's *The Structure of Intelligence in Counter Insurgency in Post War Malaya*, Clare College Cambridge Jul 2005 and Kumar Ramakrishna's 'Bribing the Reds to Give Up: Rewards Policy in the Malayan Emergency', *War in History* 2002 pp 332-353.
23. See John Nagl's *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife – Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, University of Chicago Pres, 2005, p 29.
24. See John Cloake, *Templer – Tiger of Malaya: The Life of Field Marshal Sir General Templer*, London, Harrap, 1985, p 201.
25. Sir Robert Thompson, *Make for the Hills, Memories of Far Eastern Wars*, London, Leo Cooper, p 103.
26. For an overview of the doctrinal/lessons learned approach, see Thomas R. Mockaitas, *British Counter-Insurgency in the Post Imperial Era*, Manchester University Press, 1995, pp 133-151.
27. British Colonial Officer Sir Richard Catling, IWM DSR 10392/9 (1988), pp 35-36.
28. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Trans & eds), Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Princeton University Press, 1976, p 89.
29. For a wider exposition on operations in this area, see Toby Harnden, *Bandit Country – the IRA and South Armagh*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1999
30. Lieutenant Colonel DG Benest MBE, CO 2 PARA 1994-97
31. Defence Leadership Centre Strategic Leadership Survey 2004
32. See Pakenham *op cit* and also Field Marshal the Lord Carver *The National Army Museum Book of The Boer War*, Pan Books, 1999
33. Townshend, *op cit* and in Ronald Haycock (Ed), *Regular Armies and Insurgency*, London, Croom Helm, 1979, pp 32-53
34. David Anderson, *op cit*, p 305; and Elkins, *op cit*, p 352.
35. Walker, *op cit*.
36. Walker, *op cit*, p 221.
For a remarkably similar episode, see Tim Collins, *op cit*.
Walker, *op cit*, p 294.
Hamilton, *op cit*, pp 149-163.
Hamilton, *op cit*, pp 280-307.
41. Tony Moore, Cranfield University Resilience Centre, RUSI lecture 27 Sep 05.