C2 and Leadership

The UK’s C2 set-up is partially a result of our past experiences.  Winston Churchill believed that everything that had gone before him made it his destiny to lead the British people to victory in WWII; he described this achievement as his 'walk with destiny', for which he had spent all his life in preparation.  It was Churchill’s ability to precisely impart his intent with such clarity, simplicity and passion which galvanized the wartime coalition Government, the Armed Services and the British people.  During the Battle of Britain, ACM Sir Hugh Dowding directed operations from Fighter Command based at RAF Bentley Priory; but history tells us there was a disagreement between Dowding and AVM Park (AOC 11 Group) and AVM Leigh-Mallory (AOC 12 Group).  11 Group and 12 Group operated in fundamentally different ways, despite having the same Air picture and the same aim.  The outcome of the Battle of Britain may not have been the same if the tactics employed by the less responsive 12 Group (who needed considerable time to form up the ‘Big Wing’ formations) were used at the outset over south east England.  There appeared to be a lack of control from Dowding over Park and Leigh-Mallory, in that he did not exercise his authority in a robust and clear manner.

Decision Making

Throughout the staff ride the importance of Intelligence to the C2 process was a recurrent theme.  However, it is not simply the possession of Intelligence, but what you do with it that matters.  Had the British Armed Services not had such an effective working relationship, then its highly integrated dissemination and filtering of information, which informed the mission planning process, would have meant that the capability of our aircraft and quality of our aircrew would have been less relevant than it was.  It was the timely action against the incoming Luftwaffe that enabled victory.  In contrast, the German Armed Forces had a spectacular failure in terms of gathering and interpreting intelligence; they clearly underestimated the British Armed Services capability.

Responsiveness

A clear understanding of the nature of the command chain, and the authority relationships within it, enables crucially concise and timely operational decisions to be made.  Today, No 9 Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC 9) at RAF High Wycombe has an Air Policing Role which requires information to be filtered efficiently and effectively, especially if the UK mainland is to avoid a devastating attack such as that during 9/11.  The ability to manage complexity, ambiguity and political friction from numerous angles means it is important for key personnel in the C2 chain to communicate and consult effectively; in short, today’s decision maker has less time to respond to ensure a suitable outcome.

Technology

Finally, Churchill stated that ”We shall not fail or falter; we shall not weaken or tire...Give us the tools and we will finish the job.”  Technology was, and still is, seen as a key enabler if used properly.  Typhoon will provide greater options, and its planned multi-role capability will ensure greater flexibility and agility.  However, the weakest link will, as ever, be the human factor.  We need to recruit, train, educate and retain the right people and concentrate money and brains on developing new technologies (such as that to support a Network Enabled Capability) and an even more integrated Joint approach.